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It seems as if the so-called “Indian Wars” of US continental expansion continually haunt 
the US military. Consider just a few examples: American soldiers in the Philippine-American 
War celebrated many of their commanders as “Indian fighters.” Marines in the Vietnam War 
regularly referred to enemy territory as “Indian Country.” And in 2011, Operation Neptune Spear 
resulted in the death of terrorist Osama Bin Laden, whose mission codename, “Geronimo,” 
referred to a famous Apache chief. In an effort to make sense of these resonances, this 
dissertation investigates how the violence of North American continental expansion has shaped 
the US military from the nineteenth century to the present. What emerges is the story of how 
colonialism became embedded in the US military, particularly within the realm of what is now 
known as counterinsurgency warfare. Counterinsurgency, as practiced by the United States, is as 
much about cultural attitudes towards those defined as insurgents as it is about applying a 
technical form of warfare, and those attitudes, I argue, have colonial roots.   
Using military records, strategic manuals, battlefield reports, and literary texts, I explore 
how the process of continental expansion positioned Native people as “insurgents” in their own 
homelands, subjecting them to indiscriminate, biopolitical violence. Most critical work on 
counterinsurgency and the biopolitics of warfare focuses on the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. However, if we turn our attention to the violence that accompanied US continental 
expansion, colonialism emerges as a key site for the development of biopower, which manifested 
in what I call “euthanasia politics.” Euthanasia politics names a specific moment in the history of 
US colonialism when a growing imperative to manage Native life was combined with an 
increasingly indiscriminate approach to military violence. To these overlapping forms of state 
power was added the colonial nostalgia of the “vanishing Indian,” the presumption that Native 
people’s extinction was inevitable.  
At the end of the nineteenth century the “Indian Wars” went global as the US acquired 
overseas territories following the Spanish-American War. Charting these transnational 
connections, I show how American soldiers in the Philippines imagined themselves as “Indian 
fighters” and instituted tactics that had been honed in the plains and deserts of the western United 
States. These imaginative references to the frontier would continue to define what I refer to as 
America’s “counterinsurgency culture,” a national mythology shaped out of a range of colonial 
discourses that simultaneously valorized the nation’s revolutionary origins while consistently 
opposing the self-determination of others. As forms of proto-counterinsurgency (and later, 
outright counterinsurgency) emerged as the continual subtext to US military action, the 
formative experience of continental expansion became embedded in the US military, the origin 
story of a counterinsurgency-culture. Almost every US conflict since has been, at least partially, 
imagined as an “Indian War.” The violence of continental expansion has left such an enduring 
imprint on military culture that contemporary theorists of counterinsurgency warfare study the 
Indian Wars for strategic insight into the ongoing War on Terror. This dissertation reflects on 
what it means for the conquest of Native peoples to be thought of as a success that can be used as 





Introduction: Geronimo EKIA 
On May 2nd, 2011, President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and other 
members of the United States national security team sat in the White House situation room. In 
tense silence they listened as CIA director Leon Panetta narrated the unfolding of Operation 
Neptune Spear, a mission targeted at long sought after Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden. When 
the Special Forces operatives reached the target, Panetta reported that “we have a visual on 
Geronimo,” and after a few minutes he proclaimed “Geronimo EKIA.” Geronimo, the name 
given to Chiricahua Apache leader Goyahkla by his Mexican enemies, was code for Bin Laden, 
and the coded message that reported a successful mission was “Geronimo – EKIA,” or “enemy 
killed in action,” drawing a comparison that Fort Sill Apache Tribe chairman Jeff Houser would 
later call “painful and offensive.”1 The ensuing debate over the code-name controversy, which 
was taken up in newspapers, blogs, and the Senate committee on Indian Affairs, pointed to the 
enduring legacy of the so-called “Indian Wars,” those conflicts fought in the continental United 
States primarily in the second half of the nineteenth century. Geronimo has been held up as one 
of the most intractable, elusive, and dogged resisters of US continental expansion, the last 
famous Native leader to surrender. He has been variously represented as incurably savage, 
impossibly elusive, and unwaveringly cruel. In short, Goyahkla the person has been replaced by 
a representation, “Geronimo,” which has been appropriated to serve a variety of interests. As 
Richard King notes, “Goyahkla may have been captured in 1886, but images of him have always 
                                                 
1Karl Jacoby, “Operation Geronimo Dishonors the Indian Leader,” Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/10/opinion/la-oe-jacoby-geronimo-20110510. Native comedy troupe The 
1491’s have also produced a poem that criticizes the usage of “Geronimo” as a code for Bin Laden, repeating the 
refrain “Geronimo was not killed in Pakistan.”  
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been restless and liberated, living on long after his death in 1909 in the form of Geronimo.”2 
Geronimo has been both admired and reviled, but he has most consistently been imagined as an 
iconic enemy of the United States, feared while he still resisted and celebrated once gone.   
So why Geronimo, and why Bin Laden? The terror attacks of September 11th, 2001 
touched off the War on Terror, a massive worldwide military campaign so broad that definitions 
of the “terrorist” became increasingly fluid, applied to revolutionaries, militias, religious 
fundamentalists, and a host of enemies in a range of countries. The War on Terror made apparent 
that the conflicts of the United States are still understood in racial terms, as ethnic and religious 
groups were coded as “terrorist” and subjected at home and abroad to a range of disciplinary 
practices justified through wartime necessity. As Mahmood Mamdani argues, after 9/11 
terrorism was understood and explained as “Islamic,” reducing long and complex political 
histories down to cultural and racial essences.3 However, the War on Terror, like almost every 
American war, also saw the recycling of frontier mythologies and language that referenced 
conflicts with Native people. These representations still relied on race to make sense of the 
United States’ enemies, but did so using earlier racial formations from the era of continental 
expansion.4 Policymakers argued that “if the government of Iraq collapses… you’ve got Fort 
Apache in the middle of Indian country, but the Indians have mortars now.” Elsewhere the US 
Army published strategic papers that looked to campaigns against Apache Indians to help better 
                                                 
2 Richard C. King, Unsettling America: The Uses of Indianness in the 21st Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2013), 57. 
3 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 2004), 17-19. 
4 Nikhil Singh argues that the US has always connected war making and race making, from the frontier wars, to the 
imperial wars of the early twentieth century, to the world wars. See Nikhil Pal Singh, Race and America’s Long War 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), xii. María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo makes a similar, geographically 
focused argument in María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, Indian Given: Racial Geographies across Mexico and the 
United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016). See also: Jodi A. Byrd, The Transit of Empire: Indigenous 
Critiques of Colonialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).   
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wage war in Iraq and Afghanistan. And journalist Robert Kaplan wrote that “welcome to ‘Injun 
Country’ was the refrain I heard from troops from Colombia to the Philippines, including 
Afghanistan and Iraq. To be sure, the problem for the American military was less 
fundamentalism than anarchy. The War on Terrorism was really about taming the frontier.”5 
More than 100 years had passed since Goyakhla surrendered to the US army but somehow 
America was still fighting a global Indian war.  
Culture and Counterinsurgency 
“Indian Country” and similar characterizations draw on a long history of representations 
of Native people found in literature, media, and art. From the novels of James Fennimore Cooper 
to the cowboy movies of John Wayne, “savage” Indians have consistently been represented as a 
threat to the United States settler-colony, an inversion that serves to sanitize the history of 
conquest.6 These images function as what Gerald Vizenor calls “simulations,” constructs of 
Indianness that act as a fog, obscuring the political and cultural concerns of indigenous peoples.7 
At the same time, the U.S. military has a long history of using words and images referring to 
Indians to represent itself, from Apache helicopters to the paratroopers that shout “Geronimo” as 
they jump from airplanes.8 Indianness is deeply coded into the imagination of the US military 
(and American culture at large). Goyahkla’s resonance as the ultimate elusive enemy made him a 
likely candidate for deployment in the most high-profile mission of the War on Terror. However, 
                                                 
5 Stephen W. Silliman, “The ‘Old West’ in the Middle East: U.S. Military Metaphors in Real and Imagined Indian 
Country,” American Anthropologist 110, no. 2 (June 2008): 237–47, 240; Kendall D. Gott, In Search of an Elusive 
Enemy: The Victorio Campaign, 1879-1880 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004); Robert D. 
Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (New York: Random House). 
6 Robert F Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New 
York: Knopf, 1978); Philip Joseph Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
7 Gerald Robert Vizenor, Manifest Manners: Postindian Warriors of Survivance (Hanover: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1994), 6. 
8 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation (New York: Atheneum, 1992); Richard Drinnon, (Facing West: The 
Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 
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the usage of Geronimo as a code word was also a reminder that some the earliest experiences of 
the US military with irregular warfare were in conflicts with Native people resisting the 
imposition of US sovereignty. The image of the Indian casts a long shadow over the US military 
that solidifies whenever the words “guerilla” or “insurgent” are deployed in the service of 
empire. 
But what does it mean for an image or idea to solidify? What are these things we call 
“culture” and “discourse,” and how do they relate to the fingers on the triggers of guns, the hands 
that hold the torches used to burn villages? Culture has been defined in a myriad of ways: as the 
symbolic structures within a given society, as the glue that ties members of a group together (and 
determines who is outside the community), as the “common sense” ideologies that shape the 
beliefs and attitudes of individuals, and as a process, a set of meanings that continually shift over 
time, giving shape to social relationships and the material world.9 This dissertation offers both a 
cultural history attentive to the materiality of warfare, and a history of violence attuned to the 
ways culture shapes that violence. In that sense, culture, in this project, is both the symbolic 
terrain on which meaning is made, and the expression of cultural ideas in physical actions, 
objects, and events.  It is both the object and means of analysis, naming not only a complex web 
of meanings and actions, but the analytical category used to investigate that very web.10  
Cultural history, as a subfield that focuses on “language, identity, perception, and 
meaning making,” has much to offer in the analysis of the powerful images, ideas, and ideologies 
that have shaped US history.11 But that should not imply a separation from the physical or 
                                                 
9 My definitions here are drawn from Aaron B. O’Connell, Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps 
(Harvard University Press, 2014), Introduction; and Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the 
Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Introduction.  
10 Philip Joseph Deloria and Alex Olson, American Studies: A User’s Guide (Oakland: University of California 
Press, 2017), 6-9. 
11 James W. Cook, Lawrence B. Glickman, and Michael O’Malley, editors. The Cultural Turn in U.S. History: Past, 
Present, and Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3-58. 
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material expression of those ideas, the actions of individuals shaped by ideologies. When cultural 
ideas resonate they do so not only through language, but through bodies, through actions. These 
cultural ideas often take shape as a discourse, “a historically specific ‘structure of statements, 
terms, categories, and beliefs’ generated within a particular social and institutional context.” For 
example, we might think of “manifest destiny,” the nineteenth century belief that the United 
States’ continental expansion was divinely ordained, as a particular kind of colonial discourse. 
Mary Renda calls the process by which actors are shaped by discourse “cultural conscription,” an 
appropriately militaristic rendering of the linkages between culture, discourse, and action. 
Discourse, and the identities they play a role in shaping, are not unconstrained, but rather are 
produced in relation to specific structures of power.12 This project is most concerned with the 
enduring role that discourses of colonialism have played in shaping the culture and practices of 
the US military. 
Resonances of the frontier function as powerful discursive structures, making meaning 
out of violence and conscripting military action into a familiar narrative and form.13 They are 
metaphors that draw on the legacy of US colonialism to produce a potent ideological justification 
for the projection of US empire on a global scale. However, the reoccurring discourse of “Indian 
country” gestures towards an underlying continuity that is harder to track, a tactical legacy born 
from the United States’ earliest experiences with guerilla fighters. The processes of colonialism 
that resulted in the creation and expansion of the United States have often positioned Native 
people as insurgents, long before that word entered common usage. Consistently viewed as 
rebels in their own homelands, proto-insurgents to an unrealized US continental supremacy, the 
                                                 
12 Renda, Taking Haiti, 17-24; Nan Enstad, “Fashioning Political Identities: Cultural Studies and the Historical 
Construction of Political Subjects,” American Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): 745–82, 746. 
13 For a description of discourse and “cultural conscription” see Renda, Taking Haiti, 16-24. 
6 
 
conquest of Native people in North America is central to the history of counterinsurgency as a 
particularly imperial form of warfare. We might go as far to say that US history is typically 
conceived of as a counterinsurgency without naming it as such: an effort to impose political 
authority on a series of lawless and dangerous territorial acquisitions, from continental 
expansion, to the annexation and occupation of foreign territories, to the repression of urban 
resistance, to the global War on Terror. Out of this process emerged America’s unique 
“counterinsurgency-culture,” a national mythology shaped out of a range of colonial discourses 
that simultaneously valorized the nation’s revolutionary origins while consistently opposing the 
self-determination of others, continentally, internally, and globally. As forms of proto-
counterinsurgency (and later, outright counterinsurgency) emerged as the continual subtext to US 
military action, the formative experience of continental expansion and colonial warfare became 
embedded in the US military, the origin story of a counterinsurgency-culture. Almost every US 
conflict since has been, at least partially, imagined as an “Indian War.”  
The colonial origins of America’s counterinsurgency-culture have been largely 
unexplored due to the dearth of strategic material the US military produced specifically focused 
on Indian fighting. The same is true for counterinsurgency theory more generally, which has 
largely been the province of European writers grappling with the consequences of colonization 
and decolonization. In the twentieth century Europeans wrote the theory on counterinsurgency; 
Americans had already baked it into their national ideology.14 However, engaging the loose 
threads of counterinsurgent thinking in US history is crucial because it can help us to understand 
moments like this interaction during the congressional hearings on the My Lai massacre during 
the Vietnam War: 
                                                 
14 For a concise history of counterinsurgency literature see Laleh Khalili, Time in the Shadows: Confinement in 
Counterinsurgencies (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2012), 11-43. 
7 
 
Captain Robert B. Johnson: Where I was operating I didn’t hear anyone personally use 
that term [“turkey shoots”]. We used the term “Indian Country.”  
 
Congressman John Seiberling: What did “Indian Country” refer to?  
 
Johnson: I guess it means different things to different people. It is like there are savages 
out there, there are gooks out there. In the same way we slaughtered the Indian’s buffalo, 
we would slaughter the water buffalo in Vietnam.15 
 
When Captain Johnson says “in the same way we slaughtered the Indian’s buffalo, we would 
slaughter the water buffalo in Vietnam,” you can hear the unspoken subtext: in the same way we 
fought Indians, we fight the Vietnamese. Remember, this was in the context of congressional 
hearings on the most visible, but hardly unique, massacre of the Vietnam War, a massacre that 
resurrected the ghosts of Native people killed at Bear River, Sand Creek and Wounded Knee.16 
Captain Johnson is not only talking about how he imagined the Vietnamese; he is talking about 
how he fought them.  
How to chart these connections from Wounded Knee, to My Lai, to the War on Terror? 
The answer lies in the history of US colonialism, militarism, and particularly in the history of 
counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency, or COIN, is a form of warfare designed specifically to 
combat insurgency, defined by the US military’s field manual on counterinsurgency as “an 
organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of 
an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing 
insurgent control.”17 Insurgents often rely on guerilla warfare to combat the numerical and 
technical superiority of an occupying power. In turn, a counterinsurgency is the “military, 
                                                 
15 Silliman, “The Old West,” 237-247. 
16 For a full accounting of US-lead massacres in Vietnam, see Nick Turse, Kill Anything That Moves: The Real 
American War in Vietnam (New York: Picador, 2013). 
17 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 1-2. 
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paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to 
defeat insurgency.”18 A crucial distinction from other forms of warfare is that victory in 
counterinsurgency terms does not simply entail the destruction of an opposing army, but rather 
the pacification of resistance and the reincorporation of insurgent populations into a governing 
structure. Insurgents must be corrected, not simply defeated, a formulation that emphasizes the 
biopolitical aspects of counterinsurgency warfare.19 Military defeat (or the illusion of it – George 
W. Bush famously and prematurely declared “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq in 2003) often 
breeds “insurgency,” and military defeat of “insurgency” can further the grounds for resistance 
as fighters are dispersed and new recruits are mobilized. This may be why counterinsurgency 
strategies, ostensibly focused on “winning hearts and minds,” often veer back into the realm of 
total warfare as imperial militaries, unable to achieve anything resembling victory, reduce 
populations to the point of complete demoralization.   
However, while these definitions provide a useful baseline, they give little sense of the 
contested and shifting definitions of the insurgent that varying counterinsurgency policies have 
sought to suppress. Counterinsurgencies and the enemies marked as “insurgent” have always 
been fluid and shifting, subject to the imperial flexing of discursive power. They often remain 
submerged; the shadow-wars that have continuously occupied the United States despite a 
military history that tends to emphasize large-scale conflicts. In fact, the field manual on 
counterinsurgency was written to address the US military’s lack of institutional knowledge 
despite a history replete with efforts to repress and eliminate so-called insurgents. In the 
                                                 
18 US Army / Marines, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-2. 
19 Markus Kienscherf calls contemporary counterinsurgency a form of “modern biopolitical imperialism” in which 
humanity must be made secure from its own inherent threats. Markus Kienscherf, “A Programme of Global 
Pacification: US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Biopolitics of Human (In)security,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 
6 (December 1, 2011): 517-535; 522. 
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aftermath of the War on Terror the military scrambled to create both practical strategies and a 
usable history on which to draw, pivoting away from the perceived failures in Vietnam and a 
dominant narrative in which the military was chronically unable to learn from past experiences.20 
It is in this context that the “Indian Wars” have come to function as a military success story for 
the scholar-warriors of modern counterinsurgency theory.  
 While most histories of counterinsurgency warfare are concerned with the twentieth 
century, there has been an increasing effort by the US military in the last two decades to draw on 
the Indian Wars as a source of tactical insight, as examples of a successful counterinsurgency. 
Studies by both military professionals and historians often focus on the tactics of the militant 
late-nineteenth century tribes and their US Army opponents and seek to draw comparisons to the 
American campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 The arguments are largely concerned with 
demonstrating an example of success in counterinsurgency warfare, with saying “see, the US has 
effectively fought these sorts of conflicts before.” In essence, this work is concerned with 
asserting what counterinsurgency is, and how it can be more successfully applied to 
contemporary US military efforts.  
In contrast, this dissertation is concerned with where counterinsurgency comes from. The 
practices and ideologies of this form of warfare, at least in the US military, emerged in part from 
American colonial expansion. Counterinsurgency, as practiced by the United States, has been as 
                                                 
20 D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 4-6. 
21 Robert Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War 
(Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2008); Matthew J. Flynn, Settle and Conquer: Militarism on the 
American Frontier, 1607-1890 (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2016); Jeremy T Siegrist, Apache Wars: A 
Constabulary Perspective. (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012); Wesley M Pirkle, 
Major General George Crook’s use of Counterinsurgency Compound Warfare During the Great Sioux War of 1876-
77 (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2015); Ike Skelton, “America’s Frontier 
Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts,” Military Review July-August 2014; Kendall D Gott, In Search of an 
Elusive Enemy: The Victorio Campaign, 1879-1880 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004).  
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much about cultural attitudes towards those defined as insurgents as it has about applying a 
technical form of warfare. And those attitudes, and the accompanying tactics, I argue, have 
colonial roots. There may not be an unbroken chain of strategic continuity that links the 
nineteenth-century Indian Wars to the contemporary War on Terror. However, there is an ever-
lurking set of resonances, ideologies, and tactical gestures, utterances of America’s 
counterinsurgency-culture that find continual expression via ideas about Indians and Indian-
fighting. This dissertation is an argument for the centrality of colonialism to the broad arc of US 
history, particularly in the realm of military violence. There are undeniable continuities in the 
history of American violence that are bound together by that ever-present race war, the “Indian 
War,” simultaneously pervasive and invisible, a deep structuring narrative of US history.  
 In this effort I join a group of scholars from fields such as American Studies, Ethnic 
Studies, and History, who have turned a critical eye on the contours of US state violence, at 
home and abroad. In particular, there is an exciting body of emerging scholarship that examines 
the role of counterinsurgency in the interrelated histories of the Cold War, mass-incarceration, 
policing, and the War on Terror. 22 In conversation with this work, my research demonstrates the 
relevance of Native American history to the broader historiography of US empire by exploring 
the continuities between the violence of continental expansion and the increasingly global 
imperialism that was inaugurated with the Spanish-American War. These are connections that 
have remained elusive in the literature on US history. A handful of scholars have noted the 
                                                 
22 Recent meetings of the American Studies Association have featured a critical mass of panels investigating 
counterinsurgency and its relationship to The Cold War, the War on Terror, domestic policing, and other topics. 
Examples of this work include: Jordan T. Camp, Incarcerating the Crisis: Freedom Struggles and the Rise of the 
Neoliberal State (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016); Hannah Gurman, ed. Hearts and Minds: A 
People’s History of Counterinsurgency (New York: The New Press, 2013); Nick Estes. “Born on the Fourth of July: 
Counterinsurgency, Indigenous Resistance, and Black Revolt.” The Red Nation 
https://therednation.org/2017/07/04/born-on-the-fourth-of-july-counterinsurgency-indigenous-resistance-and-black-
revolt, (accessed December 18, 2018); Stuart Schrader, Policing Revolution: Cold War Counterinsurgency At Home 
and Abroad (Berkeley: University of California Press, Forthcoming). 
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repetition of words like “Indian Country” in Vietnam and the Middle East, or the presence of 
frontier veterans in the Spanish-American War, but this project is one of the first to 
systematically consider the relationship between continental expansion and ongoing US 
militarism.   
This intervention builds on the work of the “New Indian History,” a field that, as Richard 
White put it in his definitive book The Middle Ground, places “Indian peoples at the center of the 
scene” in an attempt to understand the reasons for their actions.23 This focus on “reframing” or 
“looking East from Indian Country” has allowed historians to re-read familiar source material 
minus the “Imperial biases” present in the archive, while exploring new stories that highlight 
Native actions and Native power. Historians have worked to move beyond what Vine Deloria Jr. 
called “the cameo theory of history” wherein “indigenous peoples make dramatic entrances, stay 
briefly on the stage, and then fade out.”24 To a large degree this enterprise has been successful, at 
least within Native American history.25 It is no longer possible to tell the story of the “American 
southwest” without paying equal attention to Comanche, Ute, Apache and O’odham people, in 
addition to Spanish colonists and Anglo-American settlers. Scholars of the antebellum Southeast 
have had to broaden their conceptual framing of “slavery” to incorporate Native participation 
and subjection to captivity and slavery. The “Great Lakes” are no longer the province of 
                                                 
23 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xxvii. 
24 Michael Witgen offers a deft re-reading of “Imperial” sources minus their biases in his work: Michael Witgen, An 
Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of 
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25 Scholars are less optimistic about US history writ large – much of the discussion at the 2013 Newberry Library 
Conference “Why You Can’t Teach American History Without Native American Studies” focused on the inability 
of historians in the field to destabilize the enduring myths of American history outside the discipline Native 
American History, where they are “preaching to the choir.” 
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voyageurs moving between villages of passive Native hunters, but are rather the geography of a 
“Native New World,” related to not subordinated to the “New World” of English and French 
settlements.26  
 While the New Indian history has proven a persuasive revision to the history of 
colonization in North America, it comes with its own set of problems. As Jeffrey Ostler writes in 
The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee, New Indian 
history “has deemphasized questions of power, ideology, and the state” in its valid attempt to 
focus more on the autonomy of Native people.27 On the one hand, playing down “power, 
ideology and the state” is sort of the point: New Indian history often argues that “the state,” i.e. 
the colonial state, is a far less potent force than historians have always assumed. However, 
Ostler’s criticism cannot be ignored given the ongoing colonial situation in North America. The 
settler-state is a far more comprehensive force in the twentieth century than the eighteenth or 
nineteenth. The stories that emphasize Comanche, Ute, and Ojibwe power, autonomy, and 
regional dominance in earlier centuries would not be the same if they extended into the twentieth 
century. So although Ostler’s concern about efforts to “minimize the vast imbalance of power 
between Native peoples and Europeans” misses the point in some examples of New Indian 
history, where a reframing of the balance of power is exactly the object, his criticism is a potent 
                                                 
26 Ned Blackhawk, Karl Jacoby and Julianna Barr have emphasized the participation, and even dominance, of Native 
people in the formation of what is now the American Southwest. See Ned Blackhawk, Violence over the Land: 
Indians and Empires in the Early American West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Karl Jacoby, 
Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of History (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); Juliana 
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University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Historians including Tiya Miles and Christine Snyder have radically 
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Miles, Ties That Bind the Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005); Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
27 Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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reminder of the vast mobilization of colonial violence following the Civil War, which, for Ostler, 
culminated in the massacre of hundreds of Lakota people at Wounded Knee in 1890. That same 
decade is when much of the scholarship on U.S. empire begins to focus on military violence, 
particularly the Spanish-American War. The result has been a partial separation of Native 
American history from the broader historiography on US empire. In large part this is a separation 
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a separation hinged by the year 1898 and the 
Spanish-American War, when some scholars have argued that the US moves overseas and 
becomes a colonial power for the first time.28 The conquest of Native people in North American 
typically functions as an analogy for some later instance of colonial conflict. Scholars of US 
empire frequently cite soldiers who liken their particular context, whether in Haiti, Cuba, the 
Philippines or Vietnam, to the “Indian Fighting” of the frontier, but leave these connections 
mostly unexplored.29 
The field of settler-colonial studies has proven an invaluable tool when exploring these 
very connections, as it offers a theoretical framework for analyzing the continuities of ongoing 
colonialism in the United States. In contrast to more extractive forms of colonialism premised on 
the acquisition of resources or the exploitation of labor (for example, many European colonies in 
Africa), settler-colonialism is a project of replacement, one that works to eliminate the 
                                                 
28 Although this separation isn’t pervasive – for example Matthew Frye Jacobsen’s Barbarian Virtues seeks to draw 
some minimal connections across the 1898 divide, it still emerges in the work on US Empire, often in a way that 
eclipses Native sovereignty. For example, Anne Foster’s Projections of Power argues that in 1898 U.S. imperialism 
changes into colonialism, with colonialism defined as the imposition of outside governments on acquired territories. 
In other words, Foster doesn’t think that U.S. continental expansion was the imposition of an “outside government,” 
effectively denying a preexisting Native sovereignty. See Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United 
States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001); Anne L. 
Foster, Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 2-3.  
29 This example is taken from Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti, but it shows up elsewhere, typically taking the form of an 
analogy both at the level of the source, i.e. what a soldier says, and at the level of the writer’s analysis, i.e. this 
instance of colonial violence is like that older instance of colonial violence. This frequent invocation of analogy has 
prevented, in my opinion, scholars from pursuing the seemingly deeper implications of these comparisons between 
“Indian Country” and overseas colonialism.  
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indigenous presence. Settlers establish new political entities, impose borders, and assert legal 
claims to territory.30 This makes the colonial process “a structure, not an event.”31  This 
eminently quotable formulation is a useful way to counteract histories that locate North 
American colonization somewhere in the “past,” not relevant to contemporary political issues 
and concerns.  The danger of this formulation is that settler-colonialism assumes a prior or 
foundational status as the determining effect on all relations in a colonized society. Everything 
reduces down to settler-colonialism, and the consequence has been a range of arguments that 
subordinate a variety of structures (gender, race, capitalism, sexuality…) to the determining 
effects of ongoing settler colonialism.  Additionally, this invitation to systemic analysis risks 
flattening out the interventions of the New Indian history. If settler-colonialism is a totalizing 
blanket that settles over the entire continent of North American sometime in the eighteenth 
century, then the stories of indigenous political autonomy, economic independence, and imperial 
power can become obscured.  
Attention to historical specificity should not foreclose the generative theoretical tools that 
settler-colonial studies offers. This dissertation has a wide-ranging chronology, and ongoing 
colonialism is the connective tissue binding the various chapters together. Military practices at 
the center of US global power emerged from the process of continental expansion, a settler-
colonial process that attempted to eliminate Native people from the land. “Elimination,” as 
Patrick Wolfe reminds us, can take different forms, including death, removal, and legal erasure 
or incorporation into the settler-state. What is consistent across the different forms of 
“elimination” is the attempted elimination of native sovereignty. Wolfe argues that “the 
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irreconcilable Native difference that settler polities seek to eliminate can be detached from the 
individual, whose bare life can be reassigned within the set of settler social categories, yielding a 
social death of Nativeness.”32 Settler-colonialism in the United States sought to transform Native 
people from an “Indian problem” to an internal problem, domesticating indigeneity through the 
administration of Native life that sought to subtract the “native” from the equation. Settler-
colonialism, like counterinsurgency, can both kill and transform, wielding military violence in 
one hand and biopolitical governance in the other hand. 
The Biopolitics of Counterinsurgency 
Rather than reading the Indian Wars backwards as an early example of counterinsurgency 
warfare, this project interrogates the politics that defined Native people as insurgents and 
explores how the specific processes of US continental expansion produced military doctrine and 
cultural meaning generative of this particularly American form of war. The nineteenth century 
military was both ambivalent about and preoccupied with Native people, deriding “savage 
warfare” yet committed to retaining control of Indian policy. By the end of the century however, 
the Army had developed a coherent program for Indian fighting. The Army exercised devastating 
violence alongside complex social and cultural controls as they worked to conquer people that 
were defined as insurgent in their own homelands. This biopolitical blend of governing and 
violence has since become central to how the modern US military wages counterinsurgency 
warfare. This dissertation will chart the emergence of a population-centric biopolitical militarism 
during the “Indian Wars” that laid a foundation for modern military and paramilitary practices. 
Most critical work on the history of counterinsurgency focuses on the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. In her excellent history of confinement in counterinsurgency, Laleh 
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Khalili argues that an emphasis on populations “distinguishes modern counterinsurgencies from 
their nineteenth-century predecessors. The emergence of population as a concept of study, 
warfare, and manipulation emerged most apparently in the mass incarceration of civilians in a 
number of twentieth and twenty-first century counterinsurgencies.”33 This dissertation will push 
back against Khalili’s chronology. Nineteenth century US Army officers were preoccupied with 
Native people as populations to be manipulated, confined, governed, and in some cases 
destroyed.  
Biopolitics refers to a political shift that theorist Michel Foucault locates in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, in which modern states became invested in life – its production, 
maintenance, proliferation and examination. “Populations” became the focus of governing 
power, particularly their productivity, health and reproduction. Where the older regimes of 
absolute sovereigns wielded a power to “take life or let live,” the new biopower instead exercised 
a power to “make live or let die.”34 In other words, power no longer intervened at the moment of 
taking a life, but rather took hold of life itself in an attempt to proliferate, regulate, and control 
it.35 However, as Foucault theorized this preoccupation of the modern state with life, he had to 
explain instances of horrific and large-scale death that these same modern states were engaged 
in. To explain the murderous effects of biopower he introduced the idea of state racism, which 
creates a caesura within the population between those who get to live and those who must die, 
those whose existence is conceived as a threat to the population. This inaugurates a military 
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relationship within the realm of biology – kill so you can live becomes a logic for entire 
populations, rather than for soldiers facing each other on the battlefield.36  
Theorizations of biopolitics have been invigorated in the twenty-first century, deployed to 
analyze increasing globalization, refined techniques of state surveillance, and the patterns of 
detention, torture, and racialized violence that characterize the War on Terror.37 Central to this 
scholarship has been Giorgio Agamben’s writing on the “state of exception.” Building off the 
work of Carl Schmidt and Foucault, Agamben shows how the power of the sovereign is defined 
by the ability to transcend the law; in other words, the sovereign maintains the law by reserving 
the power to exceed it. This gives the sovereign the power to render individuals or populations as 
“homo sacer,” bare life who are subject to the power of the sovereign but not included within the 
system of law that coalesces around the sovereign. Homo sacer was a person who, under Roman 
law, could be killed but not sacrificed; subject to death within the system but whose death was 
not a violation of the laws of that system. They were included through their very exclusion, 
occupying a state of exception. The contemporary example that animates Agamben is the US 
practice of indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” at places like Guantanamo Bay. These 
detainees exist at the threshold of the law, outside the protections of US or international law yet 
subject to US sovereign power.  
Scholars have noted Foucault’s lack of attention to questions of race, colonialism, and 
empire. As Ann Stoler shows, Foucault’s work on biopolitics was curiously inattentive to these 
questions, even as he helped develop tools to analyze them, notably through the above-
mentioned exploration of racism as foundational to modern states. Arguing that “race is not a 
subject marginal to Foucault’s work,” Stoler and others have shown how the histories of 
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colonialism and empire are a crucial part of the development of biopower.38 And for all his well-
documented blind spots regarding European colonialism, Foucault did claim that “racism first 
develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide.”39 Historians and 
theorists of race and colonialism have certainly expanded on the foundation laid by Foucault. 
Perhaps no investigation of colonial biopolitics has been as devastating Achille Mbembe’s work 
on “necropolitics.” Mbembe terms “necropolitics” those spaces where biopower, the state of 
exception, and what he calls the “state of siege” all converge with colonial regimes of racialized 
violence to produce “death worlds,” new and unique forms of social existence in which vast 
populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead.”40 
Under necropolitics entire populations are targeted with militarized state power, literally under 
siege.41  
Contemporary scholarship on questions of security, counterinsurgency, and development 
have also made use of biopolitics to understand how liberal states position the world as 
threatening and unstable, in need of governance and control. Jasbir Puar argues that modern 
regimes of biopower deploy “the racializing biopolitical logic of security,” in which “less than 
lethal” violence sits alongside a range of techniques used to manage and control marginalized 
communities.42 As states mobilize biopower to regulate, proliferate, and perpetuate (certain 
kinds) of life, populations billed as security threats are subjected to particular forms of violence, 
a fragmentation of the biological field along racial lines. Similarly, Jaclyn Pryor argues that a 
post-9/11 United States functions as a “security state” defined by the regulation and control of 
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bodies, borders, and populations through measures ranging from surveillance to outright 
violence. These biopolitical measures constitute what Foucault calls a “disciplinary society” in 
which subjects are required to conform out of necessity; the state is not simply invested in 
making subjects live, but live a certain way. Tweaking Foucault’s formulation, Pryor deftly 
utilizes “security state” as a sliding descriptor connoting both the forms of state-power devoted 
to security, as well as the affective states of fear and precarity marginalized communities are 
subjected to under regimes of (in)security.43 
The flurry of theory that utilizes biopolitics to analyze the War on Terror provides a set of 
tools for revisiting the “Indian Wars” and situating them in a long lineage of US militarism. We 
can reformulate Mbembe’s theory to show how the state of siege can work both ways. Mbembe 
uses the phrase to describe conditions under regimes of necropolitics, a “terror formation” of 
colonialism that combines biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege. Necropolitics 
draws our attention to the particular biopolitical violence of the colony, the space where racial 
violence intersects with bureaucracy. But an inverted “state of siege” has often been mobilized 
by colonizers to justify their own violence, portraying settlers as under a constant state of threat. 
These sorts of discourses have their roots in the ideologies of “defensive conquest” that defined 
US continental expansion. As Philip Deloria has shown, US settler-colonialism consistently 
reframed invasion as a defensive struggle in which settlers are always under attack, exemplified 
by the image of the surrounded wagon train. The settler “state of siege” defines Native space as 
threatening, making the transformation of Native territory into colonized space a necessary act to 
preserve life. Mbembe gestures towards this relationship, likening colonies to “frontiers” 
inhabited by “savages.” In these zones western norms governing wars between sovereign nations 
                                                 
43 Jaclyn Pryor, Time Slips: Queer Temporalities, Contemporary Performance, and the Hole of History. (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2017), 18-19. 
20 
 
do not apply, the distinctions between combatants and noncombatants are dissolved, and 
exceptional violence is viewed as operating in the service of “civilization.”  
The besieged-settler finds its current iteration in descriptions of a dangerous and 
undeveloped third world threatening the global liberal order. Brad Evans and Markus Kienscherf 
have shown how the wars, interventions, and occupations justified through references to security 
reframe older binaries of savage/civilized into one of developed/underdeveloped. 
Humanitarianism is then used to justify military intervention as societies are targeted for 
wholesale transformation in the name of global security. This is often explicitly biologized, as 
recalcitrant, resistant, or marginalized populations are rendered as contagions that must be cured 
by the counterinsurgency inoculation, securing humanity from its own inherent threats. And as 
much as contemporary counterinsurgents seek to highlight the humanitarian aspects of the 
practice—the Counterinsurgency Field Manual advises that “some of the best weapons do not 
shoot”—we should not forget that violence lies at the core of this form of warfare. According to 
Ben Anderson counterinsurgency acts as the bridge between war and development, advocating 
the killing of particular kinds of life, “insurgents that refuse the remedial logic of repair and 
improvement. Counterinsurgency is the point of contact, then, between two ways of dealing with 
what threatens—a will to improve life and a will to destroy life.” 44  
It is this space between improving life and destroying life that what I call the “euthanasia 
politics” of nineteenth-century Indian policy operated. What I am calling “euthanasia politics” 
names a specific moment in the history of US colonialism when a growing biopolitical 
imperative to manage Native life was blended with an increasingly indiscriminate approach to 
military violence. These overlapping forms of state power were combined with the colonial 
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nostalgia of the “vanishing Indian,” the presumption that Native people’s extinction was 
inevitable. The military’s obligation to Native people was, as General William Tecumseh 
Sherman put it, to hasten their “inevitable fate” with a “due regard to humanity and mercy.”45 
Managing extinction became a humanitarian act. This was not a necropolitics intended to 
maintain the racial terror of the colony; it was a euthanasia politics intended to usher Native 
people out of history. Central to this process was defining Native people as guerillas and 
insurgents – criminals rather than sovereign nations. This characterization normalized, 
simultaneously, the machinery of biopolitical management and tactics of indiscriminate violence.  
Leerom Medovoi, tracing the common genealogies of globalization and the War on 
Terror, details the expansion of biopolitical governance and the resulting collapse of liberalism’s 
traditional distinction between internal and external enemies. Globalization and the War on 
Terror both take the entire globe as their frame of reference, the target for biopolitical 
intervention.46 Similarly, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri show how biopolitical practices of 
security collapse divides between the foreign and domestic, between policing and militarization, 
by replacing “defense,” which focuses on external threats, with “security,” a constant militarized 
biopower that is global in form. Contemporary regimes of biopower, of which the United States 
is a crucial arbiter, take the entire globe as their object.  Building on Foucault’s formulation of 
the productive elements of power, Hardt and Negri show how the permanent state of exception 
created by the endless wars of the United States results in an imperialism “charged with the task 
of shaping the global political environment and thus to become a form of biopower in the 
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positive, productive sense.”47 Biopolitical logics of security attempt to shape the global 
environment through military and policing actions – increasingly, counterinsurgency – aimed at 
the transformation of life. Indeed, we might think of the endless war of the twenty-first century 
as a militarized biopolitical intervention targeted at the transformation and proliferation of 
(certain kinds of) life through military intervention.48 Hardt and Negri highlight, as others have, a 
“revolution in military affairs,” or RMA, that took hold following the end of the Cold War. The 
combination of rapid technological advancement in warfare, seemingly unquestioned US global 
dominance, and the likely end of large-scale conflicts resulted in a restricting of US military 
strategy towards air and naval superiority and a de-emphasis on the deployment of large numbers 
of ground forces. War becomes increasingly virtual and bodiless as incredible technological 
superiority (ideally) translates into a minimizing of risk for US soldiers. This creates, according 
to Hardt and Negri, newly biopolitical soldiers, able to not only kill, but to dictate for the 
conquered populations the cultural, legal, political, and security norms of life.”49 
This newly (or is it? More on that later…) biopolitical soldier has seen its greatest role in 
the revolution within the RMA, namely the shift towards counterinsurgency warfare undertaken 
by “insurgents” in the US military establishment such as General David Petraeus and Lieutenant 
Colonel John Nagl, the flashpoint of which was the publication of the aforementioned 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual.50 The very practices of counterinsurgency have been analyzed 
as biopolitical projects par-excellence, military actions that attempt to blend warfare into an 
alchemy of social, cultural, economic, and political actions.51 
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In the following chapters I will argue that the biopolitical dimensions of contemporary 
US counterinsurgency warfare—“development,” “population-centric,” “winning hearts and 
minds”—have both deep and precise origins in the violence that accompanied US continental 
expansion in the nineteenth century. Re-reading sources traditionally used to construct heroic 
portrayals of the frontier, I show how American soldiers positioned Native people as insurgent to 
US authority and subjected them to a militarized biopolitics that blended indiscriminate violence 
with mechanisms for governing populations. Most military histories of these conflicts gloss the 
so-called “Indian Wars” as an interlude between the Civil War and World War One, while 
critical scholarship on counterinsurgency and biopolitics tends to focus on the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. In contrast, I reconstruct how nineteenth century Army officers 
incorporated a politics of life and death into the machinery of militarized colonization. 
Ultimately, this written and experiential archive of proto-counterinsurgency would be used to 
devastating effect during the US occupation of the Philippines, though it did not become 
immediately codified in military doctrine. Despite this gap, I show how contemporary 
counterinsurgents have returned to the Indian Wars for insight into the ongoing War on Terror, 
questioning what it means for settler-colonialism to be thought of as a military “success.”  
Chapter Summary 
This project is divided into three sections that chronologically cover more than 200 years 
and span several continents. This breadth is balanced by a series of deep cuts into key moments 
of US militarism that help to render visible a history of the development of US 
counterinsurgency warfare as a particularly colonial form of violence. Part one, “Colonial 
Violence and the Indian-Fighting Army,” reconstructs the history of “Indian fighting” as a 
related set of strategic and ideological formations in the US military over the course of two 
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chapters. It locates the development of concepts that have been critical to the contemporary 
analysis of global militarism, including “security” and “population-centric warfare,” in the 
nineteenth century and the unique blend of civil-military power that was central to the expansion 
of the US settler-colony. This is a key part of the story about the emergence of militarized 
biopolitics, a story that has been recently emphasized in the context of twenty-first century 
counterinsurgency, but which actually has deeper roots. Part Two, “Indian-Fighter Culture and 
Global US Empire,” charts, in two chapters, how the tactics and ideologies of the Indian Wars 
moved overseas and influenced the expansion of America’s territorial possessions after the 
Spanish-American War, with an emphasis on the Philippines-American War. Part Three, 
“Indian-Fighters and the War on Terror,” surveys the fluid mobility of ideas and practices of 
Indian warfare during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It focuses on the expansion of a 
counterinsurgency-culture that has increasingly turned to lessons from the Indian wars to better 
prosecute the War on Terror.  
Chapter one charts the emergence of a codified doctrine of Indian fighting, a precursor to 
counterinsurgency warfare. As long as the United States has existed, Native people have 
functioned as an enduring example of insurgent fighters. But despite more than one hundred 
years of sustained conflict the US military was slow and hesitant to develop formal tactics or 
strategies, or to include “Indian Fighting” within the mainstream of military activity. These were 
“savage wars,” far removed from the sort of civilized combat of European states that the new 
nation sought to emulate. Indian-fighting tactics were relegated to the realm of cultural 
representation. They could be found in popular novels, and could be used to criticize one’s 
opponents (Civil War generals on both sides regularly accused their enemies of acting like 
Indians), but they did not find their way into Army doctrine. This is not to say that US military 
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officers thought little about Native people. In fact, soldiers penned hundreds of articles, essays 
and speeches advocating military solutions to the “Indian Question,” often demanding control of 
Indian Affairs even as they argued in the same breath that Native people were doomed to 
eventually disappear. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that a small number of strategic 
manuals appeared, and these advanced an approach to warfare that blended combat tactics with 
just the sort of governing apparatus military writers had advocated for. Native populations, not 
just warriors, had to be the target of military campaigns. It was not enough to defeat warriors on 
the battlefield. Native people had to be defeated and confined to reservations, where they could 
either fundamentally alter their social and cultural lives or wait out an inevitable extinction. The 
military wing of US settler-colonialism thus developed and practiced a form of warfare that 
blended civil governance with extreme violence, warfare aimed at either eliminating or altering 
entire groups of people. 
 The few military historians that have considered US colonialism tend to fit it into a story 
about the rise of total war. In a common version of this story generals like W.T. Sherman and 
Philip Sheridan normalized war against entire populations during the latter part of the Civil War. 
Sheridan, Sherman and their contemporaries then exported total war to the plains in the war’s 
aftermath and used these scorched earth tactics to drive Native people onto reservations, 
anticipating the extremities the twentieth century and two World Wars. However, this story fails 
to account for the fact that violence against noncombatants had always been an element of 
continental conquest. It also ignores colonialism as a structuring force on the warfare that 
followed the Civil War. Chapter two explores a specific instance of Indian fighting that was 
particularly influential on the nineteenth century military. Sheridan’s campaign against southern 
plains Indians in 1869-69, and much of the military policy that built on his strategies, more 
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accurately fits into a genealogy of US counterinsurgency warfare. Sheridan defined the 
Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Kiowa and Comanche that remained off-reservation as insurgents waging 
a guerilla war, and that designation subjected them to a winter military campaign in which 
several Native villages were targeted for destruction through surprise attacks. And although the 
destruction of settlements, food, and lives was hardly a new development, these tactics rose to 
increasing prominence during a period of burgeoning US military professionalization. These 
indiscriminate tactics were thus written into the new military publications that offered a blueprint 
for Indian fighting, and they left an enduring mark on an entire generation of officers. Many of 
those soldiers would suddenly find themselves overseas at the turn of the century, and the Indian 
Wars would go global. 
 Some of the first counterinsurgency experts the US military produced imagined 
themselves as global Indian Fighters. These were soldiers that had served in Indian Country 
before finding themselves in places like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The war and 
subsequent occupation of the Philippines was influenced by continental colonialism in particular 
ways. US soldiers narrated their time in the islands as an Indian war and imagined themselves as 
Indian fighters. The Indian Wars were translated, through the actions, imaginations, and writing 
of soldiers into a flexible discourse able to travel across space and time. Chapters three and four 
analyze the histories and writings of prominent generals Henry Ware Lawton and Charles King. 
Both were active in the fighting in the Philippines, and both were producers and subjects of the 
cultural representations around Indian Fighting. Lawton, as the man who captured Geronimo, 
was assumed before he ever arrived in the Philippines to be uniquely suited to defeating the 
supposedly “savage” Filipinos. While on the islands he formed a specialized scouting troop 
called Young’s Scouts, led by an “old frontiersman” named W.H. Young. Lawton used the 
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scouts in ways that directly drew on prior experiences with Native people, and they help to 
render visible the military linkages between continental colonialism and global empire. Charles 
King, himself a celebrated general, was more famous as an author. King, more than any other 
writer, narrated the experiences of frontier soldiers and helped to cement the “Indian Fighter” as 
an enduring cultural figure. King also found himself in the Philippines, and his later novels draw 
explicit connections between the Indian Wars and the Philippines-American War. Lawton and 
King show the continuities in US military policy, and the ways that counterinsurgency warfare 
was influenced by colonialism. 
 In 2006 the US Army and Marines Corps published Field Manual 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency, with a frank admission that the military had neglected to develop and 
maintain a clear and effective doctrine for that mode of warfare. As the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq continued, and the War on Terror expanded, the military was desperate for effective 
strategies and a history on which to draw from. In this climate the Indian Wars emerged as an 
example of American’s first successful counterinsurgency, with military theorists and writers 
returning to the study of the wars with Apaches, Cheyenne, Lakota and others. Chapter five 
shows how the Indian Wars reentered US military doctrine as a usable history and blueprint for 
contemporary counterinsurgency warfare.  This was the result of the American 
counterinsurgency culture, which had proliferated cultural representations of Indian people 
during the twentieth century in ways that continually framed US military conflicts as “Indian 
Wars.” These mythologies of conquest were translated, during the War on Terror, into the 
technical vocabulary of “strategy.”   
 Over the course of five chapters this dissertation will cover more than two hundred years 
of history, move from North America, to Asia, to the Middle East, and examine everything from 
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battlefield reports to children’s literature. This breadth of content is necessary to show just how 
intertwined the histories of colonialism and militarism are in the United States. The Indian Wars 
have been everywhere, and they continue to persist as both an imaginative framework for 
military violence and an origin story for the counterinsurgency strategies of the twenty-first 
century. This project is a history of the discourses and cultural ideas about Indian warfare that 
have continually reemerged in every American military conflict. It is also an examination of the 
biopolitical violence that originated in nineteenth century US military policy, an approach to 
warfare that mobilizes ideas about race and security to justify an ever-expanding global US 
militarism. Ultimately, however, this project is a critique of the ways in which American empire 
cannot stop re-fighting the Indian Wars. As the Indian Wars resonate into the present in the form 
of code-words, tactical manuals, and historical lessons, we would do well to remember that 
calling those conflicts “successful” casts a celebratory light on a series of profound losses for 
Native people. To reckon with the legacy of settler-colonialism means facing up to the influence 




Chapter 1. Euthanasia Politics and the Indian-Fighting Army 
Prologue: Graduation at West Point 
On June 14th, 1876, William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding general of the US Army, 
addressed the graduating class at the US Military Academy at West Point. It was the country’s 
centennial celebration and Sherman’s speech was forward-looking and hopeful. He charged the 
cadets to “carry into the next century all that is valuable of the lessons and memories of the last.” 
Those lessons included the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, 
and the Civil War, all of which had left an example for these new officers to follow: “Revere the 
memories of the past” Sherman said, and “love that flag which now waves over you as the 
symbol of all past glories and the harbinger of greater yet to come.”52 It is likely that some cadets 
rolled their eyes at Sherman’s patriotic exhortations, as many were probably envisioning 
assignment to frontier outposts where they worried that their careers and daily lives would 
languish in a haze of dust, boredom, and vice. And while Sherman’s genealogy of US military 
triumph did not include conflicts with Native peoples, he understood, just as the cadets did, that 
the nineteenth century Army’s primary occupation was the conquest of Indian Country. Those 
Cadets inclined to be cynical about the first part of Sherman’s speech may have felt he was 
speaking directly to them when he turned to the Indian Wars: “The mass of you, however, will 
pass into the cavalry and infantry, destined to be busily occupied until the Indian problem is 
finally settled… the probabilities are that you will be dispersed and scattered along the line of 
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frontier, pushed farther and farther as military posts become transformed into cities and towns.” 
The cadets were warned to keep busy and to find solace in their horse, dog, and gun, to enjoy the 
natural beauty of western landscapes.  
The new officers sitting in front of the general may have contemplated a life of 
monotony, but Sherman assured them that frontier duty would soon disappear. The Army would 
hasten that day by offering “protection and encouragement to that industrious mass of our fellow 
citizens who press forward to carry civilization and the arts of the white man to the remotest 
parts of the center of this great continent.” True, Indians stood in the way, but Sherman charged 
the cadets to hasten their “inevitable fate” with a “due regard to humanity and mercy.” Indians 
were unwilling to labor, unwilling to till the soil, and unwilling to abandon their territories, and 
the general warned against a sympathetic disposition towards Indians and their necessary 
conquest. These were questions that Sherman wanted the cadets to consider, particularly since 
their education at West Point had provided little preparation for frontier duty: “I have thrown out 
a few of these thoughts” the general said, “because I know you will soon have to grapple with 
them, and I believe they are not written down in any of your text books.”53 One can imagine 
rows of cadets, hot, bored, and anxious to complete their graduation and perhaps do some 
celebrating. However, a few of the more thoughtful may have paused at Sherman’s warning, 
reflecting that their military training had offered almost no direction for the sort of warfare they 
could be facing after leaving the academy. Indian warriors featured prominently in the US 
cultural imagination, but far less prominently in the educational institutions and strategic policies 
of the Army.  
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As the class of 1876 listened to Sherman’s prediction of inevitable conquest, Cheyenne, 
Arapaho and Lakota warriors were preparing to offer a stunning rebuttal to US militarism on the 
northern plains. In the summer of 1876 the Army invaded the territory of the Lakota Sioux and 
their allies, targeting those bands who refused to submit to the reservation system and resisted 
continuing encroachment on Native lands. Just three days after Sherman’s speech at West Point 
an Army column under General George Crook was checked on June 17th at the Battle of the 
Rosebud, and on June 25th-26th, Custer and the Seventh Cavalry suffered more than 300 
casualties at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. “Custer’s last stand,” as the debacle came to be 
known, shocked the nation. As for the freshly graduated cadets, perhaps the anticipated boredom 
of a frontier posting was replaced with the fear of following in Custer’s footsteps.  
Introduction 
In his speech at West Point Sherman worried that military education had little to say 
about Indian fighting, but less than two weeks later Custer was defeated attempting to execute 
what had become a core strategy of the Army in the nineteenth-century wars with Indian people. 
He charged the Native villages at dawn in the hopes of taking them by surprise and unleashing 
wholesale slaughter. And while the attack of the Seventh Cavalry ended in defeat, they had used 
that same tactic with devastating consequences in the years previous. This disconnect raises a 
question: how could the Army have a set of go-to strategies without an apparatus for training 
officers in their use? The answer lies in an exploration of the institutional, cultural, and political 
factors that influenced how the US military approached its role in the conquest of North 
America. This chapter will chart the development of a militarized colonialism that became 
embedded in the institutions of the US military over the course of the nineteenth century. What 
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emerges is a story about the relationship between militarism and culture, and the colonial 
violence that was central to the rise of modern biopolitical state-power. 
This is not an easy story to uncover given how little the strategic and tactical apparatuses 
of the US military seriously considered Native people. This, in turn, has not encouraged 
engagement by contemporary academics. Few scholars of US military history have paid serious 
attention to the violence of settler-colonialism, and when they do they tend to deemphasize its 
influence, pointing to the lack of archival materials and fitting it into a narrative about broader 
military trends such as the rise of “total war.” Acknowledging the lack of source material, John 
Gates writes that “surprisingly, all of that experience in irregular warfare fostered virtually no 
doctrinal development and produced no doctrine of pacification.”54 This has been variously 
attributed to belief that the Indian Wars were a temporary problem, a distraction from the 
military’s goal of preparing for overseas conflict, and disdain for the “savage” conflicts of the 
frontier, so far removed from the province of “civilized” war.55 General John Pope derided the 
developmental value of the Indian Wars, arguing that they were not “conducive to the proper 
discharge of military duty or the acquirement, either in theory or practice, by officers or soldiers, 
of professional knowledge or even of the ordinary tactics of a battalion.”56 However, Pope’s 
attitude did not stop him from penning articles and preparing reports with numerous 
recommendations for how federal Indian policy should function.  
Pope’s perspective captures the contradictions in how nineteenth century officers viewed 
these conflicts, which they were often completely preoccupied with but simultaneously 
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dismissive of. In fact, by the end of the nineteenth century the US military had developed a 
doctrine of pacification. The problem was that only a few military publications acknowledged it, 
and much of the discussion of Native pacification took place in civil and administrative venues. 
Because there is no Indian Wars equivalent to the influential Small Wars Manual of the US 
Marine Corps (1940) or the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006), military historians like 
Gates very reasonably bemoan what they see as a gap in the military’s doctrinal development. 
However, a doctrinal outline is there if one is willing to widen the lens to cultural discourses 
about the future of Native people, and chart how these conversations intersected with military 
violence.  
By the late-nineteenth century a military consensus for how to wage Indian warfare 
began to emerge from a mishmash of strategic, political, and cultural strands of thought. Early 
military theorists in North America were slow to establish a formal set of tactics for conflicts 
with Native people. What they did write balanced disdain and admiration, on the one hand 
dismissive of the “barbarous enemy,” on the other hand impressed by Indians ability to 
maneuver and take their opponents by surprise.57 Ideas about racial difference determined how 
most Native violence was interpreted, cordoning it off from the “civilized” tradition of European 
warfare. Savage, primitive, and skulking were the keywords that structured attitudes towards 
Indian fighting, proliferated in early American literature, from captivity narratives to literature 
such as James Fenimore-Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales. In the years leading up to the Civil 
War a widespread belief in manifest destiny, the United States’ divinely ordained right to 
continental expansion, made continued Native resistance to settler-colonialism increasingly 
galling. Anglo-Americans viewed themselves as waging defensive conflicts against dangerous 
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enemies rather than expansionist invasions. As the nineteenth century passed and conflicts with 
Native people intensified the US military found itself with an ideological coherence and strategic 
incoherence. Native people were firmly situated on the savage side of a civilized/savage binary, 
imagined as primitive impediments to national progress. However, there were almost no formal 
strategies for fighting them, nor did the burgeoning institutions of military professionalism spend 
much time on training for these conflicts. It was not until the decades after the Civil War that a 
more formalized program for Indian warfare began to coalesce. 
By the time of the Civil War the figure of the savage Indian was a cultural trope 
representative of guerilla fighters. Comparisons to Indians was used to critique both Union and 
Confederate violence. The upheaval of the Civil War would raise a host of questions about what 
is appropriate in warfare, particularly with regard to noncombatants, and the specter of Native 
violence hovered over these debates. However, the Civil War did more than simply confirm the 
discursive position of the Indian as the representation of guerilla fighters. It made visible a mode 
of warfare that was already normalized in conflicts with Native people. The Civil War made the 
“population” an increasingly important part of the vocabulary of the US military. The 
philosophical tradition of biopolitics that emerges from the work of Michel Foucault similarly 
emphasizes the rise of population-centric forms of state power in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, but largely focuses on health, sexuality, and other sites of state-intervention into the 
lives of populations. Building on these theorizations of biopower, this chapter explores the 
biopolitical dimensions of this population-centric approach to warfare, often viewed as a 
revolutionary development of the Union’s Civil War effort. In fact, the wedding of biopolitical 
state power to military violence coalesced more completely in the systems of violence and 
governance that accompanied the conquest of Native peoples.  
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Many contemporary historians credit generals like William Tecumseh Sherman and 
Philip Sheridan with bringing this population-centric form of war, often referred to as “total 
war,” into the mainstream of the US military. However, if we situate our perspective looking east 
from Indian country it is more accurate to say that the Civil War brought strategies of 
indiscriminate warfare into the realm of “civilized war,” previously relegated to wars with the 
“savages.” What had been standard when fighting Native people was now rationalized by the 
modernizing military. This development would, in turn, influence the decades after the war. By 
the end of the nineteenth century it was standard for campaigns against Native people to be 
explicitly targeted at both combatants and non-combatants, with victory understood in much 
broader terms than the simple defeat of enemy warriors. This trajectory has typically been folded 
into a story about the rise of total war. However, this period more accurately reflects the 
converging forms of civil, governmental, and military power that coalesced into a colonial 
doctrine aimed at eliminating Native independence. Correcting recalcitrant populations, 
defeating fighters unilaterally defined as guerillas, and forcefully incorporating people into the 
burgeoning settler-state is an example of a modern military developing policies that would later 
become central to counterinsurgency warfare. Colonialism was intrinsic to the development of 
this more biopolitical form of military violence.  
Total war simply does not go deep enough. It can be a useful way to highlight the 
severity of many of the Army’s attacks on Native villages. It conjures up the smoke, horror, 
noise, and death that accompanied these attacks, which often began with gunfire and the 
charging of horses, and ended with bonfires of Native lodges, food, and supplies. But officers 
thought about their campaigns in broad terms; surprise attacks and noncombatant deaths were 
not opposed to the provision of food, housing, and the careful management of Native lives. In 
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fact, the two worked together. Native life was the object of colonial power, a power that could be 
expressed through a rifle and through a sack of sugar. Destroyed buffalo meat had to be replaced 
with beef rations; destroyed ponies and the mobility they enabled had to be replaced with the 
fixity of the reservation. Native people were subject to a dense network of colonial controls, 
including the distribution of food, clothing and other necessities, the forced acculturation of 
Indian boarding schools, or the creation of allotment ledgers which allowed for the mapping and 
tracking of individuals and families. As Philip Deloria notes, these controls translated into power 
over Native people, making them “intimately visible to the colonial bureaucracy.”58  
The story of the Indian Wars slides between extermination and incorporation, which 
played out culturally in speeches and books, and materially in the policies of the military and the 
Indian Bureau. In the aftermath of the Army’s defeat by Lakota warriors at the Battle of the 
Hundred Slain or the Fetterman Fight in 1866, William T. Sherman angrily declared that “we 
must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux… even to their extermination, men, 
women and children.”59 Ten years later he was encouraging West Point graduates to act with 
humanity and mercy. To be sure, these were different moments, both of which were public 
utterances intended to serve political goals. But neither is simple hyperbole. The nineteenth 
century military formulated policies that could balance extreme violence with the provision of 
those things necessary to sustain life. Native people could be eliminated while they were 
incorporated, killed, removed, or resettled.  
 As the strategic incoherence of the early nineteenth century began to erode the military 
found itself in a position specific to an army at the vanguard of settler-colonialism. By the end of 
the nineteenth century most US military officers were saying similar things about Native people: 
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Indians were doomed to vanish, and the mission of the military was to manage this inevitable 
disappearance and stamp out any remaining resistance, while regulating those who could be 
forced to surrender their autonomy. This militarized approach to the “Indian question” positioned 
Native people at the threshold of life and death and inaugurated a politics of euthanasia. The 
military’s job was, as one officer put it, to “smooth the downward road of this doomed race.” 
Native people were positioned as the living dead of US expansion and then forcefully brought 
into a system of governance. This meant that the provision of goods, resources, shelter, and other 
necessities were coterminous with policies intended to manage elimination. They were presumed 
to be headed towards extinction; the euthanasia-politics of military policy was aimed at 
managing that extinction. There is something fundamentally different about fighting a war 
against a population you believe is going to disappear regardless of that war’s outcome. This is a 
war at the threshold between life and death, inclusion and exclusion, a war in which the outcome 
is already decided in the minds of those issuing orders about who lives and who dies. This 
politics of military euthanasia leaves us with a question: how these beliefs manifested themselves 
in the strategies and tactics of the Indian Wars. The quote from the epigraph claims that “savages 
can only be governed by a military system,” and this chapter will tell the story of that system’s 
emergence in theory and in practice. 
The People as a Military Objective: Military History and the Indian Wars 
On August 1st, 1866, Lieutenant James Pike wrote a letter to William Tecumseh Sherman 
from the barracks at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. In the letter Pike thanks Sherman for the general’s 
interest in his career, which Sherman had developed while Pike was serving as a courier for the 
general during the Civil War. Pike reports that he has taken Sherman’s advice and committed 
himself to military study, currently reading Jomini’s The Art of War, Bismarck’s Lectures on the 
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Tactics of Cavalry, and Dennis Mahan’s treatise on advanced guards and outpost duty.60 In 1866 
Pike and the rest of the US military was emerging from the restructuring that followed the Civil 
War and poised on the brink of 40 years of intensified conflict with Native peoples in the 
western portions of the continent. However, Pike, along with the rest of the military, had 
received little-to-no training in the specific forms of combat they were likely to face in wars with 
Native peoples. The books listed in his letter to Sherman make no mention of Native people, nor 
do they specifically focus on the military needs of the frontier soldier. Pike would eventually be 
posted to California where, according to popular legend (and the Texas State Historical 
Association website), he accidentally shot himself by smashing the barrel of his gun against a 
rock during a skirmish. A more thorough tactical study of frontier military strategy may not have 
prevented Pike’s untimely death, but Pike, along with the rest of the army, spent the nineteenth 
century more focused on the strategic tradition of European militaries rather than conflicts closer 
to home.  
Pike’s letter to Sherman is indicative of what post-war US Army officers thought were 
important texts. Jomini and Bismarck were both European military theorists, with Jomini in 
particular occupying an influential role in the education of the US army’s officer corps in the 
nineteenth century. However, the warfare advocated in his and other European’s texts would 
have little to do with the sort of combat soldiers faced against Native warriors. Dennis Hart 
Mahan, an influential professor at the US Military Academy at West Point, was more familiar 
with the needs of an army in the vanguard of settler-colonial expansion, but most of his written 
work made no mention of Native people or tactics. Aside from a cursory inclusion in his 
antebellum lectures at the USMA, Mahan and the rest of the professors at West Point prepared 
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young officers through a curriculum firmly grounded in the European tradition with little 
attention paid to the duties most of their students would occupy following graduation.61 It is 
almost striking the degree to which combat with Native people was ignored by the nineteenth 
century US military. The post-Civil War period saw an explosion in publications, books, 
lectures, and educational institutions, “an awakening professionalism.” However, this increase in 
professional activity was focused on the “conventional” wars the military might face in the future 
and largely ignored the “unconventional” wars of the present.62 In fact, there was no consensus 
on whether the “Indian Wars” were actually a war.  
In an 1876 Senate debate senator John Ingalls criticized his colleague John Logan’s 
refusal to award honorary rankings to soldiers fighting in Indian Wars, saying “You do not even 
dignify it with the title of war; you do not acknowledge it to be a condition of war; you dispatch 
converging columns into an enemy's country, order them to rendezvous at a certain point; they 
continue for months in the field. And when they ask the Senate for recognition of their heroic 
deeds, you refuse them the cheap embellishment of a brevet!”63 The refusal to award Brevet 
rank, honorary promotions similar to medals, for service on the frontier demonstrates that even 
congress was unsure whether they were at war with Native people. Senator Logan argued that he 
opposed breveting “on the ground that the law recognizes brevets only in time of war for gallant 
conduct in the face of the enemy… If the senate will not recognize glory in Indian warfare there 
will not be any glory in Indian warfare.”64 The Indian Wars are also difficult to define because 
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they encompassed such a broad range of activities. Certainly Philip Sheridan’s devastating 1868 
campaign on the southern plains was a war, but what about first lieutenant Royal Whiteman’s 
decision to allow a community of Aravaipa Apache people to farm and live in proximity to 
Camp Grant in Arizona in the 1870’s? Both actions resulted in the massacre of Native people, 
but one was a coordinated military campaign while the other was a conscious effort to enforce 
President Grant’s “peace policy” and reduce conflict.65  Are both examples of the Indian Wars? 
Should we include the attempts to govern, protect, feed, police, house, and control Native 
peoples under the umbrella of the Indian Wars? Lieutenant Whitman wasn’t the only military 
official attempting to balance a range of policies and goals amidst bitter public debates over “the 
Indian question.” Adding to the confusion, it wasn’t until most officials considered the Indian 
wars to be over, in 1890, that congress retroactively awarded Brevets for service in the “Indian 
Wars.” These “wars” only became official once they were widely considered to be over.66 
If the reading list of young Lieutenant Pike cannot offer a glimpse of the strategic 
approach to the Indian wars, where can we look? How did the Army adapt itself to a landscape 
of violence that was so different from their training, rooted as it was in the colonial process? 
How to fight these wars-that-were-not-wars? Despite the privileging of massive worldwide wars 
in the narrative of US history, the country has spent more time engaged in interventions, 
occupations, irregular wars and counterinsurgencies, and the Indian Wars were one of the earliest 
sustained conflicts that fall into this category. They were fought with an eye for the elimination 
of Native people and their simultaneous incorporation into the US state. What follows will begin 
to answer that question, by surveying a selection of texts published by writers affiliated with the 
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US military. These texts, taken together, demonstrate a developing attitude towards the Indian 
Wars that was increasingly coherent in the decades after the Civil War. This archive, when 
combined with the second half of this chapter that focuses on the public debate over the “Indian 
question,” shows that the US military quietly developed a highly influential set of strategies for 
conducting settler-colonial warfare.  
Indian Fighting in Early America 
Although this section proceeds from the fact that a comparatively small amount of early 
US military theory focused specifically on the Indian Wars, there were a few writers who took 
up the question. Early texts focused on racial and ethnic differences, becoming more professional 
and strategic in the second half of the century. Some even explicitly acknowledge the lack of 
strategic literature, a lack they aimed to correct. William Smith’s Expedition Against the Ohio 
Indians, published in Philadelphia in 1765, worried that “scarce any thing has been published on 
a subject now become of the highest importance to our colonies,” and looked forward to the day 
when “a compleat system is at length formed for the conduct of this particular species of war.”67 
Smith would have waited a long time. It was not until the late 1800’s that US military theorists 
began to form a somewhat cohesive approach to Indian fighting. However, Smith provides an 
early glimpse into how Europeans attempted to make sense of their Native allies (and enemies).  
The earliest accounts produced by Anglo military personnel understood Native violence 
in racial terms. They make recommendations that bear on tactics and strategy, the tactical 
observations emanating from the already-intact racial beliefs. In his narrative of Boquet’s 
expedition during Pontiac’s War, Smith argues that “the advantages of the savages over civilized 
nations are both natural and acquired. They are tall and well limbed, remarkable for their 
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activity, and have a piercing eye and quick ear, which are of great service to them in the 
woods.”68 Because Smith believed that Native warriors carried both innate and learned 
advantages in war, particularly in heavily forested areas, he recommends avoiding war whenever 
possible: “Experience has convinced us that it is not our interest to be at war with them; but, if 
after having tried all means to avoid it, they force us to it (which in all probability will happen 
often) we should endeavor to fight them upon more equal terms.”69 As Richard White and Phil 
Deloria have argued, US settler-colonialism has consistently mobilized a discourse of “defensive 
conquest” to reframe invasion as a defensive struggle where settlers are always under attack.70 
Smith’s narrative shows that even pre-revolution Anglo settler-colonialism was being 
constructed in defensive terms, not as an invasion but as a reluctant response to conflicts forced 
by Native people. Europeans are portrayed as avoiding conflict, which Smith recommends, but 
which he also believes is inevitable. Smith’s narrative focuses on one of the earliest British 
expeditions into the Ohio valley, and is an early example of a military problem that would 
preoccupy later writers: how to fight a “savage” enemy using “civilized” means.    
A different Smith was responsible for penning another early account of Indian fighting. 
James Smith, who fought in the 7 Years War, Pontiac’s war, and lead an anti-Indian militia in 
Pennsylvania, spent time as a captive of the Delaware and used that experience to endorse the 
validity of his narrative. In similar fashion to William Smith he criticizes the lack of written 
strategy when it comes to Indian fighting, arguing that early New England colonists, while 
somewhat successful in their wars with Indians, left very little record of their tactics. The result 
was a colonial population unprepared for Indian fighting, in his estimate losing 50 men for every 
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one Native warrior killed during Braddock’s failed campaign to capture Fort Duquesne.71 Smith 
intended his work, A Treatise on the Mode and Manner of Indian War, to act as a resource to 
correct this problem. He celebrates certain aspects of Native tactics, but is wary of taking this 
emulation too far lest the boundary between civilized and savage be crossed.   
 In general Smith thinks very highly of Native warriors, going so far as to claim that the 
colonists’ experiences in Indian fighting lead to success against the British during the 
Revolution. He argues that “after fighting such artful, subtle barbarous enemy as the Indians, we 
were not terrified at the approach of the British red coats.”72 Smith criticizes popular descriptions 
of Indians as undisciplined savages. He argues that Indians are extremely well-disciplined but 
cautions that “we may learn from the Indians what is useful and laudable and at the same time 
lay aside their barbarous proceedings.” The danger, according to Smith, was that the imitation of 
tactics could slip into racial degeneracy. He cautioned that “it is much to be lamented that some 
of our frontier riflemen are prone to imitate them in their inhumanity.”73 Here Smith articulates a 
central concept of the writing on the tactics of Native fighters. The Indian warrior is to be 
respected, sometimes allied with, but never emulated. For Smith, Native prowess in combat was 
threatening both as an effective impediment to settlement and a source of racial corruption.74 
This would prove a central problem for the small number of military theorists that would take up 
the question of Indian warfare: was it possible to fight an uncivilized war against a savage enemy 
while remaining civilized? This preoccupation with savage warfare and the threat it held as a 
contaminant for civilized forms of violence is indicative of the anxiety writers like Smith had to 
grapple with. They clearly believed that Indian warriors were skilled and effective, but they also 
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believed that Indians were racially distinct, primitive, and unable or unwilling to conform to the 
ideals of Euro-American civilization. As a result, imitation could only go so far lest the settlers 
become the very thing they fought against.   
The narratives written by both Smiths, while intended to specifically address tactical 
deficiencies in Indian fighting, were published outside formal military channels. It was not until 
the mid-nineteenth century that literature began to emerge addressed specifically to the US 
military. In 1859 Captain Randolph Barnes Marcy wrote “The Prairie Traveler” which was 
intended to prepare graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point for frontier service and 
serve as a guide for settlers traveling overland to the west. Andrew Birtle, who has made an 
extensive survey of US military literature focused on counterinsurgency, calls it “perhaps the 
single most important work on the conduct of frontier expeditions published under the aegis of 
the War Department.” Marcy’s text aimed to correct what he perceived to be deficiencies in the 
training of army officers, who were well prepared in the European tradition but unready for the 
fighting they were likely to face on the frontier. In his introduction Marcy argues that “the 
education of our officers at the Military Academy is doubtless well adapted to the art of civilized 
warfare, but cannot familiarize them with the diversified details of border service.” Even as 
Marcy worried about the cadets’ readiness to face Indian enemies, he, similarly to Smith, warned 
that exposure to frontier violence would corrupt white soldiers. Marcy writes that the “restless 
and warlike habits of the nomadic tribes renders the soldier’s life almost as unsettled as that of 
the savages themselves.”75 Here the word “settle” takes on a double meaning, as soldiers’ efforts 
in the service of settlement threaten to unsettle their differentiation from Native people.  
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Marcy frames his concerns in terms of a civilized / savage binary, but also discusses 
irregular warfare and the unique problems it presents for expansionist empires. Calling standard 
training inadequate for Indian warfare Marcy describes a range of practices, including how to 
march through enemy territory, how to prevent Indians from stampeding horses, how to avoid 
ambushes, and the necessity of using Indian scouts against other Native peoples. For Marcy the 
problem was how to fight an enemy “who is everywhere without being anywhere,” a phrase that 
has become something of a counterinsurgency axiom.76 Indian warfare posed particular problems 
for Marcy, writing that “with such an enemy the strategic science of civilized nations loses much 
of its importance, and finds but rarely, and only in peculiar localities, an opportunity to be put in 
practice.”77 For Marcy the problem of the Indian War is both ideological and tactical: its 
deviation from the civilized norm makes it difficult to prosecute and threatens the racial integrity 
of the settler-colony by encouraging “savagery” in all participants. In the end most of Marcy’s 
advice involves vigilance, careful attention to the movement of troops, and treating all Indians as 
potentially hostile in order to avoid ambush. His text is one of the most thorough guides to 
“Indian Fighting” produced by someone affiliated with the US military, particularly before the 
Civil War. With Marcy we see an increasingly tactical tone, albeit one embedded in the 
racialized approach to violence that he inherited from earlier writers. These wars were the 
exception to traditional training, but in the decades after the Civil War the exception became the 
rule. The upheaval of the Civil War would push officers to build on Marcy’s text and 
increasingly put Native populations at the center of military strategy. 
                                                 




The Civil War 
The Civil War resides uneasily in the middle of this section. It functions as a pivot point, 
inaugurating the development of a far more cohesive set of tactics that the US military used in 
wars with Native people. Most histories of the US military consider the late-nineteenth century 
Indian Wars in relation to the Civil War, often as an extension of the Civil War’s more extreme 
elements. That chronology obfuscates the longer history of conquest and the ways in which the 
Civil War made visible practices that had long been normalized in the wars of colonial conquest. 
Ultimately the Civil War was neither an interlude from colonization nor a blueprint for the 
conquests that would follow. Representations of Native people as archetypal guerilla fighters 
helped Union and Confederate soldiers to make sense of the perceived excesses of their 
opponents. And while the actions of (in)famous generals like Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan did 
not invent an entirely new mode of “total war” that was targeted at Native people in the war’s 
aftermath, they did bring to the forefront a mode of “population-centric warfare” that had always 
quietly undergirded the military expansion of the United States.  
By the time the North and South were engaged in the Civil War Indians were firmly 
embedded in the US imaginary as guerilla warriors or elusive insurgents. The earliest British 
colonists were constantly frustrated by the hit-and-run tactics of their Native enemies, calling 
them “more wolves than men” that fought in a “secret, skulking manner.”78 The figure of the 
violent, elusive Indian would be proliferated in early American literature, and by the time of the 
Civil War was a common image, a tool to critique the tactics and behavior of enemy soldiers.79  
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For example, reports from the Union occupation of Missouri stated that Confederate guerillas 
were “committing atrocities more inhuman than those of Indian savages.”80 Confederate guerilla 
activity was a consistent problem for Union forces, and the long history of warfare against 
Native peoples provided a ready template to characterize guerilla violence (and justify harsh 
union responses).  
When George Crook, a veteran Indian fighter who served in the Pacific Northwest before 
the war, took command of a regiment in West Virginia, his troops were happy to have an 
experienced guerilla fighter in charge. One soldier wrote that “Colonel Crook is a regular Old 
Indian fighter,” while another predicted that Crook would turn the tables on the rebels, “he 
having been practising those warlike arts for over ten years among the Indians on our western 
frontiers.”81 The country was, according to Crook, full of “bushwhackers” and in his 
autobiography he wrote that “being fresh from the Indian country where I have more or less 
experience with that kind of warfare, I set to work organizing for the task.”82 With an 
experienced Indian fighter for a leader, and with a rising tide of anti-guerilla sentiment, Crook’s 
troops began shooting captured Confederate guerillas rather than sending them to military 
prisons, the official record usually reporting an accidental discharge of a gun, or a fall resulting 
in a broken neck.83 Crook seems to have approved of this take-no-prisoners approach, writing 
that “in a short time no more of these prisoners were brought in.”84 Guerillas were situated 
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outside of the protections offered to enemy soldiers under the rules of war, and, through 
comparison to Indians, rendered as the savages against whom exceptional violence could be 
deployed. The report on Missouri guerillas in the 1863 annual report of the Secretary of War 
argues that “Most of these bands are not authorized belligerents under the laws of war, but 
simply outlaws from civilized society… They usually hide themselves in the woods, and being 
well mounted, move rapidly from one point to another, supplying themselves by the way with 
provisions and fresh horses.” 85 The figure of the uncivilized “belligerent” striking from 
concealment and hiding in the woods would have been familiar to a nineteenth century writer, as 
those were the terms in which Native warfare was discussed from the earliest colonial conflicts.86 
The language of irregular or guerilla warfare in the United States has its origins in 
characterizations of Native violence.  
Union officers were not the only ones to use Native people as the basis for critique of 
their enemies. Confederate general Wade Hampton chastised W.T. Sherman’s march through 
Georgia by arguing that even Native people spared female captives, who Hampton accused 
Sherman’s troops of assaulting. Hampton wrote that “the Indian scalped his victim regardless of 
age or sex, but, with all his barbarity, he always respected the persons of his female captives. 
Your soldiers, more savage than the Indian, insult those whose natural protectors are absent.”87 
In this instance the image of the Indian is used as the ruler against which Union atrocities can be 
measured. Hampton deploys the figure of the barbaric Indian but argues that Sherman’s foraging 
parties go even further in their depredations than Native warriors. His reference to “their natural 
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protectors” evokes southern patriarchal ideals that were similarly used to justify violence against 
black men. The related accusation that Native men routinely assaulted white female captives was 
a central feature of captivity literature from the period of British settlement. Hampton turns that 
stereotype on its head in order to portray Union soldiers as the epitome of savagery in war. Just 
like the reports on Missouri guerillas, the figure of the Indian was readily available as a measure 
of what was acceptable in warfare. The specific target of Hampton’s criticism—Sherman and his 
march through the Deep South—is perhaps the most enduring example of the brutality of the 
Civil War. And the tactics that Hampton critiqued, the population-centric warfare that sought to 
deprive southern noncombatants as much as defeat Confederate soldiers, wedded the burgeoning 
biopolitical tendencies of nineteenth century state power to the sort of military violence the US 
Army had typically reserved for Native people. 
In 1864 William Tecumseh Sherman ordered his troops moving through Confederate 
Georgia to “enforce a devastation more or less relentless” against soldiers, guerillas, and 
civilians that resisted the Union army.88 The so-called “march to the sea” sent a Union army of 
65,000 men tearing through Georgia and South Carolina, living off the land and destroying rails, 
mills, and other economic and civil targets. Although not a contemporary term, many historians 
now recognize Sherman’s southern campaign as an early example of “total war” by the US 
Army, a war targeted not only at enemy soldiers but also resources and infrastructure crucial to 
civilian life. Historians have analyzed the Civil War as a precursor to the mechanized world wars 
of the twentieth century.89 This total war was waged against entire populations, the complete 
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destruction of enemy societies and their war-making capability.90 Sherman argued that “we are 
not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and 
poor, feel the hard hand of war.”91 
Sherman wasn’t the only Union general to embrace the “hard hand of war.” Ulysses S. 
Grant, as commanding general, orchestrated the transition of Union strategy away from one of 
conciliation towards southern civilians and towards a more punitive approach intended to 
damage confederate morale and hasten the war’s end.92 Rather than relying on supply trains 
Grant authorized Union armies to forage and acquire food and supplies from the Confederate 
territories they moved through, and to destroy elements of Confederate infrastructure crucial to 
the war effort. Similarly, General Philip Sheridan razed the Shenandoah Valley in 1864, 
destroying food production in a region crucial to the Confederate supply effort.93 
These practices were a break with what Russel Weigley calls “the conservative military 
tradition of West Point.” According to this view Grant, Sherman and Sheridan did not invent a 
completely new mode of warfare, but they did “rediscover it in their own time,” as Lance Janda 
argues.94 Total war was a departure from the European practices of warfare studied in the 
educational institutions of the US military in the nineteenth century. These traditions governing 
conflict emphasized the laws of civilized nations and the restraint placed on armies with regard 
to civilian populations. In civilized war, in contrast to so-called “savage war” of “barbarous 
armies,” protection of enemy civilians was the rule.95 According to this view the tactics of 
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Sherman and others were a departure from the military tradition of their time. Sherman’s 
devastating marches and Sheridan’s razing of Virginia left an enduring mark on the US army – 
Janda argues that “by the time of Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, an entire generation of Army 
officers had been exposed to the philosophy of total war.”96 Sheridan, in his tours of the German 
army in the 1870’s, went so far as to criticize the Germans for being too soft on the French. He 
told Bismarck that “you know how to hit an enemy as no other army does, but you have not 
learnt how to annihilate him. One must see more smoke of burning villages, otherwise you will 
not finish off the French.”97  
By 1870 Sheridan was intimately familiar with the “smoke of burning villages.” In the 
same decade Sheridan was encouraging the German army to burn French villages he was in 
charge of operations that burned numerous Native villages on the southern plains. This was 
probably his immediate reference point, as his tour of Europe came right after that devastating 
campaign. As revolutionary as Weigley argue these Civil War tactics were, their influence on the 
violence of settler-colonialism has been fleetingly recognized. Janda argues that only a handful 
of scholars have noted the similarities between the methods used to defeat the South and those 
used against Native peoples, instead emphasizing the influence of total war on the world wars of 
the twentieth century. However, three of the most important officers in the development of total 
war during the Civil War, Grant, Sherman and Sheridan, were three of the most influential 
architects of the military policies carried out against Native peoples.  
Top Union officers may have transitioned from the Civil War to frontier postings, but 
there was a marked difference in how they discussed their wars with native people. Sherman’s 
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“hard hand of war” was even harder when directed at Natives. Attempting to justify his order to 
expel civilians from Atlanta in 1864, Sherman wrote that “I knew that the people of the South 
would read in this measure two important conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the 
other, if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor ‘to die in the last ditch,’ that 
opportunity would soon come.”98 Two years later, in response to the US army’s defeat at the 
Fetterman Fight in 1866, Sherman declared that “we must act with vindictive earnestness against 
the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children.”99 In both instances 
Sherman’s rhetoric is aimed at populations rather than armies. However, it is crucial to 
emphasize the differences that a colonial context exercised on military policy. The word 
extermination does not show up when northern generals discuss Confederate noncombatants. 
Indeed, this is where some of the criticism of the idea that the Civil War was the origin of “total 
war” comes from. Mark Neely argues that the idea of total war originates in the twentieth 
century and was focused on tactics, like strategic bombing, that eroded the boundary between 
civilians and combatants. In Neely’s view Sherman and Sheridan preserved this boundary in 
their southern campaigns. He argues that “the essential aspect of any definition of total war 
asserts that it breaks down the distinction between soldiers and civilians, combatants and 
noncombatants, and this no one in the Civil War did systematically, including William T. 
Sherman.”100 Others have argued that the idea that the US Civil War was the first instance of 
total war is an expression of American exceptionalism. The Civil War becomes the “fulcrum of 
world military history” rather than one of many nineteenth century conflicts, such as those 
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waged by Napoleon, that were enormous in scale and devastating to armies and nations.101 Neely 
concludes his essay by arguing that “it required airplanes and tanks and heartless twentieth-
century ideas born in the hopeless trenches of World War 1 to break down distinctions adhered 
to in practice by almost all Civil War generals. Their war did little to usher in the shock of the 
new in the twentieth century.”102            
Neely may be correct that Sherman and Sheridan failed to step outside of the boundaries 
of civilized war in their southern campaigns. However, the erosion of distinctions between 
combatants and civilians did not require the trenches of World War 1. It was in place before the 
Civil War and built into the process of settler-colonialism. Scholars like Lance Janda draw a line 
from the Civil War to the late-nineteenth century Indian Wars and argue that the extreme 
violence carried out against Native peoples at places like Camp Grant, Washita, and Wounded 
Knee were extensions of the policies carried out in Georgia, Virginia and South Carolina. Others 
counter that attacks on noncombatants and the means to sustain life have been a consistent 
feature of wars fought between US soldiers and Native peoples, from the war of independence, 
to the Seminole Wars, to Civil War era massacres at Bear River and Sand Creek. This line of 
thinking emphasizes that race is a crucial differentiating factor between the Civil War and wars 
against Native people, with the belief in “savagery” serving to justify acts that would be 
unacceptable if carried out against white southerners.   
A third interpretation of the relationship between the Civil War and the Indian Wars 
emphasizes military law, particularly General Order 100, the Lieber Codes developed by 
Prussian military theorist Francis Lieber. In an effort to control the treatment of non-combatants 
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in occupied Confederate territory these codes established policies for prisoners and for defining 
the difference between combatants and civilians. John Fabian Witt argues that the Lieber Codes 
contained both constraints on the excesses of war and authorizations for total war tactics like 
property destruction, civilian relocation, and other tactics explicitly aimed at noncombatants. The 
code “was not merely a constraint on the tactics of the Union. It was also a weapon for the 
advancement of Union aims,” representative of a tension in the laws of war between constraints 
on violence and vindication of national policies.103  
The Lieber Code distinguished between the practices of civilized soldiers and “barbarous 
armies,” protecting uniformed combatants but harshly punishing guerillas, insurgents, and those 
fighting beyond the constraints of civilized warfare. In codes 20-22 Lieber notes that the rise of 
war between nation states places entire populations in the category of “enemy,” while arguing 
that civilized war still demands they be spared as much privation as possible. In code 24 Lieber 
notes that these protections rarely apply with “uncivilized people,” and warns that the line 
between “barbarous armies” and the civilized world can be eroded through “unjust retaliation.” 
The consequence would be a slippage towards “the internecine wars of savages.”104   Witt argues 
that the Lieber codes offered a legitimation of the tactics used in the Indian Wars. He quotes 
Philip Sheridan, who defended his practice of burning Native villages by arguing that “during the 
war [Civil War], did anyone hesitate to attack a village or town occupied by the enemy because 
women or children were within its limits? Did we cease to throw shells into Vicksburg or Atlanta 
because women or children were there?”105  Witt’s formulation is useful for showing how the 
modern world’s first codified “rules of warfare” contained mechanisms that legitimated the 
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violence of US settler colonialism. However, there is a large difference between shelling or 
attacking a confederate town with the explicit goal of minimizing civilian casualties, as Union 
generals did, and attacking Native villages with the goal of killing women, children, and elders, 
in addition to burning supplies crucial for the sustenance of life. The Lieber Codes may have 
offered a means to justify Indian War tactics, but those tactics routinely exceeded the boundaries 
of the law, an excess driven by race, that the law cannot contain or justify. 
The campaigns of Sherman and Sheridan did not suddenly make it permissible to target 
Native civilian populations with military violence.106 In this sense total war was not a Civil War 
innovation that was then exported to the plains. However, the increasing attention paid to the 
materials that sustain life and “populations” as viable military targets did exert an influence on 
the US military. As the army moved west and generals like Sherman and Sheridan began 
planning campaigns to subjugate Native nations, they were practiced in adapting military tactics 
to population-centric warfare. Every aspect of Native life, down to food, clothing, and shelter, 
was included in the crosshairs of military campaigns. Few things highlight this better than the 
practice, which became standard, of gathering, cataloging, and burning the contents of Native 
villages that were captured. As Buffalo robes and tent poles were marked down in ledgers and 
then destroyed the military was rendering visible and quantifiable the process of destroying 
independent Native life. The Officers that oversaw these practices saw themselves, without 
contradiction, as both destroyers and protectors, replacing Native independence with US 
dominance.  
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A Blueprint for the Indian Wars 
In 1866, only a year after the Civil War, Marcy published a follow up to The Prairie 
Traveler, a memoir titled Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border. He dedicated it to “a fast 
vanishing age,” and although it struck a more romantic and narrative tone it repeated many of the 
warnings found in his more prescriptive writing. As the Army transitioned from the Civil War he 
cautioned that “the modern schools of military science are ill suited to carrying on a warfare with 
the wild tribes of the plains.” This was because savages acknowledged “none of the ameliorating 
conventionalities of civilized warfare. Their tactics are such as to render the old system almost 
wholly impotent.” It’s hard to imagine the carnage of the Civil War as “ameliorating,” but 
Marcy’s language is just one example of the ways in which US military writers cordoned off the 
Indian Wars into an exceptional space. These wars were “uncivilized,” hence subject to a 
different set of rules and a different approach. Looking to another colonial empire, Marcy found 
inspiration in the French occupation of Algiers. He studied the writings of French officers and in 
a moment of inter-imperial racialization, noted similarities between Arab fighters and Native 
warriors, going so far as to argue that “their manner of making war is almost precisely the same, 
and a successful system of strategic operations for one will, in my opinion, apply to the other” 107 
Drawing similar conclusions to the French, who had studied the tactics of Turkish soldiers, 
Marcy recommends surprise attacks as the only way to counter Native mobility. Ideally these 
surprise attacks would occur at night, with columns of soldiers quietly positioning themselves 
around a Native encampment and charging on a sudden signal. In somewhat dry tones Marcy 
describes how enemy Indians would be likely to “lose their presence of mind” in response to a 
sudden onslaught of gunfire and horses.108 And that was just what US Army generals and settler-
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militias would do in the decades after the Civil War, at places like Sand Creek, Washita, Marias, 
and Camp Grant. This emphasis on attacking Native villages directly would become more 
explicit in the following decades. 
In 1881 Edward S. Farrow, an instructor at West Point and former commander of Indian 
Scouts, published Mountain Scouting: A Handbook for Officers and Soldiers on the Frontiers. 
Interestingly, Farrow had been one of the graduating cadets in the audience during Sherman’s 
commencement speech at West Point in 1876 which opened this chapter. In his introduction to a 
published edition, historian Jerome Greene writes that the book was “something of a 
phenomenon, for treatises dealing with the formal methodology of Indian warfare are virtually 
nonexistent.”109 Farrow’s book moves closer to being an explicit handbook for a sort of proto-
counterinsurgency. Like his predecessors Farrow is impressed by the military prowess of Native 
people but only to the extent that it justifies their conquest. He offers a range of advice similar to 
that found in Marcy’s Prairie Traveler, focusing on the materials, landscapes, ecology, and 
survival strategies useful for soldiers in the field. However, when Farrow arrives at the section 
focused on Indian fighting he warns that “strategy loses its advantages against an enemy who 
accepts few or none of the conventionalities of civilized warfare.”110 Farrow even uses a 
metaphor that has since become an enduring trope of counterinsurgency theory, writing that the 
Indian “is like the flea, ‘put your finger on him and he is not there’”.111 Farrow seems to be 
specifically addressing Army soldiers, pointing out that their training in the conservative 
European tradition will only take them so far once they head west. In reality, different Native 
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nations had sophisticated and long-standing military traditions, training, tactics, and 
conventions.112 They were certainly different than those of the US Army, but the stubborn refusal 
to confer an organized military legitimacy to Native warriors grew out of the impulse to position 
them as insurgent to US authority. Painting Native warfare as chaotic and barbaric was another 
way to delegitimize Native sovereignty.  
In terms of tactics, Farrow outlines a series of strategies that became increasingly 
common in the years after the Civil War. These strategies made Native populations the focus of 
military campaigns, dispensing with attempting to defeat Native warriors in the field and instead 
focusing on destroying Native villages. He advises against offensive maneuvers that try to chase 
down Indian warriors, whose horsemanship and maneuverability was usually superior to that of 
US soldiers. Instead Farrow recommends attacking when noncombatants are present, writing that 
“at no time are Indians so helpless to make resistance as while moving their families and camps.” 
Additionally, these attacks should achieve the element of surprise, as “the Indian is least 
prepared to resist an attack made during that uncertain period between darkness and daylight.” 113  
Farrow specifically recommends the winter campaign, used to devastating effect by Philip 
Sheridan on the southern plains in the 1868-69. Campaigning in the winter eliminated the main 
advantage of Native fighters, their mobility, and offered the military a desirable target, 
immobilized groups of Native families. Farrow writes that a commander that can orchestrate a 
surprise attack in the midst of “cold winds, rain or snow, is surely a good Indian fighter” 
(emphasis his).114 By devising tactics aimed at catching villages unawares Sheridan and other 
officers practiced what has become an enduring feature of US counterinsurgency: making 
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noncombatants and the material resources that sustain life the focus of military strategy. This 
allowed the military to pursue its objective of destroying the ability of Native people to resist, 
often forcing submission to confinement on reservations. In this mode of warfare a pitched battle 
and the distribution of government beef could function as mutually reinforcing strategies. As the 
Indian Wars became increasingly violent, particularly towards noncombatants, the boundary 
between war and peace grew increasingly blurry. 
Of the late-nineteenth century professional documents produced by the military, John 
Bigelow Jr’s The Principles of Strategy was arguably the most prominent to include a section on 
Indian fighting.115 Russel Weigley calls Bigelow’s work “the first complete textbook on strategy 
specifically calculated to meet the needs of the American service.”116 Drawing from American 
examples instead of European ones, particularly from the Civil War, Bigelow set out to create a 
working manual of tactics and strategy specifically for the US military. Like Farrow, Bigelow 
highlights the value of surprise attacks on Indian villages. Noting the superior mobility of Indian 
fighters, he emphasizes the importance of the nighttime march so that troops can catch Indian 
encampments unawares. These nighttime marches were intended to set up devastating dawn 
cavalry charges: “Having reached the hostile camp, they silently surround it; and in the morning, 
as soon as it is light enough to aim, they summon their wily enemy to surrender.”117 In Bigelow’s 
narrative these nighttime marches culminated in a call to surrender, which cannot be attributed to 
naiveté or ignorance, as Bigelow was well aware of what typically happened when US soldiers 
caught a Native encampment unawares. In reality American troops were far more likely to 
charge the camp without warning, firing at anyone and anything that moved. General George 
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Custer’s report of the attack on Black Kettle’s Cheyenne village along the Washita River in 1868 
paints a clear picture of what was more likely to happen after one of these nighttime marches. 
Having reached the camp Custer split his command into four columns with orders to attack at 
dawn. He would later report that “there was never a more complete surprise. My men charged 
the village and reached the lodges before the Indians were aware of our presence.”118 Here was 
Bigelow’s advice in practice, minus the call to surrender. This tactic left hundreds of Cheyenne 
dead, wounded, or captured, including women, children, and the elderly. And it achieved this 
goal by focusing on Native populations as units to be surprised, attacked, captured, and driven 
onto reservations or left dead on the field to be buried by their escaped relatives. Bigelow was 
well aware of this, elsewhere emphasizing the effectiveness of destructive surprise attacks in an 
essay about the campaign against Apache leader Victorio.119 These surprise attacks were the rule, 
not an exception, and the same goes for the levels of indiscriminate violence they resulted in. 
Military historians read Bigelow’s Principles of Strategy as an early endorsement of total 
war in a US military textbook. Because Bigelow set out to write his book using American 
examples he spent a great deal of time on the Civil War, particularly the campaigns of Sherman, 
Grant and Sheridan. Breaking from the conservative European tradition that viewed the decisive 
defeat of the enemy army as war’s objective, Bigelow included a section titled “The People as a 
Military Objective.” In it he wrote that “war is brought home to a hostile people by depriving 
them of their civil and political rights and privileges, or of the comforts and conveniences, and 
perhaps the necessaries, of life; by injuring their business, or by detracting in any other way from 
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their individual welfare.”120 The Union assault on Confederate infrastructure was certainly aimed 
at the rebel army, but it was also aimed directly at the southern people. Bigelow emphasizes the 
difference, which he argues is significant. For example, he separates Sheridan’s burning of the 
Shenandoah Valley, which was intended to destroy resources specifically intended for the 
Confederate army, and Sherman’s march to the sea, which was intended to deprive southerners 
generally.121 Grant and Sherman believed that residents of the Deep South were unaware that the 
war’s momentum was swinging towards the Union, and sought to encourage them to “submit 
without compromise.”122 Sherman’s subsequent march through Georgia and South Carolina 
forcefully brought the war home to the southern population and was aimed at convincing them to 
withdraw support from the rebel army. For Bigelow it was a radical departure for generals to 
view noncombatant populations as a unit to be targeted and defeated by an army. However, in 
the context of settler-colonialism this was neither radical nor new. Warfare against Native people 
had almost always been targeted at populations rather than armies.   
Bigelow certainly did not consider Confederate civilians and Native peoples to be 
equivalent. Part of the reason that conflicts with Native people make up a comparatively smaller 
portion of his writing is because, like his peers, Bigelow positioned colonial violence at the 
edges warfare. In an essay for the Journal of the Military Service Institution Bigelow calls the 
soldiers employed against Native peoples “an army of occupation,” controlling Native people 
and keeping them restricted to their designated areas. He calls Native warriors “trespassers and 
marauders,” stripping them of any legitimate military designation and constructing them as 
insurgents, lacking a preexisting sovereignty. This foreshadows similar definitional moves 
                                                 
120 Bigelow, Principles of Strategy, 228. 
121 Ibid, 229. 
122 Weigley, Towards an American Way of War, 97. 
62 
 
common to other US counterinsurgency operations, emphasizing Bigelow’s writing as a 
precursor for US counterinsurgency theory. 
Bigelow’s general instructions on Indian warfare do not deviate greatly from Farrow or 
the actual campaigns of Sheridan on the southern plains or George Crook on the northern plains. 
Overall Bigelow lists three distinct modes of operations against Indians: to chase them, to 
surprise them, or to wear them out, with the chase usually proving a futile exercise against highly 
mobile Native warriors.123 Like other writers Bigelow recommends surprising Native villages to 
take away their mobility, allowing the Army to bring devastating and often decisive force to 
bear. And, like Farrow, he is largely unconcerned about the potential for violence against 
noncombatants structurally built into this strategy. He includes only one specific example of 
Indian fighting, the campaign that resulted in the final surrender Apache leader Goyahkla, 
otherwise known as Geronimo, in 1886. Attributing the “wearing out” method to the army’s 
success in capturing Geronimo, Bigelow writes that it aimed to generate a “mental weariness 
from constant watching and devising and planning, and their final despair of ever thoroughly 
resting, or returning to wives, children, and sweethearts, unless as prisoners.”124 The US Army’s 
continuous four-month pursuit forced Goyahkla to surrender for the last time. This sort of 
strategy is indicative of an advanced stage of settler-occupation where Apache resistance takes 
place within and among settled areas, rather than in territory largely under Native control. To be 
sure, Goyahkla and other Apache leaders’ repeated flights from reservation confinement were 
expressions of Apache independence. But, even more so than earlier campaigns, the advance of 
settler-colonialism in the southwest allowed for Apache violence to be painted as banditry or 
lawlessness, an insurgent violence against what was believed to be an already coherent settler 
                                                 




state. They were operating within and between the national boundaries of the US and Mexico. In 
this landscape Apache land was largely invisible to settlers and soldiers, although it was certainly 
visible to Apache people, whose defense of that land was instead painted as an insurgency.  
Despite his focus on running Apache resistance into a state of exhaustion, Bigelow ends 
the chapter with an additional conclusion. He argues that the success of the campaign was due to 
Miles’ decision to remove almost the entire Chiricahua tribe to a military compound in Florida 
2000 miles away.125 More specifically, the Chiricahua noncombatants were removed to a prison, 
a tactic that had been used against Native warriors and leaders but here was used against a large 
number of noncombatants. The relocation of an entire population of Apache people to an 
extended period of legal and carceral limbo may be giving you “imperial déjà vu,” a phrase Anne 
McClintock uses to describe continuities across different phase of US history.126 The forced 
relocation of Filipinos, the “strategic hamlets” of Vietnam, and the incarceration of “detainees” 
at Guantanamo bay resonate out from the removal of Apache peoples – neither prisoners of war 
nor prisoners of the state, whose exceptional status placed them outside the laws of the US but 
certainly not outside its power. Bigelow’s writing sets this down as a tactical innovation. It 
seems to be an innovation that casts a long shadow. 
The nineteenth century military incorporated Indian fighting into its professional, tactical, 
and educational practice to a very limited extent. This section has presented a snapshot, but it is a 
snapshot without an extensive body of literature outside of the frame. Although limited, what 
military theorists and soldiers wrote about wars with Native people became increasingly coherent 
as the nineteenth century passed. Early writers largely relied on racialized depictions of Native 
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people as savages, offering little in the way of concrete tactical advice. They drew on a 
discursive tradition of noble savages and barbarous Indians, relegating Indian fighting to the 
uncivilized spectrum of warfare. However, Native resistance was no small obstacle to US settler-
colonialism. In the decades after the Civil War officers and theorists began to piece together a 
clear program of violence that added a strategic coherence to an already-intact set of colonial 
ideologies. It was not enough to beat Native warriors in the field; the US Army had to destroy 
Native resistance and forcefully incorporate them within the state, if not eliminate them entirely. 
The object of war could not be Native armies – it had to be Native peoples. These later writings 
offer an early glimpse of a burgeoning counterinsurgency practice, a mode of warfare that 
structurally denies the sovereignty of the enemy and aims at both their elimination and/or 
incorporation. The remainder of the chapter will complete the picture of how the US military 
viewed war with Native peoples by looking beyond strategic or tactical literature. What has been 
presented here is only one half of the story. The other half resides in the public debate over the 
“Indian Question,” a debate US military officers participated in eagerly.  
“Duties Foreign to their Military Training”: Militarized Biopolitics and Continental 
Expansion 
I really think it is important that the idea that the Army only exists to keep the Indians in order 
should be pushed aside with a strong hand. It is fatal to any proper study and preparation, and 
before long the echo will return to plague us from Congress, for the Indian question will not last 
forever. 
- Extract from a letter of an Officer of Engineers, February 18th, 1883, Journal of the 
Military Service Institution Volume 4 
In the years after the Civil War the US military turned its attention west to territories 
experiencing increasing pressure from settlers. Frontier violence had always been an occupation 
of the armed forces but the post-war years saw an intensified series of conflicts fought over lands 
that had previously been lightly settled, if at all. Indeed, the territories fought over after the war 
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laid bare the illusion of imperial geography. As much as the country projected a cohesive, coast-
to-coast national boundary in 1866, the reality on the ground was that tribes like the Lakota, 
Cheyenne, Comanche, Kiowa, Apache, and others still controlled large sections of the continent. 
This was not simply “Indian Territory” created and granted to tribes already defeated by the 
government; it was Indian territory, where tribal control was still very much intact. As these 
territories were invaded by the Army and settlers the “Indian problem” became more and more 
pressing, and the military offered a number of solutions. This post-war discourse demonstrates 
the US military’s growing preoccupation with governing populations, forced by the demands of 
settler-colonialism to take on a more expansive role than simply defeating enemy fighters. The 
discussion among these top generals illuminates what they believed the problems of the “Indian 
question” to be, which will help us to understand their proposed solutions. 
Top officers argued consistently and vociferously that Indian Affairs be transferred back 
under military control. Originally created by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1824, the 
Indian Bureau was moved from the War Department to the Department of the Interior in 1849, a 
telling referendum on the shifting view of Native sovereignty.127 Often and with increasing 
urgency following the Civil War Army officers argued that they could more efficiently, more 
humanely, and more effectively manage Indian Affairs. As the Army moved west in ever-greater 
numbers top officers began calling for Indian Affairs to be transferred back under military 
control. In the introduction to the annual report for 1866-67, General Ulysses S. Grant argues 
that the Indian bureau be moved back to the War Department from the Department of the Interior 
for reasons “both obvious and satisfactory.” Grant wrote that “it would result in greater economy 
                                                 




of expenditure, and, as I think, diminution of conflict between the Indian and white race.”128 In 
that same report General W.T. Sherman made a similar argument, noting that the military was in 
charge of surveillance, punishment, and violence, but not the day-to-day management of Indian 
affairs. For Sherman, the military’s role as the source of violence made it the logical institution 
to oversee Indian affairs. Sherman wrote that “Indians do not read, and only know of our power 
and strength by what they see, and they always look to the man who commands soldiers as the 
representative of our government.”129 Sherman’s argument was that the threat of overwhelming 
violence, embodied in the military, was the most potent and effective way to govern Native 
people. However, as much as Sherman championed a firm military hand in Indian affairs, he 
spent just as much time in the annual reports discussing non-military elements of Indian affairs. 
Sherman and other officers sometimes complained of their expanded duties, but they consistently 
demanded the right to those expanded duties, and their writings indicate that they viewed 
elements of governing as a central part of the Indian wars, a broad understanding of the 
military’s role in the colonial process. 
As debates over the “Indian Question” intensified the military positioned itself as the 
main institution tasked with managing the consequences of settler-colonialism. In his 
introduction to the 1869/1870 annual report Sherman argued that  
While the nation at large is at peace, a state of quasi war has existed, and continues to 
exist, over one-half its extent, and the troops therein are exposed to labors, marches, 
fights, and dangers that amount to war. Were the troops withdrawn, or largely 
diminished, in Texas, the Indian country, in Arizona, New Mexico, Montana, Idaho, or 
Alaska, as well as in some parts of our southern States, I believe a condition of things 
would result amounting to anarchy130 
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Sherman’s statement came amidst discussion of a reduction in the “peacetime” post-Civil War 
military. Supporters of Reconstruction and officials concerned about frontier violence argued for 
a large army, while fiscal conservatives and opponents of reconstruction wanted a dramatically 
reduced armed forces. Following the end of the war and the demobilization of the volunteers the 
Army was dramatically reduced in size from Civil War levels, with legislation in 1866 setting the 
size of the regular army to about 54,000 and an 1869 act reducing Army size to 37,000.131 This 
was a larger regular army than the pre-war number (18,000), but the increasing pressures of 
settler-colonialism rendered it inadequate in the eyes of the Army’s top officers.132  In his report 
Sherman argues that every single regiment in this reduced army is on duty, with none in reserve. 
His warning that a state of “anarchy” would ensue should western troops be reduced further was 
provoked by increasing settlement, the expansion of the railroad, and the proliferation of mining 
and agricultural interests that were all threatened by “nomadic Indians.”133 Generals like 
Sherman tended to imagine that US civil society was always-already present, and that Native 
resistance was a disruption of a cohesive state, rather than an attempt to maintain sovereign 
spaces free from settlement. This produced a sense of defensiveness and growing concern as 
Sherman and others were tasked with protecting settlers who demanded (and imagined) Native-
free spaces. Indeed, the reports by Sherman and his colleagues in the years after the Civil War 
border on crisis. Officers found themselves scrambling to meld a variety of imperial practices 
into a cohesive Indian policy. 
The annual reports of the secretary of war for the years after the Civil War’s end in 1865 
quickly center the threat of Native violence. For each year the top ranking generals in each 
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district provide a report on the activities in their region, and the generals stationed west of the 
Mississippi paint a picture of widespread conflict with Native people. In the report for 1866/67 
General H.W. Halleck wrote that “the Apache is the bitter enemy to all white settlers” and that 
“there is no hope for peace in that country till he is destroyed or thoroughly conquered.”134 That 
same year General C.C. Augur argued that if he responded to every civilian call for protection he 
would need 100,000 cavalry in his section of the plains alone (the 1866 act which fixed the 
army’s size included provision for ten cavalry regiments, or roughly 10,000 cavalry troops total 
in the entire army).135 He reported that “each little settlement along our five thousand miles of 
frontier, wants its regiment of cavalry or infantry to protect it against the combined power of all 
the Indians.”136 General W.T. Sherman reported that Indians “in nomadic and predatory bands, 
infest the whole country described, sometimes in one place and then in another.” He argues that 
they are universally regarded as hostile by frontier settlers, which in turn demands a constant 
military presence. This sense of precariousness shows that although the post-war US claimed the 
interior of the continent, many of those spaces were still under Native control. The often frantic 
calls for protection coming from settlers and territorial governors reframes their invasion into a 
defensive posture. Rather than violating the integrity of Native territory, settlers positioned 
themselves as victims of hostile Indian aggressions, demanding military protection.137 
The irony, for Sherman, is that “these Indians are construed as under the guardianship 
and protection of the general government,” resulting in a disconnect between military policy on 
the ground and federal policy in Washington. Similarly to his peers Sherman calls for military 
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control of Indian affairs, arguing that “the Indians should be controlled by the military 
authorities, and that the commanding officers of the troops should have not only the surveillance 
of these Indians, but should supervise and control the disbursement of moneys and distribution of 
presents to the tribes under past and future treaties.”138 Sherman would get his wish in 1868 
when congress gave him final approval for all expenditures for Indian appropriations. The New 
York Daily Tribune predicted this “will settle for all time the vexed Indian question in a manner 
to redound to the full glory of the republic, the highest interests of the people and of the Indians, 
at a much less cost of the treasure and reputation than to fight them a single week.”139 This 
prediction was wishful thinking, but it does demonstrate that Indian Affairs was popularly 
viewed as simultaneously military and civil in nature. Putting Sherman in charge of 
appropriations was a result of the 1868 Indian Peace Commission which made a broad survey of 
Indian policy and toured much of Indian Country, meeting with tribes and attempting to secure 
peace agreements. Responding to the tide of violence on the plains, the peace commission began 
to put into place the policies that would be formalized during the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant, 
the “peace policy” which sought to settle all Indians on reservations and declare those outside 
“hostile,” creating peace on the reservation and war everywhere else.  In their final report the 
Indian Peace Commission attempted to resolve the conflict between military and civil control of 
Indian policy. They wrote that  
To determine this properly we must first know what is to be the future treatment of the 
Indians. If we intend to have war with them, the bureau should go to the Secretary of 
War. If we intend to have peace, it should be in the civil department. In our judgment, 
such wars are wholly unnecessary, and hoping that the government and the country will 
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agree with us, we cannot now advise the change. It is possible, however, that, despite our 
efforts to maintain peace, war may be forced on us by some tribe or tribes of Indians.140  
To resolve this problem, they recommended that during wartime “civil jurisdiction shall cease 
and the military jurisdiction begin.”141 However, this differentiation would prove impossible in 
practice, as the military consistently assumed authority over matters that could be defined as 
civil. This was the result of both governmental inadequacies and the impossibility of defining the 
“state of war” – if “civilizing” processes such as agriculture were intended to defeat Indians, 
should they really be defined as “civil”?  
Returning to the passage that opened this section, Sherman’s characterization of the 
frontier in 1869/70 as “a state of quasi war” threatening to dissolve into anarchy betrays the 
unstable boundaries of the settler-colonial project. Sherman laments the strain on his officers, 
noting that “many of the officers have been required to perform, at great personal risk, the duties 
of Indian agents, governors, sheriffs, judges and inspectors of elections, &c, &c, duties foreign to 
their military training, and they have done this duty without a murmur and with marked 
intelligence.”142 Two years later in an essay published on “The ‘Indian Question’” Sherman 
would report that, as a result of Grant’s peace policy, the middle ground between war and peace 
made the army’s job more difficult. He argued that “the Army has a much more difficult task 
now than if we were actually at war and could anticipate depredations and follow the 
perpetrators to their very camps.”143 The Native people under Sherman’s supposed control, in 
this case the Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Lakota on the southern plains, 
inhabited a grey area where their incorporation into the mechanisms of American government 
                                                 
140 “Furman: Indian Peace Commission Report (1868),” accessed January 17, 2019, 
http://history.furman.edu/~benson/docs/peace.htm), 102.  
141 Ibid. 
142 United States, Annual Report of the Secretary of War (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1865), 24. 
143 Peter Cozzens, Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890: The Army and the Indian (Mechanisburg: Stackpole 
Books, 2001), 120-126. 
71 
 
created a state of not-quite war. Unsure as he is about the actual state of war, Sherman is crystal 
clear that the military is centrally involved, even involved beyond their capacity as soldiers. 
These duties involved regulating Native life rather than defeating Native people on the 
battlefield, and Sherman wasn’t the only officer to worry about this expansion of his mission. At 
a lecture on “The Indian Question” in 1878 General John Pope similarly argued that “exactly 
what constitutes peace and what is a condition of war is not clearly defined.”144  Pope, one of the 
most scathing critics of Federal Indian Policy, worried that he had “no authority over treaty 
Indians at peace” and in the Army annual report for 1866/67 predicted that heightening tension 
on the Ute reservation would lead to eventual extermination as the result of the broken Indian 
system.  
Pope’s criticism of federal Indian policy situated the military between encroaching 
settlers and angry Natives in a system devised by officials out of touch with realities on the 
ground: 
But one result can follow from such relations between whites and Indians: day by day the 
difficulties and broils increase; all crime committed in the whole country around is 
charged by the whites upon the Indians on these reservations, until, after outrages and 
murders on both sides, and great suffering both to whites and Indians, it is finally found 
absolutely necessary to remove the Indian to another reservation more remote, where, in 
time, the same causes produce the same results, until the Indian tribe is totally 
exterminated after something like the extermination of the early settlers. It would be 
difficult to devise a system which could work more wrong and inhumanity to both 
races.145 
Pope’s comments lead into a series of prescriptions for the Indian question. His 
recommendations are idiosyncratic in that he recommends removal back east, where Native 
people can be “placed where he can be subjected, under the most favor able conditions, to the 
influences of Christianity and civilization, and be taught to labor and to support himself.”146 
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However, key similarities can be found in Pope’s statement to that in the writings of other 
military officials. Firstly, the word “extermination” is found throughout discussion of the “Indian 
question,” both as a consequence to be avoided, a goal to be attained, or an inevitability to be 
mediated and lamented, but not interrupted. For Pope (and others) only careful regulation of 
Native life can prevent this predicted genocide. Of course, that regulation was rooted in polices 
aimed explicitly at eliminating Native independence and culture. One of the main targets was the 
quickly-shrinking herds of bison that inhabited the American plains. 
 Perhaps no other policy exemplified the convergence of biopolitical control and military 
strategy than the relationship of the Army to the bison herds that were crucial to Plains Indian 
culture and subsistence. Sherman publicly argued that “the quickest way to compel the Indians to 
settle down to civilized life was to send ten regiments of soldiers to the plains, with orders to 
shoot buffaloes until they became too scarce to support the redskin.”147 Sherman and other 
officers that called for the elimination of the buffalo were aware that their military campaigns 
had to force a change at the cultural and social level in Native communities. This made the 
buffalo a viable military target – indeed, Sherman, Sheridan, Schofield and other officers all 
argued for the military to commit itself to the elimination of the herds. Sherman argued to 
Sheridan that “I think it would be wise to invite all the sportsmen of England and America there 
this fall for a Grand Buffalo hunt, and make one grand sweep of them all. Until the Buffalo and 
consequent[ly] Indians are out [from between] the Roads we will have collisions and trouble.”148 
Schofield viewed the buffalo as a key element in the “Indian question,” writing that “I wanted no 
other occupation in life than to ward off the savage and kill off his food until there should no 
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longer be an Indian frontier in our beautiful country”149 These sorts of tactics would become a 
standard in US counterinsurgency practice. Only a few decades later in the Philippines general J. 
Franklin Bell committed himself to the widespread destruction of food supplies outside the 
control of US forces, arguing that if Filipino insurrectos were deprived of food they would have 
no choice but to accept US control. This was the same logic behind the desire to eliminate the 
bison, which was intended to draw Native people onto the reservation where their access to food 
would be subject to military and government control.150 
 In a rare instance of nineteenth century comparison between the Civil War and the Indian 
Wars, the June 26th, 1869 issue of the US Army and Navy Journal compared the destruction of 
the buffalo to the war on confederate guerillas. Referencing the mobility and elusiveness of 
Native fighters, the journal argued that “suppose his warfare is of the guerilla sort – that he has 
no ‘base,’ no line of preparations or defence, no strategic points to defend, no important depots 
of stored munitions or provisions. You are in a manner forced to [attack] his depredations simply 
by making it impossible for him to exist in the country he operates.” The Journal was advocating 
attacking the means to sustain life rather than the actual lives of individual enemy fighters, which 
would necessarily result in an indiscriminate sort of violence for all Native people deprived of 
their primary source of food. Just as Sheridan had attacked confederate food supplies in Virginia 
in 1864, the Journal advocated for a similar set of tactics in Sherman’s campaign on the southern 
plains: “And the buffalo is the Indian’s supplies – it is to him what the grain of the Shenandoah 
Valley was to the soi-disant “farmer” that always had a gun handy by the hay-stack, or a saddle 
ready to throw on the grazing horse, in aid of JACKSON or JUBAL EARLY, as he came 
sweeping down from Lynchburg toward harper’s Ferry.” If the army could deprive the insurgent 
                                                 
149 Smits, “Buffalo,” 316. 
150 “Buffalo,” United States Army and Navy Journal (June 26, 1869). 
74 
 
peoples of their livelihoods and sustenance then their resistance would crumble. The war on the 
bison was both military and civil, biological and tactical. It embodied the Army’s claim that 
“savages can only be governed by a military system. Their first step toward civilization must be 
through military discipline.”151  
Euthanasia Politics and the Indian Question 
This chapter has charted an increasingly coherent set of policies put forward by officers 
and military theorists with regard to wars with Native people. By the 1880’s officers were saying 
relatively similar things, at the core of which was what I have called a politics of euthanasia. The 
military had become an institution of colonial governance, no longer simply expanding the 
United States’ borders but rather attempting to control entire populations. In the nineteenth 
century Indian people were widely understood to be “problems” and “questions.” The problem 
was that increasing demands for land made Native people an obstacle to be overcome or resolved 
in the eyes of the US government and settlers. Once the policy of removal was no longer viable, 
particularly after the Civil War, this “Indian Problem” intensified as settlers and the US military 
clashed with powerful tribes in the center and southwest of the continent. The question that 
accompanied the Indian problem was whether Native people would continue to survive once the 
“problem” was resolved. Should they be assimilated into Anglo-American society? Were they 
doomed to extinction? Should they be allowed to quietly disappear, or should the US Army 
commit itself to a program of extermination? These outcomes (and more) were widely debated in 
print, in the government, and in American society at large. Essays and articles were published in 
droves, bearing titles like “Our Indian Question” or “The Indian Problem.” These texts offer a 
window into nineteenth century mentalities regarding Indian affairs, particularly the distressingly 
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casual way in which commentators considered the elimination of entire ethnic groups as a very 
real (and often desirable) outcome of American settlement. Constructing Native people as 
questions and problems rendered the eventual triumph of US expansion predetermined. It wasn’t 
a question of whether, but a question of when, how, and in what form US colonialism would 
eclipse Native independence.  In almost all of those projected scenarios the US military played a 
central role.  
Officers in the US Army were some of the most prominent writers on the “Indian 
question.” Journals, essays, public speaking events, and letters are full of their recommendations, 
complaints, and predictions regarding Indian policy. These officers articulated a vision of an 
imperial military: always fighting but not-quite-at war, invested in managing life and producing 
death, ambivalent about the continued existence of colonized people but committed to their 
incorporation within the state. At the core of this debate lay a gruesome contradiction: officers 
who debated the Indian Question consistently demanded changes and reforms to Indian policy, 
while simultaneously believing that Native people were living a doomed existence. These sorts 
of arguments were widespread and formed the basis on which military policy towards Native 
people was established – a terminal policy that looked towards what was believed to be the 
inevitable end to a Native presence. This “Indian Question” was a pervasive nineteenth century 
discourse. Lucy Maddox has called the ideological impasse generated by the “Indian question” 
an “impassable stone wall” in which civilization or extinction is the only option for Native 
people.152 However, the way the “Indian Question” manifested in the thinking of many US 
military officers was less a stone wall than grim prophecy: Indians were doomed, period. In the 
interim the military could try to both govern them when possible and attack them when deemed 
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necessary. It was less a question of either/or and more a question of management – managing 
extinction or acting as agents of euthanasia.  
Almost all discussion of the “Indian question” was grounded in the possibility of Native 
death. No matter the political persuasion or orientation of the author it was at least a possibility 
that Indian people were headed towards extinction, whether through direct or indirect means. 
These predictions of or calls for extermination were often combined with nostalgia or regret. In a 
lecture for a British audience at Bristol in 1875, Henry B. Carrington, a former Army officer who 
lost favor after his defeat by Crazy Horse and Red Cloud at the Fetterman fight, spoke on “The 
Indian Question.” Aligning himself with his audience’s “Anglo-Saxon fathers,” Carrington 
argued that “On the one hand, all passion are stimulated to annihilate the savage as a beast 
because he tears and tortures in the throes of his death struggle; on the other hand, we yearn for 
his rescue from that oblivion which buried his earlier ancestors, because we feel that his 
destinies, like his possessions, are in our hands.”153 However, Carrington states later that, for 
Native people, “an inevitable doom is surrounding heart and home.” In increasing white 
settlement Carrington “read the ever-present premonition – passing away. We turn up the 
American mounds and in vain seek for some conclusive record as to the antecedents of the red 
man. We are upon the verge of the disappearance of the red man himself.”154 How Carrington, 
who had literally been run off the northern plains by Lakota and Cheyenne warriors, could 
predict the “verge of disappearance” is unclear. Indeed, one year later in 1876 some of those 
same warriors who had beaten Carrington’s soldiers would hand Custer his defeat at the Little 
Bighorn. But in Carrington’s imperial imaginary US continental domination is inevitable, 
producing a simultaneous desire for elimination and preservation. This is the military problem at 
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the core of empire, in which a drive to govern is balanced against a drive to eliminate opposition. 
This drive is intensified in the context of settler-colonialism: writers like Carrington want the 
native “gone” – killed or removed from the land, devoid of competing political sovereignty, or 
incorporated as subjects of the state.  
  Sometimes writers on the “Indian Question” would forcefully advocate for improvements 
to federal Indian policy while simultaneously maintaining that Native people were doomed. 
Francis Lieber, author of the text that influenced the development of the modern “rules of war,” 
wrote that “the fighting and slaying of the Indians is terrible to me; but their gradual extinction I 
consider desirable, and the quicker the better.”155 Lieber’s code of military ethics has left a 
profound impact on warfare.156 Staunchly opposed to slavery and committed to the development 
of humane regulations in combat, he nonetheless advocated for the extinction of Indian people. 
This short statement contains one of the basic contradictions found in much of the discussion of 
the Indian question. Lieber discusses the “gradual extinction” of Indian people while hoping that 
it happens as quickly as possible. “Gradual extinction” refers to a belief in the incompatibility of 
Native people with modernity. The forward progress of civilization, so the theory went, would 
pass Native people by, leaving them without a place in the modern world. This was viewed as 
inevitable and neutral – it would happen regardless of what form Federal Indian policy took. 
However, Lieber also advocates for a fast extinction, “the quicker the better,” which hints at 
material practices aimed that that goal. The result of this sort of thinking was a range of 
approaches that took Indian extinction as the outcome, only debating the policies to be enacted in 
the interim. This belief in the neutrality of Indian extinction is a core element of the “Indian 
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Question” as it appeared in print. If extinction was inevitable, commentators could portray their 
policies as humanitarian even as those very policies accomplished the goals of removal, 
elimination and land appropriation. However, no matter how benevolent any given perspective 
on the “Indian Question” claimed to be, it was a consistent fact that the threat of military force 
lay behind the recommendation offered. The “Indian Question”—as something premised on 
Indian people dying—was fundamentally a militarized discourse.  
No set of sources documents this position better than a collection of essays published in 
one of the era’s main military journals. In the second (1881) volume of the Journal of the 
Military Service Institution the annual essay contest question focused on “Our Indian Question.” 
The journal published 5 answers to the prompt, and selected the entry by Brevet Major General 
John Gibbon of the Seventh Infantry as the winner. Viewed collectively, this group of essays 
offers one of the most comprehensive glimpses of how the US military viewed the “Indian 
problem,” and what different officers viewed as solutions to the “Indian question.” Gibbon, who 
five years earlier had rescued the survivors of Custer’s defeat at the Little Bighorn, was selected 
by the committee for providing “by far the most valuable suggestions for the solution of “The 
Indian Question” as it stands to-day.”157 The judges emphasized Gibbon’s “practical solution” in 
awarding him the prize, edging out the literary abilities of Lieutenant C.E.S. Wood and the 
historical research of Captain E. Butler. What were the practical solutions Gibbon offered to 
resolve this so-called “Indian Question”? Gibbon argued that the United States, led by the Army, 
should make every effort to “smooth the downward road of this doomed race.”158  
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It was a common refrain in the nineteenth century for US citizens to argue for the 
extinction or assimilation of Native people.159 For every call for the destruction of Native people 
was a call for Christianizing, civilizing, and “uplifting,” personified by Col. Pratt’s infamous call 
to “kill the Indian and save the man.” What is striking about Gibbon’s essay, and the other top 
essays in the contest, is that they do not articulate this as a binary but as a process, wherein they 
manage the extinction rather than attempt to preempt it. When Gibbon argues for a policy that 
can “smooth the downward road of this doomed race” he constructs the problem as a humanely 
managed extinction, not extinction or assimilation. Almost all of the authors argue that Native 
people are doomed to disappear, but they also argue that the military and civilian government has 
an obligation to craft a better Indian Policy to manage that disappearance. Each essay 
emphasizes the need to govern Native people, to “govern by force” as the essay by Thomas 
Woodruff puts it.160 The essays operate in a grey area uniquely colonial, and demonstrate that the 
calls for extermination and incorporation could be contained in the same policy.  
John Gibbon’s 1st prize essay offers no ambiguity on the potential for continued Native 
life. “The Red Man is bound to disappear from this continent. Philanthropists and visionary 
speculators may theorize as they please about protecting the Indian against the encroachments of 
the white man and preserving him as a race. It cannot be done.”161 Gibbon’s essay, offering a 
solution to the “Indian question,” takes as its foundational premise that Native people are 
doomed. He argues that “no one will deny that the red man as a race on this continent is doomed 
to destruction” and as such “it is scarcely worthwhile to reason upon any other basis.”162 For 
Gibbon the question is one of management – how can the US manage Native life towards what 
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Gibbon views as a foregone conclusion. At the core of Gibbon’s proposal is military control of 
Indian affairs. He argues that the army would be a more efficient and more humane supervisor of 
reservations, annuities, and government programs. Further, Gibbon argues that Indian Affairs 
are, at their core, military, for they carry the constant threat of violent outbreak. The result is 
civic administrators making military decisions, which Gibbon criticizes.163 
While advocating for military control of Indian Affairs Gibbon sketches an early 
description of the problems and policies of the “small war” or counterinsurgency. Arguing 
against the notion that the military exists only to fight, he writes that the best soldiers are also 
peace makers, “he who fights only when he must.” Dissenters had consistently argued that the 
military was an inappropriate home for Indian affairs due to its focus on violence, but Gibbon 
sketches a much broader set of goals for the military. He argues that “the peculiar kind of Indian 
warfare in our country” is uniquely difficult. His description, quoted at length, functions as an 
almost textbook description of guerilla warfare. 
For in this, very few of the recognized rules of warfare are applicable, and the struggle 
degenerates into a series of operations in small detached parties in which exceedingly 
hard work and occasionally desperate encounters are the characteristics. In all of these the 
enemy has as a rule an immense advantage. He is operating in a country every foot of 
which is well known to him. He is a better shot, better rider, more easily subsisted, and 
more inured to fatigue than the mass of our men can by any possibility ever be.164  
Gibbon’s descriptions of the difficulties of Indian warfare are consistent with what other military 
writers from the period had to say. “Civilized war” in the tradition of West Point had a difficult 
time adapting to the mobility, diffusion, and tactics of Native fighters. Given the difficulties, 
Gibbon writes that most soldiers would much prefer a state of peace to a state of war, but he also 
argues that the activities he groups under the category of “peace” are a more effective mode of 
handling the Indian question. He writes that “more progress has been made toward civilization 
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with these captured Indians under military charge than in any other case.” Once the army has 
control of Native warriors, according to Gibbon, they are treated kindly, fed, sheltered, and 
subject to a fair system where the “power to punish” is in the same hand as the power to 
reward.165 Remember, Gibbon’s end point is the elimination of Native people. He views that 
outcome as inevitable. But in order to resolve the temporary Indian “problem” he advocates 
military governance, grouping a range of civil practices under the military’s “Indian fighting” 
program. He calls these “civilizing” measures, but leaves no ambiguity about the long term 
consequences. A lack of reforms to Indian affairs “prevents us from doing what little we should 
do to smooth the downward road of this doomed race, once so numerous and powerful on this 
continent…”166 Gibbon’s vision of Indian fighting is about managing Native death through the 
provision of life. The defeat of Native fighters in open warfare is only one element in a military 
program that imagines a future with no autonomous Native people. It was a program of military 
euthanasia. 
The runner up essays in the JMSI essay contest hit many of the same points as Gibbon: 
Indians are still savages, noble yet doomed. Lieutenant C.E.S. Wood writes that “humanity may 
delay it but the end is beyond human control” in a section titled “Ultimate destiny – 
Extinction.”167 Even Nelson Miles, who seeks “a practical and judicious system by which we can 
govern one quarter of a million of our population” calls Native people a “subjugated, doomed 
race.”168 Captain E. Butler, like Gibbon, believes that the Indian question is about managing 
Native death. He argues that  
Since the foundation of this Government the Indian has fought against his own  
improvement and elevation. And if he continues to do as he has done—as his 
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ancestors did before him—his extinction is certain. It is but a question of time; 
and all the United States can do is to make his passage out of contemporary 
history as little painful as possible. In the struggle between civilization and 
barbarism, the former is always victorious in the end.169 
Butler’s haunting call “to make his passage out of contemporary history as little painful as 
possible” gets to the heart of this euthanasia politics. Like the others Butler calls for the return of 
Indian Affairs to the war department, arguing that the disjunction between the war and interior 
departments had been the cause of the failures of Indian policy. Once back under military control 
“blood and treasure can be saved by making all military expeditions against hostile Indians so 
strong that the Indian cannot hope to oppose them successfully. He is quick to understand such 
an argument —and it is the only one that convinces him.”170 Butler’s proposal to unite the sword 
and the olive branch gets to the heart of how much of the nineteenth century military sought to 
answer the Indian question and in the process established a blueprint for later campaigns of 
counterinsurgency. These were not wars to defeat clearly defined armies, but wars aimed at 
subjugation, which would be followed either by incorporation or extinction. This is what makes 
the counterinsurgency so unique in warfare. The provision of food and supplies, the creation of 
schools or housing, and attempts at “uplift” and “civilizing” are viewed, explicitly, as tactical 
measures. They are part of the military’s arsenal. As Lieutenant Thomas Woodruff put it in his 
essay submission, Indians should be “governed by force,” governed and regulated through 
military institutions and military means.171 Elements might include schooling, agricultural 
training, or other elements of life, but there should be no doubt that this is a military practice, 
backed up by violence and conducted as a war on Native people. 
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The War on Terror has forced the US military to pay increasing attention to 
counterinsurgency operations as “asymmetric” war continues to replace the “big wars” of the 
twentieth century. It is telling that in this era of counterinsurgency US military theory has 
returned to the “Indian wars” as one of the earliest experiences with guerilla war from which to 
draw on. Spurred by the difficulties in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, these writers look 
backwards to try and understand the present. For example, in his article “Winning the War of the 
Flea: Lessons from Guerilla Warfare,” Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy argues that the US 
military has failed to incorporate lessons from past successful counterinsurgency operations. He 
writes that “without some sense of historical continuity, American soldiers will have to relearn 
the lessons of history each time they face a new small war.”172 Cassidy’s concern about strategic 
continuity echoes what military theorists were saying in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
but unlike those writers the modern US military is no longer engaged in conflicts with Native 
people.  
Cassidy echoes the majority of military historians who believe that the nineteenth century 
US military had little-to-no codified doctrine or institutional memory on which to plan 
campaigns against Native people. Lacking a formal policy, he argues that they adopted tactics on 
the fly, creating a number of “counterinsurgency lessons” that the modern military can learn 
from. This chapter has shown that, although this was certainly the case in the early 1800’s, the 
second half of the century saw this strategic incoherence erode as officers and military theorists 
cobbled together a program of biopolitical violence that took aim at entire Native populations. 
The surprise attack and the reservation functioned as mutually reinforcing strategies that could 
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accomplish the elimination, confinement, or incorporation of Native peoples within the state. 
Much of this story has remained elusive due to its location in public debates over “the Indian 
question,” the venue in which military officers elaborated on their policies with regard to Native 
peoples. By the end of the century most officers were saying similar things. They believed that 
Native people were doomed to disappear, and it was the military’s job to manage that extinction, 
delaying it where possible and hastening it when Native people resisted. This was a program of 
military euthanasia in which the army practiced tactics that Cassidy and other contemporary 
military theorists now view as key counterinsurgency strategies. They blended civil and military 
practices, targeted populations and the material necessities that sustain their lives, and 
constructed Native peoples as “insurgents,” rebels against an already-established US settler state 
rather than independent nations.173 Cassidy highlights the blending of civil and military controls 
in what he calls “pacification efforts” that aim to “provide firm but fair paternalistic 
governance.”174 This is what makes the Indian wars such an influential blueprint for the 
counterinsurgency: they are about sovereignty and government, which the counterinsurgency, by 
definition, aims to impose. 
Despite the difficulty in uncovering it, the US military did, in fact, develop a connected 
set of strategies for the wars of continental expansion, and they did so during a period of rapid 
professional development. We can draw a line from 1886 to 2011, from Goyahkla’s surrender to 
the mission that recycled his nickname as a code-word for Osama Bin-Laden. We can also draw 
a line from US soldiers waging indiscriminate campaigns against the southern Cheyenne in 1868 
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and the contemporary military theorists that sift through those campaigns to gain insight into the 
occupations of Iraq or Afghanistan. These are resonances that jump across time. What still needs 
to be done is to chart the continuities. To what degree did these nineteenth century practices - the 
pre-dawn charge, the reservation and internment camp, the destruction of scarce resources, and 
ideologies of military euthanasia - become embedded or normalized in US military practice. 
Have they influenced US military violence in the Philippines, Haiti, Cuba, Korea, Nicaragua, 
Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere? The “Indian Wars” may have been the first and 


















Chapter 2. Beyond Total War: Settler-Colonialism and Military Strategy on the Southern 
Plains, 1868-1870 
Introduction – “It is Not the White Man’s Way to Make War on Women and Children” 
On December 11, 1868, several Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, and Comanche chiefs met with 
W.B. Hazen, the US Army general in charge of Indian Affairs on the southern plains. This was 
not a friendly meeting. The chiefs represented those bands allied with the victims of George 
Armstrong Custer’s recent attack on the Cheyenne along the Washita River in present day 
Oklahoma. They had come to Fort Cobb on behalf of the surviving Cheyenne to assert their 
peaceful intentions, with Wow-a-wie of the Comanche arguing that “the Indians are not warlike; 
only the soldiers are making war.” Hazen dismissed these claims and blamed Native violence for 
the recent hostilities. He accused them of killing settler women and children and sternly told the 
assembled chiefs that “it is not the white people’s way to make war on women and children.”175 
It is not the white people’s way to make war on women and children. How strange that must have 
sounded to these men who had witnessed the aftermath of Custer’s attack, in which the number 
of women and children killed or wounded outnumbered that of men.176 Custer had also taken 53 
women and children prisoner after destroying all the food and lodges in the camp, leaving the 
survivors to flee through the winter snow with only the clothing on their backs. How was this not 
making war on women and children? 
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Hazen predicted more violence in the future if Native resistance continued. He reminded 
the chiefs that General Philip Sheridan had promised he was “going to kill all their horses, 
capture women and children, and make them so poor they could not fight again.” Sheridan had 
more than delivered on that threat, and Hazen warned them that “winter is the white man’s time 
for war, and the fight the other day was the first touch, and they are getting ready again.”177 Ten 
Bears of the Comanche was having none of it. “You are talking two ways,” he responded to 
Hazen. “If you want the Texas trouble stopped, move the people away. They commenced first, 
and we have no love for them; it is our country; it belongs to us.”178 In the meeting Hazen had 
tried to portray the tide of settlement spreading over the plains as inevitable. Puncturing Hazen’s 
vision of manifest destiny, Ten Bears placed the blame for the tensions and violence squarely on 
the settler-invaders. The chiefs claimed that there would be no trouble in Texas if the territorial 
integrity of Native people was respected. However, their arguments were ignored and the 
conference concluded. In a letter reflecting on the conference Hazen doubted the sincerity of the 
chief’s desire for peace. He recommended to his superiors that the only hope for an end to the 
conflict was an unrelenting military campaign. 
Hazen was neither uninformed nor stupid. He understood the difference between a 
warrior and a noncombatant. So why would he tell the chiefs that white people did not make war 
on women and children? We should resist the urge to dismiss Hazen’s speech as posturing or a 
disingenuous attempt to blame the victims. It may have been both of those things. But his claim 
that white people do not make war on women and children came at a moment in the history of 
the US military when those very issues were increasingly visible. The Civil War had raised hard 
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questions about the violent limits of modern warfare. Reform minded easterners were 
increasingly vocal in their opposition to the treatment of Native people by the military.179 The 
US had recently adopted an updated “rules of war” in the form of the Lieber Code, and the army 
was professionalizing fast and trying to embody the civilized ideal of the European military. 
According to the standards of civilized warfare it would be completely unacceptable to unleash 
wholesale slaughter on noncombatants in the context of a military campaign. And yet it 
happened repeatedly, in different regions and to different tribes of Native people. Racial 
antagonism and the exterminationist rhetoric of Indian hating certainly contributed to these 
violent episodes, but they were just as often perpetuated by officers and officials invested in 
incorporating Native people into the state and settling them on reservations. This is not to 
downplay the frequent genocidal utterances of military officers but to acknowledge that 
incorporation was often accompanied by a violence equal to that of elimination. To unpack 
Hazen’s confusing claim requires a broader view of the so-called “Indian Wars” that attends to 
the multilayered violence of settler-colonialism. Hazen may have believed that what he 
considered “war” was not targeted at Native noncombatants, but he certainly considered them 
targets of the colonial process. And that meant military violence. 
Too often the history of the Indian Wars is told as a series of exceptional tragedies: Bear 
River, Sand Creek, Washita, Marias, Camp Grant, and Wounded Knee. These were dramatic 
incidents that have rightly occupied the attention of scholars, but often as individual disasters. 
However, the strategic policies the US Army utilized in the decades after the Civil War created 
the conditions for these sorts of incidents. Strategic decisions have entered historical narratives 
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as singular moments of violence, which serves to mask their normality and intentionality.180 
Inflicting large numbers of indiscriminate casualties, the burning of villages, and the destruction 
of food and supplies became the explicit object of campaigns against Native people. And while 
these were not brand-new forms of imperial warfare, they did mark a crucial moment in the 
development of the modern US military. Surprise attacks on Native villages were at the core of 
military strategy and were enshrined in the few tactical manuals that the army produced in this 
period.181 There is no better example of this sort of campaign than Philip Sheridan’s tenure on 
the southern plains from 1868-1870. Under Sheridan, what may have been an underlying if little-
acknowledged trend in Indian fighting became military doctrine. 
The Indian Wars are typically folded into a teleological narrative about the development 
of “total war.” But “total war” falls short of capturing the complicated process of settler-colonial 
violence. Total war names a specific transcending of Euro-American cultural norms around 
violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In contrast, settler-colonialism names a 
structure of conquest that European invaders brought to North America. Land was central to this 
process, and Native people had to be removed from that land. Violence against noncombatants 
has been a consistent feature of settler-colonialism from the earliest days of European 
occupation, which was always targeted at entire Native populations, an expansive process that 
included but extended beyond the battlefield.182 This specific form of colonialism deploys a 
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“logic of elimination” in which Native peoples must disappear to make room for settlers.183 
Military campaigns like the one Sheridan orchestrated on the southern plains cannot be reduced 
to an application of “total war” as a military tactic. Rather, they were components of a broader 
process where both the death and forced assimilation of Native people served the goals of a 
settler society. This meant that the US military took on an expanded social role during the Indian 
Wars. Most nineteenth century army officers believed that they should oversee all Indian policy. 
They wanted to run the reservations, oversee the distribution of food and annuities, and force 
what Indians they could to adopt Euro-American cultural practices.184 These were not seen as 
alternatives to active campaigning but as a part of the military’s overall mission. A military 
history of settler-colonialism thus embraces a range of practices that extend beyond the 
battlefield. More than total war, Sheridan’s 1868-1870 campaign demonstrates how extreme 
violence can be deployed in the service of a broader colonial project. 
Even the contemporary military has incorporated what it calls the “Cheyenne Wars” into 
the instructional apparatus of the US Army. The Combat Studies Institute has developed 
curriculum that examines Sheridan’s southern plains campaign as an example of total war with 
specific lessons for contemporary soldiers. The Cheyenne Wars Atlas, which serves as the core 
text for a course which involves on-site examination of several southern plains battlefields, 
argues that “the tactical and operational dilemmas faced by Sheridan’s soldiers are similar to 
those faced by US soldiers fighting today in Iraq and Afghanistan.”185 Like Sheridan’s soldiers, 
the contemporary military often operates within the confines of political and social communities 
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where the “battlefield” is complex and extends beyond an immediate combat zone. Total war can 
be a useful way to describe the massive destruction of large scale conflicts like the Civil War and 
the World Wars. But those struggles, while epic in scale, make up only a part of the US 
military’s history. Counterinsurgencies, occupations, policing actions, and interventions have 
been far more frequent, and in the twenty-first century have come occupy one of the core 
activities of the US armed forces. In these missions the military is called on to govern, control, 
regulate, and police, not just destroy. It is tasked with incorporating territories, populations, and 
political entities, or at least exerting a temporary influence. To echo Foucault’s famous phrase, 
the military is often trying to make people live, to make them live a certain way through a 
combination of violence and other forms of control.186  
The enemy in these conflicts is typically defined as a guerilla, rebel or insurgent; a 
subject to be corrected rather than simply defeated.187 In the eyes of a state or colonizing force 
these “insurgents” are always-already claimed as subjects, interior problems rather than 
sovereign opponents. This is how the nineteenth century US military viewed their Native 
adversaries. Sheridan referred explicitly to Native warriors as “guerillas.” But they were 
unconquered people, independent of US authority rather than insurgent to it. In fact, these 
warriors were members of Nations recognized by the US as retaining their sovereignty with 
numerous treaties affirming that fact. But their definition as guerillas or insurgents delegitimized 
Native resistance and expanded the boundaries of the violence they would face at the hands of 
the army. Sheridan’s campaign on the southern plains is a definitive and early example of what 
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this looks like when exceptional violence is deployed in the service of reform and incorporation, 
the reform of entire populations and their incorporation into the boundaries of the state. It is an 
example of how military officials can openly call for the elimination of entire groups of people in 
the same breath that they argue for the right to oversee the lives of those people.188 The Indian 
wars are more than mythological fodder for triumphant narratives of American expansion. These 
conflicts were central to the development of the modern biopolitical military. They cast a long 
shadow that solidifies whenever the words “guerilla” or “insurgent” are deployed in the service 
of empire. 
War on the Southern Plains 
“Punish the hostile Indians (who are supposed to be not far from here) as severely as they 
possibly can.” 
- General Field Orders Number 10, November 18, 1868 
 
“If the lives and property of the citizens of Montana can best be protected by striking  
Mountain Chief’s band I want them struck. Tell Baker to strike them hard.” 
- Philip Sheridan, 1870 
 
This is a history of the military campaign targeted at southern plains Indians from 1868 to 
1870 that took place primarily in what is now Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, and 
Nebraska. Hazen’s council with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache chiefs that opened 
the chapter takes place in the middle of that story, after the attack on Black Kettle’s Cheyenne 
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village along the Washita River in November of 1868. Washita was just one of a series of attacks 
during a three year stretch in which Sheridan made it his central strategy to seek out and destroy 
Native villages. The story is thus bookended by Washita on one end and the Marias Massacre on 
the other, the January, 1870 destruction of a village of smallpox-devastated and friendly Piegan 
Blackfeet. Washita and Marias were neither isolated nor accidental. The orders that unleashed 
both attacks were very similar and focused on finding, surprising, and destroying a village of 
Native people. While each disaster had unique characteristics they also fit into an increasingly 
coherent set of military policies. The Marias massacre may have resulted in the “wrong” band of 
Blackfeet being attacked but the overall framework for the violence was consistent with what the 
army had been doing for three years under Sheridan.189  
 In the mid-nineteenth century, the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa and Comanche all 
inhabited the southern Great Plains, that region between the Rocky Mountains and the 
Mississippi river characterized by extensive grasslands, extremes of weather and enormous herds 
of bison. These animals formed what Dan Flores calls “a kind of gigantic organism” spread 
across the continent that represented an enormous source of food and material goods. Skilled 
buffalo hunters, these tribes organized around harnessing the huge volumes of thermodynamic 
energy moving from sunlight into grass and then into the bison. 190 Their mobility, numbers, and 
martial skills made them an imposing military power in the middle of many overland routes to 
Oregon and California. The Cheyenne and Arapaho were divided into northern and southern 
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branches and maintained close ties with the Lakota to the north. By the 1840’s they had also 
made peace with their one-time enemies the Kiowa and Comanche, which meant that four of the 
strongest tribes on the southern plains were on friendly terms as settler emigration intensified.191 
These tribes would be at the forefront of Native military resistance in the decades after the Civil 
War, spurred in part by the militancy of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers. By the 1830’s a Cheyenne 
warrior society, the Dog Soldiers, had emerged as a separate band between the Northern and 
Southern Cheyenne. The Dog Soldiers often opposed the policies of more peaceful chiefs and 
injected a fierce militarism and staunch opposition to US expansion into plains politics.192   
 In the 1840’s tensions rose on the plains as settlers began to move across the continent in 
larger numbers. Native people faced not only an invading civilization but the potential collapse 
of the ecosystems they relied on. A series of treaties were signed with plains tribes but the US 
government’s inability to enforce their provisions and a lack of tribal consensus regarding treaty 
terms resulted in a cycle of conflict.193 In 1849 a cholera epidemic killed as many as one half of 
the southern Cheyenne, and by the 1850’s emigration through the plains was taking an extensive 
environmental toll, exhausting grass, leveling scarce timber, and disrupting wildlife. Bison herds 
had been facing a variety of pressures in the previous decades and by 1850 were in decline.194 
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Plains ecosystems and cultures were under increasing threat.195 In 1859 a gold rush to Colorado 
intensified encroachment on Cheyenne land, and while a few Cheyenne chiefs agreed to land 
deals the more militant factions refused to concede territories reserved in previous treaties, 
touching off longstanding disputes in Cheyenne politics.196  
During the Civil War Colorado territorial officials, particularly Governor John Evans, 
worked to clear all Indians from the territory. Evans regularly exaggerated the threat posed by 
Indians to drum up a military response, and he found a willing accomplice in Colorado militia 
colonel John M. Chivington.197 In the spring of 1864, Chivington issued instruction to “kill 
Cheyennes wherever and whenever found.” Chivington moved against both Dog Soldiers and 
peaceful Cheyenne leaders and Cheyenne retaliations spread across the plains, with Arapaho, 
Kiowa, and Lakota warriors joining in the raiding and making the routes through Colorado, 
Nebraska and Kansas increasingly dangerous for settlers. This violence would culminate with the 
massacre at Sand Creek. At dawn on November 29th, 1864 Chivington’s troops attacked the 
village of Black Kettle, a Cheyenne peace chief who had received explicit permission from the 
Army to camp there. Chivington’s troops pounded the village with howitzers and gunfire, 
ignoring both the white flag and American flag raised above Black Kettle’s lodge. The shooting 
lasted from dawn until about 2:00 PM and left at least 150 Cheyenne and Arapaho dead. 
Chivington’s soldiers proceeded to mutilate the dead before looting and burning the village.198 
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Sand Creek touched off three federal investigations and widespread condemnation but that 
mattered little for the devastated Cheyenne and Arapaho. Families and kinship structures were 
permanently damaged, the Council of Forty-Four, the core of Cheyenne government, lost eight 
of its leaders, and three warrior societies lost headmen. The loss of prominent peace chiefs 
shifted Cheyenne policies even further towards the militarism of the Dog Soldiers, and Cheyenne 
and Arapaho anger reverberated throughout the plains. Sand Creek was a disaster, a tragedy, and 
a flashpoint for military resistance to US settler-colonialism. And while widely condemned by 
US officials, it was far from the last surprise attack the Cheyenne or their allies would face in the 
coming years. Just as charging into Native villages in the morning became a standard practice, so 
too were federal investigations and media outrage in the aftermath of these attacks. It was as if 
when confronted with the violence of settler-colonialism those who directly benefited were 
unable to face the reality of dispossession. They were also unwilling to halt the process.  
In the years after the Civil War continued pressures from settlers and a series of treaties 
further eroded the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche and Kiowa land base. Sand Creek had 
convinced many on the plains that any promise from the government was hollow. As one 
government official warned negotiators, “an angel from heaven would not convince them but 
what another ‘Chivington Massacre’ was intended.” Militant factions in these tribes continued to 
disrupt settlement, and Civil War hero Winfield Scott Hancock led an expedition against the 
Cheyenne in 1867. Hancock intended to warn Native leaders about the consequences of not 
maintaining peace but his aggressive advance on a Cheyenne and Lakota village at Pawnee Fork 
precipitated a stampede. Hancock interpreted the panicked flight as a sign that the Cheyenne and 
Lakota were going to war, and he sent Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer and the 7th Cavalry 
in pursuit.  
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Custer’s troops would chase Cheyenne around the Smoky Hill, Platte and Republican 
rivers for most of the spring without any serious engagements. 199  Their reports of dead settlers, 
burned stagecoaches, and stolen livestock convinced Hancock to burn the abandoned village at 
Pawnee Fork, an act that only further enraged the already embattled Cheyenne and their allies. 
Ultimately Hancock would be blamed for the violence in ’67 and ’68, a charge he would 
aggressively deny despite his removal from that command. Hancock took great care to establish 
a timeline wherein he only burned the village after evidence of further Cheyenne violence had 
been reported. In Special Field Order Number 13 he reported that  
As a punishment for the bad faith practiced by the Cheyenne and Sioux who occupied the 
Indian village at the place: and as a chastisement for murders and depredations 
committed since the arrival of the command at this point by the people of those tribes, the 
village recently occupied by them which is now in our hands will be entirely 
destroyed.200 
Hancock refers to the conflict as “the present war,” and this impulse to segregate episodes of 
violence into specific “wars” – the Indian War of 1867 – contrasts sharply with what Cheyenne 
people clearly understood to be an ongoing struggle for their land. Sand Creek must have been 
very fresh in the minds of those Cheyenne and Lakota that fled from Hancock’s advance, and 
their retaliations against settlers in the Smoky Hill country, which they had been fighting to 
retain for decades, were not “fresh barbarities,” an excuse for Army retaliation in a war started 
by Native people. Dog Soldier chief Tall Bull articulated as much at treaty proceedings at 
Medicine Lodge Creek in October of 1867. He told commissioners that “when I signed the treaty 
at Little Arkansas I intended to live by it; but when we were treated as we were by General 
Hancock, I became ashamed that I had consented to the treaty. I became blind with rage, and 
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what I have done since, I am not ashamed of.”201 Ultimately the Medicine Lodge Creek treaty 
would establish two reservations in Indian Territory, one for the Kiowa, Comanche and Kiowa-
Apache, and another for the Cheyenne and Arapaho. A tenuous peace would prevail in the winter 
of 1867-’68, but delays in approval of the treaty and provision of promised goods brought old 
tensions to the surface.202  
Winter Weaponized 
Philip Sheridan took charge of the Department of the Missouri on February 29, 1868. There 
was never any doubt in what his duties would consist of when he assumed control. Native 
resistance in the region had intensified in the years after Sand Creek. For many Cheyenne the 
massacre had confirmed the militant stance taken by factions unwilling to concede any more 
land. Tribal politics increasingly gravitated towards the Dog Soldiers and away from council 
chiefs like Black Kettle. In a military inquiry that followed Sand Creek a trader familiar with the 
Cheyenne reported that the Dog Soldiers no longer “claim any connection to Black Kettle’s band 
whatever.”203 Cheyenne warriors had proved particularly adept at striking military and civil 
infrastructure, carrying off livestock and endangering overland routes to the west. A fresh wave 
of raiding in 1868 provoked a predictably hysterical response. In September of 1868 acting 
Governor Hall of Colorado wrote to the Secretary of War and frantically called for more troops, 
claiming that “the Indians have again attacked our settlements in strong force, obtaining 
possession of the country to within twelve miles of Denver. They are more bold, fierce, and 
desperate in their assaults than ever before. It’s impossible to drive them out… they are better 
armed, mounted, disciplined, and better officered than our men.” Hall’s telegram should be read 
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with a grain of salt. Impassioned declarations of imminent doom were a common feature of the 
frontier and had more to do with trying to portray settlers as helpless victims rather than 
invaders.204 However, Hall’s agitation can also speak to the effectiveness of Native militarism.205  
The ability of Native warriors to function in highly mobile strike forces made it difficult for 
the US Army, stationed in a series of forts, to respond in time to attacks. There was no way for 
the Army to police an entire region. Further, Native militancy was not universal. At no point 
were all Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, or Comanche actively engaged in conflict with the US. 
Oftentimes in a single village there was no consensus, as peace-inclined chiefs frequently 
complained of an inability to curb the raiding of their younger men.206 This made it difficult to 
identify and differentiate between militants and those interested in maintaining friendly relations 
with the US. Of course, regardless of their political persuasion every Native person on the plains 
was a living, breathing impediment to settlement. Army complaints that a few bad apples made it 
harder on peace-inclined Indians hid the fact that peace-inclined Indians were consistently 
targeted with violence, and that land acquisition would continue regardless of whether Native 
military resistance continued.  
Sheridan thus faced a dispersed and highly mobile population of Native people that were 
extremely angry and effective in their preferred mode of warfare. This was an entirely 
heterogeneous region with multiple political factions and a diffuse political structure. Sheridan’s 
strategic response aimed to simplify these categories and collectively punish Native people. 
Much of this had to do with conceptualizing Indians as an insurgent guerilla force, rather than 
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sovereign nations resisting the invasion of their territory. In a letter to Sherman dated October 
10, 1868 Sheridan reports that he sent Custer to chase down “the small parties of Indians now 
operating as guerillas” near Fort Harker. Sheridan viewed Indian people as wards of the 
government—doomed wards unless they could be forced to accept the reservation regime.207 
Defining opposition as an insurgent guerilla war reframes a conflict over territory into a policing 
action aimed to correct a resistant population. In this context Native resistance took the form, 
from Sheridan’s perspective, of an insurgency against the already-established fact of US rule. 
The Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa and Comanche had to be corrected; not only the warriors, but 
the entire population. As it has in most guerilla wars, this meant targeting the populations in 
which the so-called insurgents lived. The war on the southern plains was not expanded into a 
total war. Instead, Native warriors were defined as guerillas, their sovereignty was denied, and 
their land base was targeted for appropriation. The expansive violence they faced thus emerged 
from their designation as less-than-sovereign. Native people’s way of life, their material 
possessions, their land, and their lives were all legitimate targets. 
  Much of Sheridan’s strategy focused on the material status of the Indians – their 
supplies, food, shelter, and livestock. In September of 1868 Sheridan argued that “these Indians 
require to be soundly whipped, and the ringleaders in the present trouble hung, their ponies 
killed, and such destruction of their property as will make them very poor.”208 We can hear 
echoes of Sheridan’s statements on the Civil War and his rational for targeting food and 
infrastructure, but there are important differences as well. In the Civil War Sheridan targeted 
materials and food to force an early end to the war, to decrease the entire confederacy’s ability to 
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wage and sustain war both materially and emotionally. On the southern plains Sheridan targeted 
property and animals for destruction because it enabled Native life independent of US control. 
This may seem like splitting hairs, but as much as “lost cause” histories may try to portray the 
Civil War as an invasion it was never a systematic and ongoing conquest sustained into the 
present day. Material resources allowed Native people to fight wars of resistance and fractured 
the illusion of an already-settled United States that the reservation system sought to inaugurate. 
Sheridan argued that “they are now so independent that whether we shall have our people 
murdered, our mail lines and lines of communication interrupted… depends on the mere whim of 
the savages.”209 A month later Sheridan would report to Sherman that “I am exceedingly glad 
that the Peace Commission resolved at their late meeting that Indian tribes should not be dealt 
with as independent nations. They are wards of the government.” Sheridan notes that only a 
remnant of the “great nations of the Indians” remain and “the same fate awaits those now hostile, 
and the best way for the government is to now make them poor by the destruction of their stock, 
and then settle them on the lands allotted to them.”210 This focus on the relationship between 
independence and property resonates in later military thought on counterinsurgency. 
Reconcentration and the control of food and shelter were integral to the military’s program in the 
Philippines and Vietnam, just as it was during the Indian Wars. However, the mobility of plains 
Indians made efforts to destroy their materials and supplies difficult. The climate and 
environment of the plains offered Sheridan an opening to pursue this biopolitical approach to 
warfare. All he had to do was flip tradition on its head and campaign in the winter. 
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Environment and climate on the Great Plains can be unforgiving, particularly in winter. 
Violent storms, huge drifts of snow, freezing temperatures, and shortages of food can punish the 
unwary and unprepared. Native peoples living on the plains adapted their yearly subsistence 
cycles to accommodate these environmental factors, congregating in the summer to hunt buffalo 
and breaking apart into smaller groups to form winter encampments. For tribes engaged in active 
conflict with the US military the winter months were a time of safety. The army tried to refrain 
from campaigning in winter due to the toll it took on men and horses.211 As Sheridan noted in a 
letter to Sherman, Indians believed that “the inclemency of the weather would give them ample 
security.”212 When he took over the Department of the Missouri Sheridan aimed to change that. 
As part of his strategic plan Sheridan requested and received permission to conduct extensive 
campaigning in the winter of 1868/69. In an official report Sheridan writes: “to disabuse the 
minds of the savages of this confident security, and to strike them at a period at which they were 
the most, if not entirely, helpless, became a necessity.”213 Helpless: immobilized, hungry, 
burdened with household items and food, with no separation between warriors and women, 
children, and the elderly. He would not be trying to defeat Native warriors in the field. He would 
be taking the fight to their villages.214  
Sheridan viewed his plan as relatively novel but it was not the first time the army had 
campaigned against Indians in winter. However, it was probably the largest and most ambitious 
attempt to do so, and the unpredictable nature of a Great Plains winter made it particularly 
dangerous. Indeed, Sheridan’s troops would be severely hampered by snow which prevented 
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them from converging in Indian Territory simultaneously and perhaps doing even more damage. 
Despite these difficulties, the campaign would be decisive, elevating the winter surprise attack to 
a military doctrine that found its way into strategic manuals and the American cultural 
imagination.215 Sheridan was aware of the risks, calling his plan an experimental one, 
“campaigns at such a season having been deemed impracticable and reckless.”216 Famous 
frontiersman Jim Bridger came all the way from St. Louis to try and talk Sheridan out of the 
campaign. Even Custer, Sheridan’s protégé, warned the general that the campaign would take a 
hard toll on the horses.217 A number of measures were taken to compensate for the weather. In 
the fall of 1868 the army began to stockpile materials in preparation for the campaign. Soldiers 
were issued a supply of winter clothing including a great coat, three lined sack coats, flannel 
shirts and trousers, stockings, woolen blankets, ponchos, caps, and an impressive 26 pairs of 
drawers.218 Food for both men and stock had been stockpiled at Forts Dodge, Lyon, Gibson and 
Arbuckle, the entire process aided by the railroad which alleviated many of the problems 
associated with supplying troops over long distances. Sheridan proposed a three-pronged attack, 
with one column moving southeast from Fort Lyon in Colorado, a column heading east from Fort 
Bascom in New Mexico, and another attacking from the north via Fort Dodge in Kansas. On 
October 9th Sherman gave Sheridan’s plan his enthusiastic endorsement, even if “it ends in the 
utter annihilation of these Indians.” He promised Sheridan to “back you with my whole 
authority, and stand between you and any efforts that may be attempted in your rear to restrain 
your purpose or check your troops.”219 Sherman doubled down a few days later, arguing that the 
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Army worked to avoid conflict and that Indian aggression forced it on them: “As brave men, and 
as the soldiers of a government which has exhausted its peace efforts, we, in the performance of 
a most unpleasant duty, accept the war begun by our enemies, and hereby resolve to make its end 
final.”220 With the support of the army’s top general Sheridan had free reign to unleash his 
soldiers. No matter the cost to men and horses several columns of troops would move into the 
field starting in October to locate and destroy Native villages. The mandate was right there in 
Sherman’s orders – no restraint.  
Sheridan and the rest of the Army were tired of trying to chase the fast and mobile Native 
warriors around the plains. Instead they would attempt to catch Native villages unawares and 
immobilized. This would make it easier to inflict causalities and destroy Native supplies, the 
tangible evidence of military progress. Sheridan measured his success in terms of body counts 
and resources destroyed, as both furthered his goal of eliminating Native independence. In 
preparing for the winter campaign he explicitly acknowledged his desire to increase the body 
count: “Our success so far in the number of Indians killed is fully as great as could be expected, 
and arrangements are now being made for active operations against their villages and stock.”221 
This was exactly the plan Sheridan put in motion in the fall of 1868: “as soon as the failure of the 
grass and the cold weather, forces the settled bands to come together, to winter in the middle 
latitudes south of the Arkansas, a movement of troops will then take place from Bascom, Lyon, 
Dodge, and Arbuckle, which I hope will be successful in gaining a permanent peace.”222 The 
“permanent” in Sheridan’s statement takes on a particularly ominous tone in the context of his 
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strategic planning. He planned to hit the Cheyenne and their allies so hard that they would 
sustain severe casualties, the remainder having no choice but to submit to US control. Sheridan 
wanted to make the campaign “the end of the Indian wars.”223 
 As temperatures fell on the plains in October of 1868 the machinery of the US Army 
ground into gear. W.T. Sherman had instructed his Indian agents to gather all the Indians they 
possibly could at Fort Cobb in Indian Territory. They were to use incentives and threats to keep 
those they could out of the coming war.224 For several months the Army had been treating any 
Indians found off the reservation as “hostile,” and a concentration of Indians at Fort Cobb 
allowed Sherman and Sheridan to fully incorporate the reservation into their strategic 
operations.225 This discursive move made the reservation, a Native space reserved through treaty, 
into US domestic/carceral space, and traditional homelands become a contested space where 
Native people risked their lives to occupy. The Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, and Comanche were 
now rebels in their own country. Sherman’s orders to Sheridan were to “proceed against all 
outside of the reservation as hostile.” Sheridan was to do his best to spare the “well-disposed” 
but policy was that confinement to Fort Cobb was the only way to guarantee Indian safety. 
Sherman wanted Sheridan to pursue “the utter destruction and subjugation of all who are outside 
in a hostile attitude.”226 Despite these threats many bands and villages remained off-reservation. 
There were many reasons for Indians to avoid the reservation: loss of independence, lack of food 
or water, and a regime of surveillance and discipline. But for the southern plains Indians the 
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military’s promise of safety would have been especially hollow, as Black Kettle had received 
just such a promise when he moved his village to Sand Creek.  
 This mobilization of space gave the Army a blank check to attack Indians anywhere it 
found them, and it did not sit well with everyone in the department. Edward Wynkoop, agent to 
the Cheyenne and Arapaho, feared that his orders to concentrate Indians in the very region where 
Sheridan would be dispatching troops was setting up another massacre like that at Sand Creek. 
Black Kettle had received explicit instructions from an Indian Agent that had replaced Wynkoop 
to camp at Sand Creek, instructions which had ultimately offered no protection from the 
Colorado Volunteers that destroyed his village and people. Wynkoop would ultimately resign in 
protest the very day of the Washita attack, not knowing that his worst fears had been confirmed. 
In his resignation letter he wrote that “knowing, if I fulfilled my instructions, I was only acting as 
a decoy to induce these Indians to present themselves in a locality where they were liable to be 
fallen upon at any moment and murdered, I had nothing left me but to resign the commission I 
held.” The frequency with which Sherman and Sheridan wrote about the need to confine Indians 
to reservations is evidence of their desire to keep at least some Indians out of the coming war. 
However, Wynkoop’s critique is not merely a conspiracy theory. For Sherman and Sheridan the 
reservation and an active military campaign were not opposite sides of Indian policy; they were 
mutually reinforcing ones. The reservation and the confinement and goods it promised were 
viewed, explicitly, as a military tool to be used in the Army’s goal of subjugating Native people.  
  With the plan for the campaign in place the first troops moved into the field in mid-
October. Major Eugene Carr skirmished with Dog Soldiers on October eighteenth and on 
October 25th he once more engaged Cheyenne warriors near Beaver Creek, killing ten warriors, 
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wounding many more, and driving them back towards their lodges.227 The Cheyenne burned the 
prairie to slow Carr’s advance but he persisted, capturing camp supplies, food, and ponies that 
were abandoned by the fleeing Cheyenne. In his report the Major regrets his inability to catch the 
fleeing Cheyenne but notes a success - he captured a large supply of food, equipment, lodges and 
ponies.228 Carr’s late-October report is one of the first instances of what would become a 
defining feature of Sheridan’s overall campaign: a focus on capturing and destroying the material 
necessities of Native life whenever possible. Most of the military reports for the campaign go to 
great lengths to carefully catalog and record all the food and supplies captured. These are usually 
burned as the final act of a battle.  
 Carr carefully lists the captured equipment, which becomes a quantifiable record of the 
elimination of Native independence. As Carr counts destroyed supplies he counts the decline in 
Cheyenne ability to live outside the boundaries of US control. Carr’s soldiers captured and 
destroyed 130 ponies, 2000 lodge poles, 50 lodge skins, 50 half-dressed robes, 30 pounds of 
powder, and various camp supplies including mats, kettles, litters, pans, spades, axes, crowbars, 
picks, guns, and dried meat.229 Those ponies, lodge poles, skins, robes, and food would be 
absolutely essential with winter fast approaching, and marked a grievous loss for the Cheyenne. 
They represented hours of work and material wealth that would be difficult to replace, 
particularly during the winter with hostile US troops in the field. Carr’s attack failed to engage a 
Cheyenne village, and the women and children that would have occupied it, but the destroyed 
equipment and fleeing Cheyenne certainly accomplished the goals of keeping the Cheyenne 
running and poor. Despite his destruction of many Cheyenne supplies Carr’s efforts were 
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considered less than successful because he was unable to strike directly at a Native village and 
allowed the Cheyenne to escape.230 Cheyenne military skill had managed to hold The Fifth 
Cavalry at bay, allowing the noncombatants to escape. However, this was only the first foray in 
the winter campaign. Sheridan’s plan to “make them poor” was well underway and his command 
would soon get an opportunity to take the fight directly into a Native village.  
It is unclear how prepared Sheridan’s troops were for his strategy of attacking Native 
villages directly. In September of 1868 military district headquarters issued General Field Orders 
#3, guidelines for the coming campaign. Because explicit strategic statements on the Indian Wars 
were surprisingly rare in this period the document offers rare insight into how troops would be 
approaching the campaign. Most importantly, and perhaps obviously, the document has as its 
underlying expectation that the campaign will be targeted at Native villages.  It opens by warning 
that inexperienced officers too-often underestimate Indian opponents, who will likely be better 
equipped and prepared for warfare on the plains. Rather than chase the better-mounted Native 
warriors it recommends the following:  
Their strategy will be never to attack except they have the advantage, and never to make 
a stand for resistance, except we are lucky enough to strike their villages; their plan will 
be to harass us in small parties, endeavoring to draw the troops from the direction in 
which they may be going, or to entice us to an unsuccessful pursuit, whereby they can 
break down our animals. 
The orders advise that following the trail of tipi lodge poles is the preferred method of tracking 
and chasing Indians, but caution that warriors will often lay a false trail in this way. The 
remainder of the document outlines strict protocols for marching and making camp, the main 
goal being to prevent Indians from taking the column by surprise. Strangely, the orders do not 
cover an actual attack on Indian people. As this was the explicit goal of Sheridan’s campaign, 
                                                 




this seems odd. Cavalry training manuals from the 1860’s make some mention of Indians and 
provide guidelines on surprise attacks, but they similarly leave undiscussed the specifics of an 
attack on a civilian or noncombatant village. They presume that the target of a surprise attack 
will be enemy soldiers. In a section of the Regulations and Instructions for the Field Service of 
the US Cavalry 1862 titled “Of Sudden Attacks on the Enemy” it is assumed that the enemy 
consists of soldiers. It advises that “sudden attacks on the enemy are made with several 
objectives: 1. To alarm his posts; 2. To capture one or more of them; and 3. To attack his 
quarters.”231 What is interesting is that Custer’s attack at the Washita followed quite closely the 
tactical form suggested by these manuals. It was entirely by-the-book except for the fact that it 
targeted noncombatants. His troops approached at night from a concealed position, they had 
scouts reconnoiter the terrain before they arrived, and he divided his troops into several columns 
for the attack, using a signal so that their approach and charge would be as coordinated as 
possible.  
These are all the guidelines that General George McClellan outlined in his 1862 manual, 
and Custer follows them to a tee. In his introduction McClellan lists three primary reasons for the 
US to employ cavalry, one of which is in operations with Indians. He writes that Indians  
Are generally irregular light horsemen, sometimes living and acting altogether on the 
plains, in other localities falling back into the broken country when pursued: the 
difficulty, always, is to catch them; to do so, we must be as light and quick as they are, 
and then superiority of weapons and discipline must uniformly give us the advantage.” 
Sheridan’s campaign was six years removed from McClellan’s book and he had abandoned 
entirely the strategy of chasing mounted Indian warriors. However, McClellan’s specific tactical 
maneuvers were still, seemingly, in effect. What this means is that Sheridan’s campaign had an 
overall strategy of attacking villages, and specific cavalry tactics for taking an enemy by 
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surprise, but few-to-no guidelines on how to deal with the presence of noncombatants. It would 
seem that “enemy” was being defined as “Indian” in a generalized tactical sense. This ambiguity 
was then combined with the rush and heat of a frantic cavalry charge. The 1864 manual Cavalry 
Tactics in Three Parts acknowledges the chaos and adrenalin of the surprise attack. It notes that 
the decisive charge is the primary function of cavalry, and it should be swift: “the squadrons 
quicken the gallop and attack the enemy with impetuosity.”232 Those guidelines surely suited 
Custer, who was described by famed journalist Henry M. Stanley as having “a certain 
impetuosity and undoubted courage” as his principle characteristics.233 An impetuous and swift 
charge would make it difficult to carefully select targets in any circumstance. When that charge 
was directed at a group of people that were dehumanized and reviled by many US soldiers the 
results could be especially deadly. The cultural politics of Indian hating was widespread in 
nineteenth century America.234 For soldiers operating in a tactical grey area those cultural 
attitudes would fill in the blanks. Ultimately, we cannot know for certain what was in the heads 
of Sheridan’s soldiers, but we do know which direction they were pointed. In mid-November 
they received their orders to proceed south towards the presumed location of “hostile” Indian 
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Daybreak at the Washita 
“The field resembled a vast slaughter pen.” 
On the morning of the 26th of November, 1868, Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer’s 7th 
Cavalry struck the trail of what was believed to be a Native war party near the Texas-Oklahoma 
border. Leading one of three columns converging on the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, and 
Comanche clustered on the southern plains, an enthusiastic Custer hoped to follow the trail back 
to a Native village. Ten days earlier Custer had been denied the opportunity to follow a similar 
trail by Alfred Sully, but this time there was no superior officer to reign in the impetuous general 
and the 7th swung into motion. A heavy snowfall made the trail easy to follow and an eager 
Custer pushed his command through the night, marching from first light to 1:30 AM with only 
an hour’s rest. Custer’s Osage scouts located the village and he crept forward with two of the 
scouts to have a look. The tinkling bells of the Cheyenne pony herd confirmed the presence of 
Natives, and as he left to return to his men Custer heard a baby crying. He had found his village. 
Custer hurried back to his troops and made plans, dividing his command into four columns with 
orders to simultaneously charge at daybreak and take the village by surprise. For four hours the 
7th shivered and huddled together as the moonlight reflected off the snow, unable to light fires. 
Strict silence was maintained. Even Custer’s prize greyhound was muzzled and later garroted 
when it would not stay quiet. Several of the command’s other dogs were strangled and stabbed to 
death. A few hours before dawn the moon disappeared and left the soldiers waiting in the dark, 
hearts pounding and breath misting in the air. Eventually the night began to fade away and the 
troops would have stiffly mounted their horses in preparation for the charge.236 
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As Custer would later report, “there never was a more complete surprise… the Indians 
were caught napping for once.” Accompanied by the cavalry band playing the regimental song, 
“Gary Owen,” the soldiers of the 7th swept into the village at daybreak and unleashed a hail of 
gunfire. The music was quickly replaced with the tumult of battle as Custer’s column splashed 
across the Washita into the village, shooting directly into tipis as sleepy Cheyenne emerged into 
a scene of chaos. In addition to the Cheyenne warriors many elders, women, and children were 
gunned down, some intentionally and some casualties of the confusion. Many fell in the initial 
charge, but official reports noted that dead Cheyenne could be found as many as six miles from 
the battlefield.237 The question of noncombatant casualties is a difficult one. In his memoir 
written long after the fight Custer claimed that in the moments before the charge “I could not but 
regret that in a war such as we were forced to engage in, the mode and circumstances of battle 
would possibly prevent discrimination.” He further claimed that he ordered his soldiers to avoid 
killing any but “the fighting strength of the village.” However, he did instruct that no Cheyenne 
should be allowed to escape, and his initial reports on the battle, as well as those of his other 
soldiers, fail to mention any warning against noncombatant casualties. It is possible that the 
admonition to only kill warriors was inserted into the narrative in the aftermath of the fight to 
counter the backlash to women and children killed at the Washita.238  
What we do know is that there was pressure to attack Native villages, kill those who 
resisted, and deliver a blow so hard that surrender would be the only option. What follows is 
difficult reading, but it is important to interrupt the romance of the cavalry charge and emphasize 
what if usually meant: Native suffering, experiencing attacks that were not exceptional but rather 
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the intended outcome of a strategic prerogative.239 In the initial charge captain Albert Barnitz 
rode into a group of Cheyenne only to discover that they were women with children strapped to 
their backs. He wrote that “I did not care to waste ammunition on them, though to tell the truth I 
was not at all sentimental about it.”240 First Lieutenant Edward S. Godfrey claimed that the 
charging soldiers “took no care to prevent hitting women.” As he charged out of the village he 
came upon two Cheyenne women, one of whom put up her arms and said “don’t shoot” but was 
shot and killed by another soldier.241 Private Dennis Lynch would later recall that the soldiers 
surrounded the village and “shot everything they could see” including Cheyenne women. The 
chaos of the charge seemingly did not encourage discrimination in the choice of targets. Even a 
Mexican trader named Pilan with the bad luck of being present on that unhappy morning had 
attempted to surrender but was shot and killed.242 As historian Nicole Guidotti-Hernandez has 
argued, it was not uncommon for Anglo-Americans to profess confusion about legitimate targets 
in the context of a surprise charge on Native villages. Attackers recounting the experience would 
deny the ability to distinguish between men and women, a move rooted in notions about Native 
savagery and intended to deflect criticism for subverting moral codes about killing women or 
children.243 
Custer seemed to make no effort to avoid the killing of noncombatants in his overall 
strategy but he was also unwilling to let it go on uninterrupted once the fighting began. Scout 
Ben Clark later recalled that the men of Captain Myer’s command pursued a group of women 
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and children, “killing them without mercy.” Clark reported the slaughter to Custer who ordered 
the scout to intervene and place them under guard. Clark also witnessed the death of about 
twenty men, women and children who took cover behind a river bank and refused to surrender. 
According to Clark the Osage scouts were responsible for many of the noncombatant casualties 
and mutilations.244 Cheyenne accounts of the battle agree that more women and children were 
killed than men. Magpie, who would survive the attack and later fight at the Battle of the 
Rosebud and the Little Bighorn, recalled that a group of soldiers chasing him and some 
companions swerved to instead attack a fleeing group of women and children, the same group 
reported on by Ben Clark.245 Moving Behind Woman described the aftermath of the fight as a 
scene of carnage, the bodies of men, women, and children “strewn about.”246 Mrs. B.K. Young 
Bird remembered that “very many of our people were shot down like rabbits. No mercy was 
shown to either the babies or children of any age and no mercy was shown to the women.”247 
Mrs. Lone Wolf recalled that in the initial charge she tried to run from her tent only to be 
motioned back in by some soldiers. When the battle ended she was taken prisoner and 
remembered that “men, women, and children lay dead everywhere.” According to Cheyenne 
custom prisoners could be put to death if an equal number of Cheyenne were killed by the 
prisoner’s friends or relatives. Consequently, the Cheyenne captives expected that a number of 
them would be executed in revenge for the soldiers killed in the charge. Mrs. Lone Wolf was 
sent to inquire of Custer, through an interpreter, how many Cheyenne should prepare themselves 
for death. Custer reportedly covered his face with his hands for a full minute before informing 
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her that “white people don’t kill prisoners.”248 Custer’s theatrical exasperation was meant to 
highlight the difference between civilized and savage war but it would ultimately ring hollow. 
He would threaten to hang captive Native leaders more than once in the coming winter 
campaign. 
In the aftermath of the fight the supposed murder of white captives was used to justify the 
indiscriminate nature of the attack at the Washita. In his official report Custer claimed that he 
secured two white children who had been held captive in Black Kettle’s village. He also reported 
the murder of a white woman as well as a ten-year-old boy.249 Sheridan would forward this 
report to Sherman and no correction to the public record of the battle was ever made, but neither 
Sheridan nor Custer’s subsequent reports of the fight mention the captive boys or the murdered 
woman and child. Whether a result of mid-battle miscommunication or an outright fabrication, 
Sheridan and Custer clearly realized that they could no longer justify a narrative for which there 
was no evidence, but the presence of murdered white captives would persist as a justification for 
the attack.250 A correspondent for the New York Daily Tribune claimed that many Cheyenne 
women took part in the fighting, and that “others were spared, except those who had been seen to 
murder white captive children in their hands.” Officer Charles Brewster claimed that the 
Cheyenne killed all white prisoners when the fight began, including two infants, the work of 
“revengeful squaws.” Several soldiers reported a fleeing Cheyenne woman killing a white child 
with a knife, but the child was her own and not a captive, seemingly killed in the panic and 
despair of the attack.251 Like Custer’s report both accounts were fabrications as there were no 
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white captives in Black Kettle’s village. The only captives known to be in the vicinity were Clara 
Blinn and her infant son, captured by Cheyenne in October of 1868. Both were found dead in the 
adjacent Arapaho village two weeks after the attack and were most likely not present in Black 
Kettle’s village, and may have been killed in retaliation for the attack.252   
Custer’s attack had been devastating but he quickly found his command in a dangerous 
position. The village had been one of several Native encampments strung along the Washita 
River. Although the 7th took the village in a matter of minutes they had to spend several hours 
fighting to dislodge the Cheyenne warriors that managed to escape the initial gunfire, who took 
up positions in nearby ravines and underbrush. As the initial fighting subsided, Kiowa and other 
Indians from nearby encampments moved to engage the US soldiers. Major Joel Elliot and 17 
soldiers had pursued a group of fleeing Cheyenne downstream. They caught and killed several of 
the Cheyenne but were in turn surrounded by the Indians moving up from the other villages. 
Elliot and all 17 of his men were killed, although Custer and his officers had no idea what had 
befallen them. Only later would they learn the fate of Elliot and his men, with Custer’s 
abandonment of them a lingering controversy.253 The 7th Cavalry had inflicted heavy casualties. 
They had also killed Black Kettle and his wife, captured 53 women and children, and taken 
possession of 51 lodges. Although the actual numbers have been widely debated, Custer claimed 
the number of Cheyenne dead at 103 warriors and “some of the squaws and a few of the 
children.” This number was arrived at by Custer in conversations with his officers during and 
after the battle and was at best an estimate, as the actual casualties on the battlefield were never 
counted.254 He would later inflate this count to 140 Cheyenne killed. Soldiers present at the fight 
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would place the count far lower, calling official reports an exaggeration and claiming about 
twenty Cheyenne men and around forty women and children killed.255 Cheyenne accounts of the 
dead were even lower, reporting to Special Agent Vincent Colyer that thirteen men, sixteen 
women and nine children had been killed. The number of wounded would have been much 
higher although no clear estimate exists. 256 53 Cheyenne women and children were now 
prisoners of the US army. 
Custer’s report on enemy casualties hardly seems out of place or surprising. Perhaps he 
felt he could not obtain an exact count given the looming threat of Indian reinforcements, or 
perhaps he did not want the number and type of Cheyenne casualties specifically counted.257 
However, he was interested in cataloging more than just the dead. During a tense firefight, with 
the looming threat of Native reinforcements, Custer had his troops meticulously catalog the 
entire contents of Black Kettle’s camp, down to the last blanket. This thorough list of spoils was 
included in his subsequent report: 
The Indians left in the ground, and in our possession, the bodies of one hundred and three 
of their warriors, including “Black Kettle” himself, whose scalp is now in the possession 
of one of our Osage guides. We captured, in good condition, 875 horses, ponies and 
mules; 241 saddles, some of very fine and costly workmanship; 573 buffalo robes; 390 
buffalo skins (for lodges); 160 untanned robes, 210 axes; 140 hatchets; 35 revolvers; 47 
rifles; 535 pounds of powder; 1050 pounds of lead; 4000 arrows and arrow heads; 75 
spears; 90 bullet moulds; 35 bows and quivers; 12 shields; 300 pounds of bullets; 775 
lariats; 940 buckskin saddle-bags; 470 blankets; 93 coats; 700 pounds of tobacco. In 
addition, we captured all their winter supply of dried buffalo meat, all their meal, flour, 
and other provisions, and in fact everything they possessed, even driving the warriors 
from the village with little or no clothing.258 
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Remember that Custer’s troops were probably engaged in continuous fighting while this 
incredibly detailed list was compiled. It was not a casual survey of captured goods but rather a 
specific cataloging of the attack’s material effects on Cheyenne livelihood. It was evidence that 
both Cheyenne lives and Cheyenne independence were being destroyed. Of course, Custer did 
not have his troops count buffalo robes just so he could include it in the report. Large bonfires 
were kindled and most of the goods were destroyed, although Custer had the troops load one of 
the finest lodges into a wagon for a personal souvenir.259 Almost the entire herd of 875 ponies 
was killed, first by slitting their throats and later via gunfire when that proved too slow. This 
further enraged the Native warriors who were forced to watch from a distance.260 Custer would 
report to Sheridan that “we destroyed everything of value to the Indians,” and left the survivors 
and captured women and children to mourn the loss of their family members with only the 
clothes on their backs. Black Kettle’s band had been made “poor,” fulfilling one of Sheridan’s 
primary goals for the campaign. The loss of family members and loved ones would have been 
the central tragedy of the Washita attack for the survivors, but the destruction of the tipis, 
supplies, ponies, and food was a catastrophe for the tribe with winter arriving in full force. Cold 
and frostbite would afflict many of the survivors.261 In his report of the attack Custer commended 
his troops for enduring the sub-zero temperatures and privations of the campaign. The hardships 
faced by the now destitute Cheyenne, many of them captives, would be far greater.262 
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 For the cold and wounded, the trip back to Camp Supply was difficult as the column 
struggled through snow and freezing temperatures. The captive Cheyenne were now subject to 
violence that would extend beyond the battlefield. Much of this brutality would be borne by 
Cheyenne women. Various sources suggest sexual coercion and assault on the part of officers 
towards Cheyenne women during the journey and subsequent captivity. Frederick Benteen wrote 
to a friend years later that “of course you have heard of an informal invitation from Custer for 
officers desiring to avail themselves of the services of a captured squaw, to come to the squaw 
round-up corral and select one! Custer took his first choice, and lived with her during winter and 
spring of 1868 and ’69.”263 The woman referred to by Benteen was Monahseetah, the daughter of 
Little Rock. Benteen was famously critical of Custer but his account is corroborated in several 
places. Ben Clark claimed that “many of the squaws captured at Washita were used by the 
officers,” with scout Raphael Romero sending prisoners to the officer’s tents each night.264 
Magpie, a Cheyenne survivor of the fight, would further elaborate on these abuses to writer 
Charles Brill. When Brill questioned him about sexual abuse Magpie reported that he had heard 
several of the victims recount their experience at the hands of Custer and his officers, including 
the officers selecting Cheyenne women from the prisoners once they returned to Camp 
Supply.265 
These sorts of abuses were not unique to the Washita attack. The previous year the 
military had issued a confidential warning to officers on the plains alleging “practices hurtful to 
the reputation of the army,” including officers “keeping squaws” as mistresses under the guise of 
servants. The communication warned that any enlisted men or employees found “thus addicted” 
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would be immediately discharged. While not all relationships between Native women and white 
men would have been directly coercive, clearly there was a plains military culture that viewed 
Native women as sexually available while simultaneously illicit, a threat to the stability of 
military culture that had to be dealt with in confidential memos rather than general 
orders.266There is a long history of depicting Native women in bestial and sexualized forms, 
rooted in the image of the "squaw drudge" which functioned as the inverse of the Indian princess 
of Disney movies and settler-genealogical fantasies. Native women were viewed as subverting 
Anglo gender norms, a subversion that stood in the way of their elimination or domestication 
into a settler-regime.267 Guidotti-Hernandez argues that rape was used to dominate Native 
women and to reinstate Western gender and sexual norms. Their depiction as dichotomized 
princesses/drudges made them both reviled and available, subjected to ongoing sexual violence 
that extended beyond the Washita attack.268  
The 7th Cavalry rode into Camp Supply with an extravagant ceremony on December 
1st.269 For the attack Custer received the “special congratulations” of his commander Philip 
Sheridan for “efficient and gallant services rendered” in a set of general field orders issued the 
day after the battle. Sheridan also published Custer’s detailed list of casualties and goods 
destroyed, expressing his gratitude for the “almost total annihilation of the Indian band.” 270 
Sheridan took a broad view of “annihilation,” incorporating both casualties inflicted and goods 
and materials destroyed. As news of the fight began to spread, Sherman had to fulfil his promise 
to defend Sheridan against criticism. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Nathaniel Taylor, 
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along with members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs viewed Custer’s attack as a 
repetition of Sand Creek, with the friendly Black Kettle once again subject to an unprovoked 
attack. Members of the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek nations issued a formal protest and 
pressured Commissioner Taylor for “a fair and thorough investigation.”271 For his part Sherman 
backed up the actions of Custer and Sheridan, maintaining that while Black Kettle may have 
been peaceful the warriors of his band were not, having participated in attacks on settlers near 
the Solomon and Saline rivers in the summer of 1868. As Sherman worked to defend the actions 
of his generals against public outcry, the campaign continued. 
The Winter War Continues 
Washita was a hard blow but Sheridan’s seek-and-destroy winter campaign would 
continue. In his report summarizing the Washita fight Sheridan wrote that “the Indians, for the 
first time, begin to realize that winter will not compel us to make a truce with them.”272 Custer’s 
attack on the Cheyenne was devastating but Sheridan’s goal of driving Indians into reservations 
and killing any that remained outside was unfinished. Custer and Sheridan quickly remobilized 
and moved on the Indians that had been camped near Black Kettle on the Washita, leaving Camp 
Supply on December 7th and riding south towards Fort Cobb. They examined the Washita 
battlefield and then moved to pursue the Indians that had fled. 273 As the column struggled 
southeast through snow and ice a letter reached Sheridan from Hazen, informing the general that 
the tribes near Fort Cobb were all considered to be friendly and had not engaged in hostilities 
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during the recent conflict.274 Shortly after the arrival of Hazen’s letter a group of Kiowa under 
Satanta and Lone Wolf as well as some Apache and Comanche approached the column. Custer 
took a guard and rode out to meet them under a flag of truce, during which the chiefs offered to 
accompany the soldiers back to Fort Cobb and reiterated their friendliness. Custer was hardly 
disposed to accept their peaceful intentions. He believed that these same Indians had ridden to 
the defense of Black Kettle’s village after the Washita attack and were thus equally guilty.275 Of 
course, the Cheyenne at Black Kettle’s village hadn’t been offered a chance to surrender, so it is 
unclear what other response Custer expected from the tribes other than self-defense. 
As Custer talked with the chiefs the Indians quietly began to slip away, no doubt terrified 
of being attacked by the same soldiers that had inflicted such carnage on Black Kettle’s village. 
Custer and his officers believed this to a be ruse and proceeded to arrest Satanta and Lone Wolf 
as well as two Apache chiefs, holding them as hostages to coerce the frightened Indians into Fort 
Cobb. Custer, firmly convinced that the Kiowa and others that had been present at Washita 
deserved to be treated as hostiles, believed that Hazen’s letter attesting to their friendly 
disposition was more evidence of the corruption and ineptitude of the Indian bureau.276 Upon 
arrival at Fort Cobb Custer had the chiefs imprisoned, and when it became clear that their 
villages were not proceeding towards Fort Cobb but continued to flee Custer had them dispatch 
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messengers to their people with the news that the chiefs would be “hung at sunrise to the nearest 
tree.” As he would later report, “this produced the desired effect.” All the southern plains 
Apache, most of the Comanche, and the main portion of the Kiowa hastened to Fort Cobb.  
Custer made it clear that the tribes were not there to make new treaties or propose terms 
of settlement. They were there to place themselves under US control, “being virtually prisoners 
of war.” Of the five tribes at whom Sheridan’s campaign was aimed there remained free only the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho, who had fled to the mountains south of Fort Cobb. Custer dispatched an 
Apache chief and Black Kettle’s sister to these tribes with messages warning them to come in. 
He would later report that in his dealings with all five tribes 
No promise or inducement has been held out. I have made no pretense to be friendly 
disposed. Whatever I have asked the tribes to do, or accede to, has been in the form of a 
demand. They have, from the commencement of this campaign, been treated, not as 
independent nations, but as refractory subjects of a common government.277 
Early in the campaign Sheridan had referred to the Cheyenne as “guerillas,” and here Custer 
referred to the tribes as refractory, wayward and disobedient subjects revolting against the 
authority of the US government rather than sovereign nations with fully ratified treaties. In late 
December Sheridan wrote to Sherman with the news that if the Indians continued to refuse to 
come into Fort Cobb, “I will issue an order outlawing them, and forbidding communication from 
anyone, directly or indirectly, with them, and will order to be hung any Indian so doing; and will 
proceed against them as heretofore stated.”278 This definitional move was strategic in that it 
shifted Native resistance away from any sort of political legitimacy. If the US was so established 
as to make Natives warriors “outlaws” then Custer would not be fighting a war in the first place. 
But Custer, and his superior, and his superior’s superior all continuously positioned Native 
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people as subjects of US authority without a claim to competing sovereignty, and by extension, 
land.  
The winter campaigning would continue into 1869. In late December Sheridan claimed 
that his strategy had “filled them with consternation,” “they cannot sleep at night; they cannot 
graze their stock without fear; they have no buffalo to eat; they will have no robes to trade; and 
are feeling very nervous and insecure.”279 Custer’s movement south from Camp Supply was one 
of several troop movements in late 1868, and on Christmas Day, December 25th the column 
under Major Evans discovered a Comanche village of about 500 along the Red River in present-
day Oklahoma. Evans promptly followed the marching orders he had received from Sheridan to 
“attack all Indians met.” He brought the firepower of his four mountain howitzers to bear on the 
village and opened fire as the panicked Comanche tried to load women and children onto horses 
to escape. The village suffered an estimated 20-30 casualties and left behind their property and 
food supplies, which Evans’ command spent the entire day burning. Evans, like his colleagues, 
cataloged the destroyed supplies, including 25,000 pounds of buffalo meat, 150 bushels of corn, 
200 sacks of corn meal, 200 sacks of wheat meal, 1200 pounds of tobacco, 100 pounds of 
powder, 250 pounds of lead, 100 bullet molds, 300 robes, 100 skins, 60-80 hatchets, 100 brass 
kettles, 100 iron pots, 120 tin buckets, 120 camp kettles, 60 butcher knives, 60 draw knives, 60 
hammers, 1000 panniers, 200-300 lariats, and a variety of other supplies, “all the paraphernalia 
of a rich Indian town.”280 Everything except the food and tobacco was destroyed, the rest being 
used by Evans’ command.281  
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Evans’ description of the amount of powder, lead, utensils and tools is consistent with 
other reports from that winter, and paints a picture of a Comanche village well equipped to hunt, 
process food, and survive the hard winter months. It is unlikely that the soldiers accurately 
measured 25,000 pounds of Buffalo meat, but the perhaps inflated list of food supplies shows 
that the village had enough food to impress the soldiers and presumably to survive the winter 
months. Evans made special mention of the quality of the lodges, about 60 in total, “of the best 
Indian workmanship, and nearly all new.”282 Each lodge averaged around 18 lodge poles of red 
cedar, and twenty buffalo skins, representing a huge investment in time and effort and a grievous 
loss. The Comanche village had lost nearly everything, and the psychological effect of that loss, 
when combined with casualties and the threat of further attack, would have added to the pressure 
to submit to US authority. It also foreclosed a range of cultural and subsistence practices and 
opened a window for US authorities to force the Comanche to adopt Euro-American norms. 
More than total war, this sort of destruction was aimed at broad cultural changes, and Evans’ 
effort to emphasize the number and quality of goods his command destroyed is evidence of the 
priority the military placed on this sort of violence.  
In his report on the engagement Sheridan called it “the final blow to the backbone of the 
Indian rebellion,” but that was a premature sentiment and one not shared by the officers under 
his command.283 Evans’ troops would stay in the field until late January 1869 but would not have 
another major engagement with Indians, and in his final report he regretted that the campaign 
had to “terminate with so little success.” Indeed, a military policy based on body counts and 
villages destroyed demanded more than one inconclusive battle, although Evan’s destruction of 
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Comanche supplies was no small matter in the middle of winter. Ultimately the weather, which 
had enabled some of the attacks carried out that season, also played a role slowing down and 
interrupting the movement of US troops. Evans’ command lost 172 horses to cold weather and 
lack of food, and the troops under Major Carr spent most of December and January struggling 
through snowstorms without encountering any Indians. In late December a seemingly 
exasperated Carr requested permission to bring his troops in from the field, reporting 8-inch deep 
snow that prevented the starving animals from eating.284  
The attacks in November and December were not the end of the violence. Evans and Carr 
had kept Indians on the southern plains anxious and mobile. The strike on Black Kettle’s village 
at the Washita, in addition to the various troop movements in the region, had caused thousands of 
Indians, both those in tribes considered hostile and others, to flee to the Fort Cobb agency to 
avoid a similar fate.285 These were not idle fears. According to Custer in the aftermath of the 
Washita fight “it was determined that upon a slightly modified principle, reinforced by the biting 
frosts of winter, we should continue to press things until our savage enemies should not only be 
completely humbled, but be forced by the combined perils of war and winter to beg for peace 
and settle quietly down within the limits of their reservation.”286 However, the main body of 
Cheyenne and Arapaho, including most of the Dog Soldiers, remained southwest somewhere 
beyond the Wichita Mountains.  
Sheridan managed to arrange a meeting with several of the independent Cheyenne, 
Arapaho, and Kiowa leaders on January 1st, 1869. The chiefs reported the impoverished 
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condition of their people and Little Robe explained the toll that the various columns of troops 
had taken on their sense of safety. He told Sheridan that “there are a great many troops in the 
country now travelling around. No matter which way we turn we meet troops travelling through 
the country. We are tired looking around and seeing bad, and now want to take the white man by 
the hand and whatever we do hereafter to see good.”287 Enforcing a hard line, Sheridan and 
Custer promised more violence unless the Indians were willing to surrender themselves entirely 
to US control. Custer warned that “this reservation is now the only ground left for the Indians; all 
the other is bad ground, and has war made on.” Sheridan similarly warned the assembled chiefs 
that “if they stay out, I will make war on them winter and summer as long as I live, or until they 
are wiped out.” He further warned that he was unwilling to discuss peace until every Indian was 
collected at the agency.288 Given the slaughter on the Washita Sheridan’s threats were far from 
idle. However, proximity to reservations and forts had failed to protect the Cheyenne before, and 
with the memory of Sand Creek still fresh not all Indians were willing to submit themselves to 
the dubious safety of military administration.  
Military pressure continued to worsen the condition of Native people on the southern 
plains but many of the Cheyenne remained independent. Most of the Arapaho had been captured 
by Custer in late January and moved to Fort Sill, the site chosen as an alternative to Fort Cobb 
for the southern Plains Indian reservation.289 Meanwhile Sheridan and his subordinates worked 
to manage the Kiowa and Comanche that had settled on the reservation. In February he wrote to 
Sherman and complained that “it would be necessary, if we acted with fairness and justice, to 
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hang nearly all the principal chiefs or their sons, of the five bands belonging to this reservation, 
and now here, and about half the balance of their people.” It is hard to see how he arrived at that 
conclusion unless he was counting every Native person to ever take up arms against US soldiers. 
This was not hyperbole, as Sheridan had previously ordered Brevet Major General Benjamin 
Grierson to assist Hazen in managing the new reservation and to hang and imprison any Indians 
found committing acts of violence or thievery in Texas. Sheridan thought of Native people as 
something closer to criminals than warriors, advising Grierson that Native people in a “savage” 
state could not be expected to behave themselves without a system of punitive laws and 
punishments.290 Sheridan believed that hanging every “guilty” Indian would “have been the best 
in the end” but that it would have threatened the success of the reservation system. Sheridan was 
“deeply interested in its success” and believed that if the reservation system failed extermination 
would not be far behind for Indian people.291  
As Sheridan worked to confine the Kiowa and Comanche to the reservation and halt their 
raids into Texas, Custer moved to attack the still-independent Cheyenne. On March 2nd he led the 
7th Cavalry and the 19th Kansas Cavalry out of a camp near Medicine Bluff Creek, 30 miles south 
of the reservation at Fort Cobb. Custer, no doubt trying to replicate the attack at the Washita, 
followed several trails of lodge-poles hoping the led back to the main village. By March 12th the 
trail had grown to over 100 lodges. Hoping to catch the Cheyenne unawares Custer ordered a ban 
on bugle calls or the discharge of firearms, forbid fires during daytime and had the troops burn 
their excess supplies to move faster.292 On the 15th one of the Osage scouts located a herd of 
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ponies guarded by several Indians. Custer advanced and learned from the guards that the main 
body of the southern Cheyenne, about 260 lodges, was camped in the vicinity. Most were in a 
camp nearby consisting of Dog Soldier bands lead by Rock Forehead, known to the whites as 
Medicine Arrows, as he was the keeper of important Cheyenne spiritual objects of the same 
name.293 Custer quickly made plans to surround and attack the village as he had at the Washita 
but cancelled the plans when he learned in a council with some of the chiefs that two white 
women, Anna Belle Brewster Morgan and Sarah Catherine White, were held captive. Fearing 
that they would be killed if he attacked, Custer delayed his charge and accompanied Medicine 
Arrows to the center of the village for a meeting, observing that the entire camp was being 
packed up in a rush. In the meeting Custer was purportedly seated directly beneath the Four 
Sacred Arrows and was told by Rock Forehead (Medicine Arrows) that “if you are acting 
treachery toward us, sometime you and your whole command will be killed.” Rock Forehead 
also tapped the ashes of the ceremonial pipe out onto Custer’s boots, a Cheyenne sign of bad 
luck which perhaps forecast the destruction of Custer’s troops at the Little Bighorn seven years 
later.294 As the meeting delayed Custer the frightened Cheyenne began to move away towards 
Little Robe’s village several miles away, leaving behind lodges and supplies. Custer attributed 
this to their guilt over crimes committed but it was no doubt out of fear of a repetition of the 
Washita attack.295  
When it became clear that the Cheyenne would slip away, Custer had four chiefs, 
including two representing the Dog Soldiers, Big Head and Dull Knife, captured and held at 
gunpoint.  He threatened to hang the chiefs unless the Cheyenne surrendered and moved to the 
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reservation, a repetition of the tactic used against the Kiowa the past December. After three days 
of delay and attempted bargaining by the Cheyenne, Custer delivered an ultimatum: the chiefs 
would be hung unless they surrendered the captive women by sunset, and he would then attack 
the village. The captives were relinquished and Custer learned from them that the Cheyenne 
were in a desperate state, having been driven beyond the buffalo ranges and forced to subsist on 
their starving mules and horses. However, Custer was unable to pursue them due to the similarly 
bad shape of his own troops and animals. Returning to the now abandoned Cheyenne villages 
Custer ordered the lodges, food and supplies burned. He then moved his command back to the 
supply depot. The Cheyenne had managed to slip away but Custer still had three of their chiefs 
as hostages, and he extracted promises that they would return to the reservation. In his report he 
claimed that “we have penetrated every haunt frequented by the five tribes which were lately 
hostile. We know their accustomed routes and hiding places. We have taught the Indians that 
they are safe from us in no place, and at no season… that the white man can endure the 
inclemencies of winter better than can the Indian.” Although frustrated that he had been unable 
to attack them directly Custer believed that the hostages would ensure future Cheyenne good 
behavior and he concluded his report to Sheridan claiming “this I consider as the termination of 
the Indian War.”296 
This was another premature declaration of victory. While most of the Arapaho moved to 
the reservation, only Little Robe and about 67 lodges of Cheyenne came in. That left some 200 
lodges of Dog Soldiers and their allies still independent. Indeed, a letter from Colonel Benjamin 
Grierson reported that Custer’s recent campaign had persuaded the Cheyenne to remain 
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independent. Grierson, in meetings with Little Robe and other Cheyenne chiefs, learned that the 
bands had been headed towards Camp Supply with the intention of surrendering when Custer 
overtook them. After the encounter with Custer they held a council and the general opinion was 
that Custer’s deception and capture of several of their chiefs did not bode well for their welcome 
at Camp Supply. The tribes scattered, with Little Robe and his followers surrendering at Camp 
Wichita while the rest moved up the Canadian River to hunt buffalo.297 The Dog Soldiers 
remained off-reservation and would continue to refuse to come in. A June 1869 report sent to 
Sheridan relayed that the split between Little Robe’s Cheyenne and the Dog Soldiers had become 
permanent. Several Kiowa and Comanche chiefs reported that Little Robe had held a large 
council with all the Southern Cheyenne at which he demanded that the Dog Soldiers either settle 
on the reservation or leave that part of the country. The Dog Soldiers refused, telling Little Robe 
they would never make peace or settle down, declaring their intent to go north and join the 
Lakota and continue to fight.298 
The Dog Soldiers moved north up the Republican River and made some sporadic attacks, 
eventually prompting a response from Colonel Carr and the Fifth Cavalry, which would set out 
in pursuit in June. Carr’s orders were to “clear the Republican Country of Indians. All Indians 
found in the vicinity will be treated as hostile, unless they submit themselves as ready and 
willing to go to their proper reservations.”299 A few brief skirmishes failed to deter Carr and he 
caught the entire camp of Dog Soldiers in their village at Summit Springs on July 11, 1869, 
taking the village by surprise and winning decisively. Tall Bull, one of the leaders of the Dog 
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Soldiers, was killed along with some 52 Cheyenne men and an unknown number of women and 
children.300 Seventeen women and children were captured. There were two white women held 
captive in the village, one of which was killed once the attack started while the other escaped 
with a severe injury. Carr’s troops pursued fleeing Cheyenne up to four miles away from the 
village but their exhausted horses eventually gave out. The soldiers occupied the village and the 
next morning proceeded to catalog and burn the food, lodges, and supplies. Carr, perhaps more 
invested in protocol than Custer, convened an impromptu military board consisting of three 
officers to produce an incredibly detailed list of supplies captured and destroyed. He would later 
report that “there were one hundred and sixty fires burning at once to destroy their property.” 
The board estimated that the soldiers burned ten tons of Dog Soldier property before 
leaving the camp.301 Carr’s report states that “there is much other valuable property on the list, 
but the above will materially reduce their means of killing white people” Carr had only one 
casualty, a slight injury from an arrow. His report calls the fight a source of “extreme 
gratification,” complaining of a general feeling of underappreciation among the soldiers of the 
5th Cavalry: 
It may be imagination, but there is a general feeling that the services and hardships of the 
regiment have not been appreciated for want of any brilliant list of killed and wounded. 
We have, however, no pleasures in killing the poor miserable savages, but desire, in 
common with the whole army, by the performance of our duty, to deliver the settlers 
from the dangers to which they are exposed on account of the past mistaken policy, or 
rather want of policy, in Indian affairs, which renders it necessary to chastise them until 
they submit.  
Carr finally had a body count to match that of Custer, as well as the material destruction to go 
with it. He seems aware of a general pressure in the department to inflict large numbers of 
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casualties, a practice that would be revisited during the Vietnam War where body counts became 
the metric by which success was measured.302 While slightly more self-conscious than Custer, 
Carr’s criticisms blamed the necessity for violence on failed Indian policies. The Cheyenne, 
according to Carr, were already conquered, and it was the policies controlling them which were 
flawed. Of course, the Dog Soldiers demonstrated, perhaps more than any other group on the 
plains, that Indian people were not conquered in the mid-nineteenth century. Their militant 
resistance had provoked a widespread and destructive military response.   
The attack broke the power of the Dog Soldiers on the southern plains, and while it 
would not permanently end Native resistance in that region it did wrap up Sheridan’s campaign 
which had begun 9 months earlier. For the time being most of the Southern Cheyenne, Arapaho, 
Kiowa, Comanche and plains Apache had been confined to reservations. Sheridan planned to 
involve them in “the good work of civilization, education, and religious instruction.”303 The 
annual report to the Secretary of War for that year reported that “the Indians were severely 
punished, deprived of a large proportion of their animals, provisions, and other property, and 
compelled to release two captive women carried off by them from Kansas.”304 Sheridan’s 
program of attacking villages directly was considered a success. His model would make it into 
the few strategic manuals on Indian fighting produced in the nineteenth century.305 Locate a 
village, take it by surprise, and attack at dawn. This was now military doctrine. The violence of 
this strategy would be fully realized in an event that took place in early 1870. Once more 
Sheridan would order his troops to move out and strike an Indian village. However, this attack 
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would be inflicted on the wrong target, a band of smallpox-infected and friendly Piegan 
Blackfeet on the Marias River.  
Epilogue: “Strike Them Hard” 
They attacked the village of Bull Shield at dawn. White Man’s Dog had sung his 
Wolverine power song and had tied a small pouch containing the white stone around his 
neck. He rode between his father and Crazy Dog, slightly ahead of them. It was his 
honor, in Yellow Kidney’s place, to strike the enemy first. The long gallop down the hill 
seemed to take forever. Behind him he heard the thunder of the horses’ hooves and the 
cries and yodeling of the warriors. A steady pop of rifle fire increased until it seemed that 
Thunder Chief, Many Drums, rode with them. White Man’s Dog’s throat was dry in the 
surging wind, and his heart beat strongly in his ears. Then he was on the flat, guiding his 
horse with his knees, firing his many-shots gun, his wedding present from his father, 
blindly at the lodges. He saw a man emerge from one of the tipis clad only in leggings. 
He turned the gray horse slightly and bore down on him and he heard a strange animal 
cry that filled his heart with fear before he realized that it came from him.306 
 
Military reports have a detached and clinical voice that fails to capture the adrenalin, fear, 
and chaos that would accompany a surprise attack or cavalry charge. But out of these reports 
historians, artists, writers, and filmmakers have elevated stories of these attacks to an iconic 
image of the Indian Wars. Histories of Sand Creek, Washita, Camp Grant, and Little Bighorn 
typically open with the early morning quiet, the still moments before a storm of soldiers breaks 
over a Native village. The ensuing violence has been depicted in art, such as in Frederic 
Remington’s Battle of Washita, and in film, such as Custer’s charge in Little Big Man. Few 
depictions contrast the detachment of a military report like the passage from James Welch’s 
novel Fools Crow that opens this section. Welch captures the intensity and fear of a surprise 
attack from the perspective of a young Blackfeet man, Fool’s Crow, the novel’s central figure. 
However, this passage from Fools Crow depicts an attack by Piegan Blackfeet on a camp of 
enemy Crow rather than a charge by US soldiers. In this passage, Native people are both 
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aggressors and defenders, and it might seem to have little to do with nineteenth century US 
military policy. But Welch’s novel culminates in an event known as the Marias Massacre, the 
slaughter of more than 200 Piegan Blackfeet by the US Army on January 23, 1870. This was 
perhaps the fullest realization of Sheridan’s strategic policy, once again tragically applied to a 
group of people that were ostensibly out of harm’s way. However, despite being a sharp critique 
of the effect colonial violence had on Native people, Welch’s narrative only deals with the 
aftermath and avoids description of the actual attack. Welch’s decision to not depict the Army’s 
attack at the Marias and instead describe the attack on the Crow village reveals a series of 
comparisons.  
Some elements of Fools Crow’s attack are like what the 7th cavalry would have 
experienced during Custer’s charge at the Washita or Carr’s attack on the Dog Soldiers at 
Summit Springs. The hooves of the horses thunder. A cacophony of yelling, music, and gunfire 
merge together into a disorienting wash of sound. There is chaos and death. But Welch gives us 
more. He gives us a sense of Fool’s Crows emotional state as he charges. He narrates the slowing 
of time as Fools Crow’s throat turns dry and his heartbeat echoes in his ears. Fools Crow is 
afraid, and when he kills a Crow Chief we experience his disconnect as “he looked down at the 
dead man and his head felt strange, as though it were trying not to be there.” Individual soldiers 
in the Army certainly struggled with the consequences of their own violence during the Indian 
wars, much like Fools Crow. But that rarely makes it into histories of America’s ascendance as a 
continental power. Welch’s inclusion of a moment of inter-Native warfare in a book about the 
consequences of colonialism is a reminder that violence in the service of land and conquest takes 
on forms that set it apart from other moments of war and conflict. Fools Crow and his 
companions did not attack the village to wipe out Crow independence and move them to an 
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internment camp. In contrast, the attacks at the Washita and the Marias were aimed at exactly 
those goals, and they have entered US historical narratives as isolated, dramatic moments, rather 
than the result of structural policies. Welch’s text is a critical one. The whites in the novel are 
known as “seizers.” Rides-at-the-Door, Fools Crow’s father, delivers a speech in which he 
argues that  
If we take the war road against the whites, we will sooner or later encounter great 
numbers of them. Even with many-shots guns we couldn’t hope to match their weapons. 
Or their cruelty. We have heard what they did to our old enemies, the Parted Hairs, on the 
Washita; rubbed them out. So too would they do to the Pikunis. We are nothing to them. 
It is this ground we stand on they seek.307 
For all the complicated theorizations of settler-colonialism, no one has put it better than Rides-at-
the-Door. “It is this ground we stand on they seek.” Rides-at-the-Door warns of the dangers of 
going to war with the seizers, but he also seems to understand that regardless of whether the 
Pikunis choose war the attempts to acquire their land will proceed. Welch’s novel proceeds 
towards the sort of incident Rides-at-the-Door predicts: a massacre much like Custer’s attack on 
the Cheyenne (the Parted Hairs) at the Washita. But the actual attack is not part of the narrative, 
as if Welch felt like surprise attacks and the slaughter of Native peoples already occupied too 
prominent a place in the narrative of US history. Instead of one climactic moment the Marias 
Massacre is told through the eyes of the survivors who describe the smoke, the guns, the fires 
spreading through the lodges and death of men, women, and children.308 
 When Rides-at-the-Door foresees an event similar to the Washita fight for the Blackfeet 
Welch is not pulling a literary connection out of thin air. In many ways the Marias Massacre was 
the culminating event of Sheridan’s tenure on the plains, the direct result of policies he instituted. 
It was a surprise attack, in winter, on a Native village unaware the US Army was targeting them. 
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When the army made the decision to respond militarily to the supposed crisis in Montana, the 
conditions for the massacre were already in place. Historians have termed the violence in 
Montana between encroaching settlers and the Blackfeet a guerilla war in which Native people 
attempted to preserve their land and ways of life amidst the pressures of settler-colonialism. 
Horse raiding and small skirmishes characterized the fighting, and disagreements that escalated 
into murders would then further escalate into statewide panic. The period from 1865-1870 was 
particularly tense, and in August of 1869 an event took place that would eventually lead to 
tragedy. On August 17th Malcolm Clarke, a white trader, was killed by a Piegan Blackfeet man 
named Ne-tus-che-o, also known as Owl Child. Tensions between the two men went back 
several years. Clarke, a well-known figure to both Blackfeet and whites in the area, was married 
to Owl Child’s relative Coth-co-co-na. In 1867 Owl Child had blamed Clarke for the theft of 
some horses while visiting Clarke’s ranch, and had retaliated by stealing some of Clarke’s 
horses. Clarke and his son Horace pursued Owl Child to a nearby Piegan village and beat and 
publicly humiliated Owl Child. However, Blackfeet accounts tell a different story in which 
Clarke raped Owl Child’s wife who later gave birth to a mixed-race child that did not survive. 
The divergent accounts are difficult to reconcile but whatever the cause, Owl Child’s murder of 
Clarke pushed the already tense situation in Montana past the breaking point.309  
 In October of 1869 the Secretary of the Interior, Jacob D. Cox, encouraged the war 
department to move against the Piegan Blackfeet. Phil Sheridan, relocated to departmental 
headquarters in Chicago, already had a blueprint for Indian fighting in place and quickly 
mobilized a campaign that built on what he had learned in 1868/69: “I think it would be the best 
plan to let me find out exactly where these Indians are going to spend the winter, and about the 
                                                 
309 Andrew R. Graybill, The Red and the White: A Family Saga of the American West, (New York: Liveright 
Publishing Corporation, 2013), 97-104. 
138 
 
time of a good heavy snow I will send out a party and try and strike them.”310 With that decision 
the conditions for the massacre were in place. Remembering the backlash after the Washita fight 
Sheridan attempted to get a clear picture of the situation in Montana, sending the division’s 
inspector general James A. Hardie to interview the highest-ranking officers in the field, Alfred 
Sully and Philippe Regis de Trobriand. Sully had been inflating the danger of the situation in 
Montana while Trobriand had cautioned against a heavy handed military response. However, 
when Hardie arrived he found their positions reversed. Trobriand was confident he could identify 
and target the band of Mountain Chief who was considered the leader of the hostiles, while Sully 
argued for delay. Ultimately Sherman decided that “if the lives and property of the citizens of 
Montana can best be protected by striking Mountain Chief’s band I want them struck. Tell Baker 
to strike them hard.”311 Sheridan and his officers formulated a plan to mobilize in January of 
1870. Sheridan wrote to Sherman and told him that by mid-January the Piegans would be “very 
helpless” and his troops would be able to “give them a good hard blow.”312 
 Baker was the hard-drinking Major Eugene Baker, who led the Second Cavalry along 
with members of the Thirteenth U.S. Infantry out of Fort Shaw on January 19th, 1870. With 
Baker were several civilians including Joe Cobell, a fur trader married to one of Mountain 
Chief’s sisters. Baker headed for the Marias river where Mountain Chief’s band was supposedly 
camped, learning from a small village of captured Blackfeet that a much larger band were 
camped downstream on the Marias.313 Baker rushed his command onward hoping to arrive at the 
village by daybreak. A forced march allowed Baker to deploy his troops on bluffs overlooking 
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the Blackfeet village at dawn on the 23rd. The quiet was broken by one of the other scouts, Joe 
Kipp, who had recognized the central teepee as belonging to Heavy Runner, a friendly Piegan 
chief that the troops had express orders to avoid. A horrified Kipp rushed towards Baker 
shouting that this was the wrong villag,e but a drunk and furious Baker had Kipp arrested for 
breaking the silence. The noise had alerted the camp and Heavy Runner ran from his lodge 
brandishing a paper from the Indian Bureau promising him safe conduct. Scout Joe Cobell shot 
and killed Heavy Runner as he ran towards the soldiers, an action he later claimed was done to 
divert the attack away from Mountain Chiefs band, the brother of Cobell’s wife. Cobell’s shot 
unleashed the rest of the soldiers who turned their rifles on the Piegans. For almost an hour the 
soldiers fired into the village, aiming not only at Native people but also the lodge poles, causing 
teepees to collapse on top of the cooking fires, suffocating or burning those inside. A smallpox 
epidemic had devastated Heavy Runner’s village and almost no resistance was offered during the 
hour-long barrage of gunfire. As the firing ended the troops swept into the village, shooting and 
killing indiscriminately, cutting into teepees to murder the gravely ill inhabitants. Accounts 
would vary but some 200 Blackfeet lay dead, men, women, and children, victims of a slaughter 
intended for others. Mountain Chief, Owl Child, and the other targets of Baker’s expedition had 
already fled the area.314  
 A week later Sheridan sent Sherman a telegram that would have been familiar to the 
army’s ranking general, describing another surprise attack and another supposed victory over 
hostile Indians. In it Sheridan reported complete success, with 173 unspecified Piegan dead and 
44 lodges destroyed along with their supplies. As usual Sheridan confidently reported an end to 
the “Indian troubles” and made no mention of the facts which would soon make Baker’s attack a 
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controversy.315 Sherman quickly wrote back cautioning Sheridan to “look out for the cries of 
those who think the Indians are so harmless” and asked him to gather evidence of Piegan guilt. A 
controversy would ensue not unlike those after Sand Creek or Washita but it did little to interrupt 
colonization and it certainly did not bring back the lives of those Piegan murdered in their beds. 
Although somewhat lost to history compared to Sand Creek or Wounded Knee the Marias 
massacre was one of the most devastating and dark chapters in the history of plains warfare. But 
it was not an aberration or exception. The confusion and deception that resulted in the attack was 
certainly the result of decisions made by specific individuals. But the attack was consistent with 
Sheridan’s orders and unfolded in the manner the general would have expected, albeit targeted at 
the wrong group of people. Ultimately it would not matter to Sheridan, Sherman, or their peers 
that the attack was a mistake, as it served the same purpose as an attack on the “correct” band: 
the destruction of Blackfeet independence and the acquisition of their land. Native resistance had 
to be crushed. And within the structure of settler-colonialism the unfortunate mistakes of men 
like Baker and the outrage of sympathetic reformers would both further the goal of acquiring 
Native land. 
 Sheridan and his troops struck many “hard blows” from 1868-1870, and while these 
attacks were devastating they did not end Native resistance to US expansion. Sheridan and his 
peers would often replicate the tactics used on the southern plains. Winter campaigns and 
surprise attacks on villages were at the core of US military strategy, a doctrine that would 
ultimately backfire on some of its practitioners. Custer would disastrously attempt to recreate his 
surprise attack at the Washita eight years later at the Little Bighorn, resulting in arguably the 
most dramatic loss the US army ever received at the hands of Native people. The defeat of the 7th 
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cavalry in 1876 only meant that surprise attacks and cavalry charges became even more visible 
in American culture. It was as if one spectacular defeat sanitized the Army’s policy, justifying 
the practice of attacking Native villages and inflicting indiscriminate casualties. For of course 
Custer’s attack was only spectacular in that he led his command into a slaughter. If the attack had 
unfolded according to plan the Little Bighorn might sit alongside the Washita as an example of a 
general military policy rather than an infamous defeat. And the defeat was momentary, as most 
of the Native people at the battle would be forced to surrender in the coming months as the Army 
once again pushed its campaign into the vulnerable winter months. Custer’s last stand was 
chewed on and dissected for decades in literature, film, and countless works of history now 
gathering dust on the shelves of used bookstores. But as the charges and surprise attacks of the 
Indian wars entered mythology the colonization of Native people continued. The military would 
stay intimately involved in this process as both killers and caretakers, destroying even as they 
attempted to incorporate Native people into the United States.   
 It is hardly controversial to argue that Sheridan unleashed total war on the southern 
plains. The contemporary US military acknowledges as much. In the Cheyenne Wars Staff Rides 
designed through the Combat Studies Institute at the US Army Combined Arms Center, student-
soldiers learn that “Custer recognized that destroying the village and denying the Cheyenne their 
ponies rendered the Indians destitute; the total war strategy would inevitably force the Cheyenne 
to accept the will of the government and submit to life on the reservation.” 316 This frank 
appraisal manages to jettison some of the starry-eyed mythology that suffuses many descriptions 
of the Indian Wars more sympathetic to US soldiers. It acknowledges the devastation wrought by 
Sheridan’s strategic choices that sought to eliminate the possibility for Native independence. But 
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these were more than just tactical decisions. They emerged from an ideological structure in 
which Native people were designated as insurgents in their own homelands; criminals in an 
already-conquered continent rather than sovereign Nations protecting their territory. And this 
designation produced the sort of violence that these plains tribes experienced, a violence in the 
margins between citizen and combatant. It is telling that the Combat Studies Institute curriculum 
that draws on Sheridan’s campaign recommends it as a valuable lesson for ongoing wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, two occupations in which US empire has mobilized violence at the expense of 
local sovereignties. This is a common definitional move in recent military history – to identify 
the Indian Wars as one of the United States’ only successful counterinsurgencies, a roadmap for 
ongoing conflicts. But a crucial distinction needs to be made. Total war on the southern plains 
was more than a tactical choice, and classifying a conflict as a counterinsurgency is as much a 
discursive move as a simple act of classification. Military action with the presumption of a non-
existent or diminished sovereignty for an enemy subjects them to a violence that extends beyond 
the battlefield. It transforms battlefield enemies into malfunctioning populations that need to be 
corrected, removed, or eliminated. Images of the Standing Rock Sioux and their allies facing 
down paramilitary mercenaries and police to exercise treaty rights is a reminder that Native 
people can still be classified as insurgents in their own homelands. 
143 
 
Chapter 3. “Indian Fighters” in the Philippines: Imperial Culture and Military Violence in 
the Philippine-American War 
Introduction 
General Elwell Stephen Otis, the military governor of the Philippines, was like many 
military leaders throughout history that have faced an opponent waging guerilla warfare. During 
the initial campaigns of the Philippines-American War Otis was quick to argue that Filipino 
resistance was crumbling and the war would soon be over.317 He went to great lengths to censor 
the press in the Philippines and manipulate the news coming from the islands.318 And like many 
counterinsurgents that have followed him, Otis was proven wrong when the Filipino 
revolutionary forces launched a renewed offensive against the American occupation in the fall of 
1899. Like the Tet Offensive 69 years later, the counteroffensive was strategically aimed at 
eroding domestic support for the war. It was specifically timed to influence the US presidential 
election, in the hope of spurring anti-imperialist sentiment and defeating the reelection of 
William McKinley, a supporter of the US occupation. Filipino fighters scored several victories 
but they failed to prevent McKinley’s reelection, and in response US soldiers and war 
correspondents began to call for a more brutal form of military occupation in the islands.319 
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Writer Phelps Whitemarsh argued that the US commanders had conducted the war in an 
“intolerably feeble and hesitant manner” and unless more stringent measures were taken the war 
would go on for years. Colonel Jacob Smith, a veteran of the Wounded Knee Massacre, told 
reporters that he had already adopted appropriate tactics for fighting “savages” because fighting 
Filipinos was “worse than fighting Indians.” 320 General James Parker, in a letter to his mother, 
noted that “if these Filipinos could ambush like our Indians, we would have a bad time; but they 
have not the grit.” And Secretary of War Elihu Root proclaimed that the Army had to return to 
“methods which have proved successful in our Indian campaigns in the West.”321 These 
references to Native people illuminate a vexed question in the historiography of US empire: to 
what degree was the Philippine-American War influenced by the United States’ history of 
colonialism and continental expansion? 
This chapter sets out to answer that question, exploring how the war in the Philippines 
was impacted by the US experience with continental colonial warfare. Perhaps geographic 
distance has served to mask the temporal proximity of these linked periods of US military 
expansion, because this is a connection that has remained surprisingly tenuous in the literature on 
American history, occasionally invoked but rarely explored. A handful of historians have noted 
that many of the generals who served in the Philippines had prior experience in wars with Native 
people, but little has been done to demonstrate how that influence manifested, beyond broad 
comparisons of tactics.322 Other scholars have examined the prevalence of paternalistic racial 
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ideologies that compared Native people and Filipinos to justify the US occupation.323 The 
military and academic literature on US counterinsurgency warfare situates the Philippines-
American War between the Indian Wars and the “Banana Wars” of the early-twentieth century as 
early iterations of that particular mode of warfare.324 However, a careful examination of whether 
and how the so-called “Indian Wars” went global at the turn of the century has been lacking.325 
This chapter will show that such a connection exists and can be charted through an approach that 
examines the interaction between imperial culture and military violence. Rather than viewing 
1898 as a caesura marking the separation between the continental and global phases of American 
imperialism, these connections highlight the continuities in US imperial policy.326 Many US 
soldiers in the Philippines drew directly on their experiences in wars with Native people, 
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narrated their time in the Philippines as an “Indian war,” and validated their actions by 
discursively positioning themselves and their fellows as “Indian fighters.” In sum, the Indian 
Wars were translated, through the actions, imaginations, and writing of US soldiers, politicians, 
and journalists, into a flexible discourse able to travel across space and time.  
However, we should be cautious. There was never a wholesale transfer of the ideologies 
and practices of US settler-colonialism onto the war in the Philippines. Charting the discursive 
and material imprint that Indian warfare has left on the US military requires a tight-rope walk 
along the boundaries between academic disciplines. It involves a tension between local 
particularities and systematic patterns, between temporal specificity and long imperial 
continuities, between material violence and its literary resonances. It demands a cultural history 
attentive to the physicality of warfare, just as it requires a history of violence attuned to the ways 
culture shapes that violence. Ultimately, an analysis of culture and discourse allows us to connect 
the dots when institutional records and practices fall away. Discourses - the terms, categories, 
and beliefs found in particular social contexts - have the power to shape human actors, investing 
their actions, their bodies, and the tools they wield with particular meanings.327 This is certainly 
true for soldiers, and the war in the Philippines was awash in colonial discourses that drew on the 
mythologies of US continental expansion. To understand the influence that the Indian Wars 
exercised on the Philippine-American War, we have to account for both the lived experiences of 
frontier veterans and the colonial discourses that permeated US imperial culture.328  
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“Indian warfare” was not the only racializing discourse that US soldiers brought to the 
Philippines. Anti-black racism and imperial paternalism abounded, as did new forms of anti-
Filipino racism.329 But the discourse of Indian fighting exercised a potent imaginative power that 
journalists, officers, and individual soldiers deployed to legitimate and narrate US military 
action. Many of the top officers in the Philippines had experience in wars with Native people to 
draw on, and they did, as this chapter will show. But a more subtle influence was exercised on 
the younger US soldiers who had never fought against Native people, but who nonetheless were 
conscripted into a discourse of “Indian fighting” while in the Philippines.330 
This chapter is thus attentive to both the material consequences of the Philippine-
American War and the discourses that shaped its participants. It is both a history of “Indian 
fighting” as a mobile, imperial discourse, and a story about one of the earliest American 
experiences with the type of warfare now known as “counterinsurgency.” In less than a decade 
the US military moved from the 1890 massacre of Lakota Sioux at Wounded Knee on the Pine 
Ridge Indian Reservation to the jungles and mountains of the Philippines. Many of the same men 
who fought the Lakota, the Apache, the Cheyenne, and the Ute now had to fight a war in the 
Philippines that was both familiar and different. The Indian Wars resonated to the Philippines in 
the words of journalists who compared Geronimo to Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo, and in the 
justifications of politicians who compared the occupation of the Philippines to the reservations 
that Native people in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were fighting to transform 
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from government-controlled prisons into homelands. But the Indian Wars also travelled 
materially in the minds and actions of US soldiers required to fight a guerilla war against 
opponents they regularly labeled “insurgents,” in which the only immediate precedent was the 
wars of continental expansion.331 This is not an argument for the uncritical acceptance of 
“insurgent” as a designation for Filipinos (or Native people). Rather, I want to call attention to 
the violent consequences of that discursive move, which transformed Native and Filipino fighters 
into subjects to be corrected rather than simply defeated. In this biopolitical form of warfare 
“insurgents” are always-already claimed as subjects, interior problems rather than sovereign 
opponents.332 Analyzing the Philippine-American War as a part of the history of American 
counterinsurgency thus demands a critical analysis of how subjects are constituted as 
“insurgent,” a process that relied, in part, on comparing Filipinos to Native American people.333  
In what follows, I will explore the first year of the Philippine-American War, 1898 to 
1899. The bulk of this chapter focuses on General Henry Ware Lawton and the informal scouting 
unit he created called “Young’s Scouts,” demonstrating the ways in which the war in the 
Philippines was imagined and, at times, fought, as an “Indian War.” The time frame and 
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geographic scale will be relatively narrow. Lawton operated on the island of Luzon, the largest 
island in the Philippines, from March 1899 until his death on December 19, 1899. He was 
present for the initial phases of the war, when the US assumed control of the islands from 
colonial Spain, betraying Filipino hopes for independence. American troops won several early 
victories against the Filipino revolutionary forces, but as the conflict transitioned into a 
protracted guerilla war men like Lawton were increasingly imagined as “Indian fighters” that 
would be able to translate their experiences with colonial violence into success in the 
Philippines. Lawton and Young’s Scout would help set the tone for the increasingly brutal war 
and occupation of the islands, and their experiences would offer a wealth of material for 
journalists and writers seeking to connect US setter-colonialism to the broader contours of US 
empire in the early twentieth-century.  
Narratives of “Indian Fighting” in the Philippines 
In the January 1900 issue of Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly writer H.R. Mencken published a 
poem titled “The Four-Foot Filipino.” The first stanza reads as follows: 
 We have chased the slick Apachy over desert, plain and hill, 
  We have trailed the sly Osagy through the bresh, 
 We have fullered Ute and Sioux all their blasted country through, 
  When their liquor made them get a little fresh; 
 We have seen our share of fightin’, we have stopped our share of lead, 
  We have fought all sorts of fighters, great and small, 
 But the four-foot Filipino, when it comes to doin’ harm, 
  Is the toughest proposition of them all.334 
A cut out of the poem is included at the end of a scrapbook dedicated to the life of Henry Ware 
Lawton, assembled by his close friend and fellow soldier Robert G. Carter. The poem is not 
particularly remarkable for its racism nor for the connections drawn between Native North 
American peoples and Filipinos. The overseas expansion of US territory at the turn of the 
                                                 




century was driven, in part, by a virulently racist paternalism that assumed non-white peoples 
were incapable of self-government. Much of this rhetoric drew on descriptions of the supposed 
inferiority of American Indians when describing the inhabitants of the Philippines. But the 
inclusion of the poem in a scrapbook dedicated to Lawton was not incidental or casual. Lawton 
had chased Apache people all over the southwest, had fought Lakota (Sioux) and Cheyenne on 
the northern plains, and had worked to confine Ute people to their reservation in Colorado. He 
ended his career in the Philippines where his experiences in the Indian Wars formed a potent 
endorsement of his potential to defeat Filipinos. The crude caricature of the “slick Apachy” and 
the “four-footed Filipino” met, in Lawton, a lifetime of experience fighting against men and 
women working to preserve their independence from US political authority. The Indian Wars 
travelled overseas in the heads and bodies of men like Lawton, who were both the bearers of a 
discursive legacy and enactors of a military policy that drew on experiences fighting American 
Indians to construct the first insurgents of the 20th century.  
Born in Ohio in 1843, Lawton enlisted with the start of the Civil War and served 
throughout, fighting in numerous engagements including the exceptionally bloody battle at 
Shiloh in April of 1862. After the war Lawton studied law at Harvard but returned to the Army 
in 1866, serving in the Reconstruction south. In 1871 Lawton joined the Fourth US Cavalry in 
Texas, and began an extended period of active duty against Native peoples on the plains and in 
the southwest. Lawton fought in the 1871 expedition into Indian Territory, the 1872 expedition 
to the Staked Plains, in border fights with both Mexicans and Indians in 1873, and the Red River 
War in 1874. In 1874 Lawton was assigned to recruiting detail and took a short break from 
frontier service, but after the defeat of Custer and the 7th Cavalry in 1876, Lawton requested and 
received permission to join the troops headed to the northern plains. There Lawton took part in 
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General Crook’s campaign against the still-independent Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho. He was 
present for the destruction of Dull Knife’s village of Northern Cheyenne in November of 1876 
and was tasked with escorting the remaining Cheyenne to their reservation in Indian Territory.335 
Lawton’s regiment was then reassigned to Texas, but the ever-aggressive Lawton would again 
request reassignment to an active conflict zone in 1879 for the war with the Utes. Lawton even 
postponed his marriage so he could join his regiment when it was reassigned to Arizona 
Territory to fight Apaches. Lawton would remain in the southwest until 1888, an integral part of 
the US military’s ongoing war on Apache people.336  
Lawton’s military career, particularly in the US southwest, endowed him with an aura 
that followed him to the Philippines. He was larger than life – a mythical figure to journalists and 
the troops that served under him precisely because of his role in the Indian Wars. That mythical 
status was supposed to translate into a tactical advantage over the Filipinos. Writers covering the 
war emphasized it as soon as he arrived in the islands. In an article for the Saturday Evening 
Post, Senator Albert J. Beveridge noted that the US troops in the Philippines were full of 
“hardened regulars who had seen service with the Indians for years.”337 None of these frontier 
soldiers was more celebrated that Lawton. An article in the American Manila from May 6, 1899 
proclaimed “Lawton: Fighting Machine.” The general was “as tireless as a wolf and can go a 
week without food or sleep.” Lawton was “steady, rapid and remorseless,” and for these reasons 
the general had been chosen to lead US troops in the Philippines.338 The article references one of 
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his supposedly many “Indian names,” “Man-Who-Gets-Up-In-The-Night-To-Fight,” which is 
conspicuously close to the name Emilio Aguinaldo is rumored to have had for Lawton, “The 
General of the Night.” Foremost among Lawton’s accomplishments was his role in the surrender 
of Apache Leader Goyakhla (Geronimo): “It is the Geronimo incident – or rather the record of 
years in the West crowned by the Geronimo incident – which has sent him to the Philippines to 
command the American forces in the field.” Some of the descriptions of Lawton even begin to 
slip into the realm of folklore, sounding more like Paul Bunyan or Johnny Appleseed: He can 
sleep for three days straight, he can drink anyone under the table, and he can eat two-dozen 
redbirds in one sitting... “It is not difficult to imagine him a pillar of steel, hurling his huge bulk 
through the lists or heading some heroic thunderous charge when a thousand spurs are striking 
deep and a thousand lances are in rest.”339 This was the literary Lawton that served as an 
endorsement for the actual military actions the real Lawton would undertake in the early 
campaigns of the Philippines-American War.  
On May 1st, 1898, the US Navy defeated the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay, 
the first battle in the Pacific theater of the Spanish-American War. A month later Filipino 
revolutionaries led by General Emilio Aguinaldo, who had been fighting the Spanish since 1896, 
declared their independence from Spain. In the ensuing months Filipino forces would gain 
control of most of the country except Manila, surrounding the city. They erected a governing 
apparatus throughout the islands and appealed to foreign leaders for recognition.340 However, 
neither the US nor Spain recognized Filipino independence, and Spain ceded the country to the 
US in the Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898. Tensions would mount in early 1899 as 
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Filipino troops continued to surround Manila. The US occupation, commanded by General 
Elwell Otis, was conducted with an imperial paternalism and increasing belligerency and 
fighting broke out the night of February 4th.341  
US troops quickly pushed Filipino forces away from Manila in a series of violent clashes. 
Otis, rejecting a conditional surrender, sought to capture Aguinaldo and destroy the Philippine 
Revolutionary Army, which was concentrated in the northern part of the island of Luzon under 
the command of General Antonio Luna. He naively believed that if he could eliminate the 
revolutionary leadership and capture Malolos, the capital of the Philippine Republic, most of the 
provinces would accept the “benevolent assimilation” of American rule. Otis’ unrealistic 
assessment of the conflict extended to US troop levels; he had maintained a force of 25,000 to 
30,000 was sufficient despite the disagreement of his subordinate officers. Exacerbating the 
problem was that many of the US troops that made up the Eighth Army Corps in the Philippines 
were volunteers, due to return home once the war with Spain was over.342 Shorthanded, but 
intending to cut the fractured revolutionary army in two, in mid-March Otis sent General Lloyd 
Wheaton southeast from Manila, and General Arthur MacArthur north towards a fleeing 
Aguinaldo. These columns made limited gains, but the US advance quickly stalled, as 
commanders learned that occupying Manila and controlling the dense Philippines countryside 
were two very different endeavors.343 The Manila Freedom reported that Filipinos were 
increasingly turning to “harassing tactics,” unable to face US troops in pitched battles. Hidden 
sharpshooters were picking off US soldiers and then running away before they could be engaged. 
                                                 
341 The American occupation was marked by racial animosity from the very beginning. Racial slurs and abuse 
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The paper argued that these tactics were expected, and were the reason that when sending for 
reinforcements the War Department “made it a point to send as many as possible of the regular 
troops, who had been used to Indian fighting in the bad lands of the west.” Lawton was 
specifically highlighted as “an old Indian fighter,” ready to strike a heavy blow.344  
Lawton arrived in the Philippines in March to great fanfare from the press, and a possibly 
jealous Otis kept the general in Manila for a month before sending him to attack the city of Santa 
Cruz southeast of Manila along the shores of Laguna De Bay, the largest lake in the Philippines, 
where it was believed Filipino troops were regrouping following Wheaton’s campaign. As 
Lawton and a force of 1500 US troops collected from various units moved away from the urban 
areas around Manila their Indian-fighter pedigree became increasingly prominent in coverage of 
the war. One newspaper proclaimed, “Indian Tactics to be Adopted” in an article titled “In 
Pursuit of Rebels.” The reporter, who likely spent time with Lawton or someone on his staff, 
wrote that “the tactics will be those of the old-time frontier fighting, and it is probable that the 
command will be divided into squads of twelve, under non-commissioned officers.”345  
Other journalists emphasized that Lawton’s attack on Santa Cruz would be modeled on 
the “old Indian tactics” of mobile, smaller units. Of course, these tactics were hardly old. They 
were fresh from use in the US southwest and on the plains, but journalists were quick to endow 
Indian fighting with a nostalgia that sat awkwardly alongside the actual war they were covering. 
These tactics became “old Indian fighting” almost immediately, discursively closing off the 
colonization of North America as finished, complete, even as Native people were working to 
maintain their political autonomy on reservations. The campaign was a logistical nightmare, with 
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Lawton’s soldiers hampered by dense swamps and an amphibious strike force stuck in shallow 
water, but despite these difficulties US troops captured Santa Cruz on April 10th and nearby 
Pagsanjan on the 11th. 346 The expectation was that Lawton’s command would continue to scour 
the region in smaller units much as he had the mountains of Sonora and Arizona. Lawton’s 
mystique as the Indian-fighter was beginning to link up with reality. However, Otis recalled the 
expedition on April 15, against Lawton’s wishes.347 
 After the Laguna de Bay campaign Lawton’s troops moved north from Manila into 
central Luzon. The Philippine Revolutionary Army had fortified many of the railroads and river 
crossings in the region north of Manila, but friction between Aguinaldo and Luna threatened to 
fracture Filipino resistance to the American advance.348 The plan was to coordinate with General 
Arthur MacArthur and catch the retreating Filipino forces in a two-pronged attack, targeting the 
towns of Calumpit, Baliuag, and Norzagaray. Like Lawton, MacArthur had commanded troops 
in the southwest during the Apache Wars, although largely as a garrison commander. Lawton 
and MacArthur’s frontier service was useful for writers hoping to project a hopeful image of the 
American advance, an enterprise encouraged by Otis. The campaign was profiled in an article for 
The National Magazine by Peter MacQueen. He describes the campaign as full of “wild, 
romantic scenery and rich, abounding vistas… wild trails through unknown mountain tribes” 
which could not help but invoke the months Lawton spent in the Sonoran Mountains.349 The 
reality was that small groups of Apaches had, for years, eluded sustained efforts to confine them 
to reservations, continually outmaneuvering Lawton and other American soldiers in the US-
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Mexico borderlands. It was only through the use of Apache scouts that the US Army finally 
cornered Goyakhla (Geronimo) and his followers.350  
Nevertheless, MacQueen refers to Lawton as the “old Indian exterminator” and notes that 
while the general is strict about looting and plundering he is “the very scourge of God” with 
armed Filipinos.351 Emilio Aguinaldo was the prime target of the campaign but he remained 
elusive despite the efforts of Lawton and his troops. The successes ascribed to Lawton in chasing 
down Geronimo was supposed to result in a similar success with Aguinaldo. A Massachusetts 
newspaper reprinted correspondence from a soldier with Lawton under the title “Tireless 
Lawton: He Will Follow Aguinaldo as He Did Geronimo – Officers on his Staff Have to Work 
Hard.”352 The Washington Post ran an article on Lawton which made a similar argument: “Just 
now he is using in the Philippines to excellent purpose the tactics and strategy he learned years 
ago against Naches and Geronimo in Apache land, in pursuit of Aguinaldo.”353 Clearly the press 
was invested in emphasizing the connection between Lawton’s career in the Indian Wars and his 
campaign in the Philippines. But these were not simply imaginative linkages with little relation 
to on-the-ground tactics. As much as Lawton was the embodiment of the discursive aura of an 
Indian fighter, he also put into practice tactics which directly drew on his experience in frontier 
violence. 
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“Old Frontiersmen” – The Formation of Young’s Scouts 
Very little of the US Army’s experience with nineteenth century frontier violence made it 
into training and strategic manuals.354 Men like Lawton were the main repository for that sort of 
institutional knowledge. However, several tactical approaches emerged informally and then 
officially, codified in the few texts that did set down a strategic approach for the Army’s wars 
with Native people. Surprise attacks on villages, ideally while the inhabitants were sleeping, the 
use of smaller mobile units alongside Indian scouts, and the coercion and incarceration of Native 
non-combatants were all used to devastating effect in the wars of continental expansion. The US 
Army learned how to wage war on entire Native populations, whether by attacking 
noncombatants directly or by destabilizing Native communities into either accepting life on the 
run or detainment on reservations.355 While the early phase of the US campaign in the 
Philippines emphasized defeating the Philippine Revolutionary Army, commanders, including 
Lawton, also pursued similarly population-centric forms of warfare that targeted Filipino non-
combatants and their property.356 Lawton also made frequent use of scouts and guides, and he 
emphasized mobility, pushing his troops so far ahead of their supply trains that his northward 
advance out of Manila stalled out.357 Although the role of Native scouts in the US military had 
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been hotly debated for decades, with both supporters and critics, Apache scouts had played a 
large role in the success Lawton won during the campaign to capture Goyahkla (Geronimo) in 
1886.358 He had witnessed firsthand the advantages of mobile scouting units in pursuing and 
wearing down the enemy. A member of Lawton’s staff even remarked that Lawton was 
“prosecuting an Apache warfare,” and was held back by his superior, General Otis.359 It would 
not take long for Lawton to organize an elite scouting unit that would reflect his desire for 
mobility and seek-and-destroy operations.  
On May 3rd, 1899, as US troops pushed north from Manila, Lawton sent a telegram to the 
Adjutant General with an unusual report: “I have organized a most efficient detachment of 
scouts, employing Mr. W.H. Young, an old frontiersman, prospector and scout, as chief – with 
25 selected volunteers.” Who was this “old frontiersman,” and why had Lawton given him 
control of a picked group of US soldiers? The history of this elite unit demonstrates the ways in 
which “Indian fighting” operated both discursively and materially in the Philippines, 
conscripting US soldiers into a narrative of colonial violence that was then enacted against 
Filipinos.360 Where Lawton was the soldier, Young was the frontiersman, a civilian who could 
operate at the bleeding edge of civilized warfare, often outside of the loosening restrictions of 
military convention. “Frontiersman” evoked the settler-militias, trappers, mountain-men, guides, 
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prospectors, and criminals of the American West. An old frontiersman was just what Lawton 
needed as he pushed further into the island of Luzon, and he used Young to deadly effect.   
Much of our information on W.H. Young comes from the diary of John B. Kinne, a 
member of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry. Kinne’s first encounter with Young is 
entirely literary, a glimpse of the frontier mythos manifested in the jungle of the Philippines.   
While watching the troops embark on the cascoes my attention was called to a fine, 
athletic looking individual in civilian clothes, leaning on his rifle. He was not taking any 
part in the preparations, but seemed to be an interested spectator of the operations. He 
reminded me of Leatherstocking, the hero of Cooper’s Tales. Finally he went aboard the 
Wapidan with the scouts, and we afterwards learned that his name was William H. 
Young, of whose interesting career in action we will have considerable to tell later.361 
Nothing could be more indicative of the literary inflection of the Indian Wars, and US empire 
more broadly, than Kinne’s immediate association of this frontier soldier of fortune, standing on 
the shoreline in the Philippines, with a hero from James Fennimore-Cooper’s famous novels. 
Here was a real-life Leatherstocking, leaning on his rifle and casually observing his 
surroundings, not a soldier but civilian, a man whose deviation from the professional norms of 
the US military would ultimately make him the perfect tool. Born in Connecticut, Young had 
served as a scout under General O.O. Howard in the wars with the Nez Perce, had prospected in 
Montana, California, Korea, and China, and had served as a soldier in Korea and in Japan. He 
had made his way to the Philippines after the US occupied the islands hoping to prospect, but 
instead fought alongside the volunteer regiments. Young gained quite a reputation with the US 
soldiers, particularly for his skill at countering the hated Filipino sharpshooters. His reputation 
was further amplified by his history as a frontier scout in one of the more famous conflicts of the 
Indian Wars. Much of his time was spent with the First North Dakota, and many of his scouts, 
including Kinne, came from that regiment. 
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The First North Dakota spent about a year in the Philippines, largely serving under the 
command of Lawton. In 1898 the regiment was ordered overseas and moved west on the trains 
that had been so integral to the conquest of Native land on the northern plains, land these men’s 
families had settled on. Where US empire had once expanded west in search of continental 
supremacy, now it pushed further west in search of an ocean to cross, prairie settlers bound for 
San Francisco, Hawaii, and finally the Philippines. A few decades earlier an east-west movement 
meant an invasion of Native land, but in 1898 Kinne narrates the journey as a sober reflection on 
now-pacified Indian people. Rather than bison herds he notes that the bones of these animals had 
been collected by Natives and piled near the track for shipment to sugar refineries. Their train 
passes near a Blackfeet village, no longer a threatening presence but rather a curiosity, the 
Blackfeet waving blankets in answer to the shouts of the soldiers. Indian people are now met 
with cameras rather than guns. In Idaho, the North Dakotans took pictures and shook hands with 
three Indians, which Kinne calls “a little burlesque and seemingly solemn occasion” that he 
thoroughly enjoyed. Kinne seems to understand the staged nature of their interaction with these 
three nameless Native men.362 For Kinne, Indian people are no longer the preoccupation of US 
imperialism, but rather a remnant, a distraction and curiosity that precedes his deployment to the 
Philippines. The immense effort Native communities were exerting to transform reservations 
from prisons to homelands remains invisible, submerged by Kinne’s imperialist nostalgia.363 
In San Francisco the First North Dakota camped in what Kinne calls “an old Chinese 
graveyard.” Now on the coast, the contours of US empire are larger, and the soldiers find 
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themselves sleeping on the graves of people whose labor helped construct the railroad the North 
Dakotans had just travelled on. The initial disrespect of stationing soldiers on top of the graves is 
further compounded when some men dig up two skeletons. Kinne noted that “in digging a sink 
the boys dug up two Chinese skeletons and had lots of amusement with the queues.” Kinne’s 
global tour of US empire continues in Hawaii, where their transports docks temporarily. The 
soldiers throw coins in the water for Native Hawaiian divers to retrieve, and steal from a food 
vendor, Kinne calling it a shame to steal from such “simple and honest” people. Soon enough the 
North Dakotans are in the Philippines, where the “gu gu,” “savage” and the “nigger” replaces the 
Hawaiian, Chinese, and Indian as the object of Kinne’s scorn. The regiment took part in the 
capture of Manila, and then helped to garrison the city for the remainder of 1898.364 
Kinne and the North Dakotans participated in the initial fighting of the war, pushing out 
of Manila under the leadership of General Charles King after the retreating Filipino soldiers. He 
casually recounts stories of “dead niggers,” burned buildings, and wounded noncombatants in 
between the daily minutiae and entertainments of young soldiers: paddling canoes, the quality of 
the food cooked by their Chinese chef, and the appropriation of brass from an abandoned church 
to be sold for cash to fund gambling. What for the Filipino soldiers was a desperate defense of 
home and country was for soldiers like Kinne an imperial excursion that alternated between 
fatigue, hilarity, boredom, and adventure, punctuated by episodes of violence. It is jarring to 
quickly transition, sometimes in a single journal entry, from descriptions of race-war to the 
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amusements of young soldiers.365 But this juxtaposition of the mundane and the horrific is 
characteristic of empire, and hardly unique to these North Dakotans. Take the following incident 
observed by US Army general James C. Parker, who served in Lawton’s command, while on 
board a Navy ship in November 1899: “The next morning we closed in on the beach, near the 
village Cavayan, the port of Vigan. Insurgents were seen in trenches. They did not reply to our 
fire. The navy shelled the beach with all kinds of guns… The navy men apologetically explained 
they did it in order to expend their allowance of ammunition for target practice. We heard later 
that they killed two women, and badly wounded one non-combatant – no insurgents.”366 The 
contrast is jarring; the casual shelling of a beach in order to use up ammunition balanced against 
the loss of three Filipino lives. The families of those who died certainly would not have viewed 
the shelling as target practice.  
Lawton had first encountered Young on the 29th of April, 1899, when he noticed a 
civilian walking ahead of the troops as they advanced towards the town of San Rafael during the 
so-called “northern expedition” targeted at Filipino revolutionary strongholds north of Manila. 
Lawton summoned the strange man intending to reprimand him and send him to the rear of the 
line, but Young apparently made quite the impression on the general. Young told Lawton he had 
been a scout in Indian campaigns and had made his way to the Philippines to “help the boys.” 
The general was impressed, and he recognized Young’s name as “one who had done some 
gallant work against the redskins.” This was enough to earn the itinerant civilian a chance to 
work his way into the general’s good graces: “Something in the man’s bearing and appearance, 
made me change my mind, and I directed him to go to the front and bring me in a citizen that I 
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might get definite information about the location of San Rafael.”367 Five minutes later Lawton 
heard three shots, and soon Young reappeared, carrying a rifle and a sack full of ammunition. He 
had encountered a Filipino outpost of eight men, killed one, and drove the others off. Impressed, 
Lawton had Young select twenty-five men to form a scouting unit. Most of the men had been 
sharpshooters or scouts in their respective regiments, uninterested in military discipline and 
protocol. One had served in the Spanish, English, and US navies before enlisting in the army. A 
few had multiple court-martials on their record. Private William Harris, one of the original 
scouts, recalled the men as informal and rugged, often heading into the countryside without 
permission to explore.368  
These disheveled men must have seemed a transplant of the frontier army, and they 
suited Lawton’s purpose perfectly. Indeed, they seem to fit a long history of ragtag soldiers who 
are allowed to escape military discipline by becoming particularly vicious frontline (or behind-
the-lines) killers. These sorts of military units have become cultural tropes which often draw 
explicitly on “Indianness” to represent both their savagery and effectiveness, particularly in 
Hollywood. From Mel Gibson’s bloody tomahawk in the film The Patriot to Brad Pitt’s scalp 
knife in Inglourious Basterds, certain soldiers are allowed to exceed the boundaries of civilized 
warfare in the pursuit US military goals. These men become irregulars in the service of 
liberalism and democracy, their mismatched clothing and guerilla tactics an alluring 
transgression of civilized norms. Often these men embark on suicide missions, a Cooper-esque 
twist in which they help to win a peace which they themselves can never enjoy. “The Apaches,” 
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a group of Jewish soldiers lead by Brad Pitt’s character in Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious 
Basterds, are celebrated for beating German officers to death with baseball bats and scalping 
Nazi soldiers before almost all dying in the conflagration that marks the film’s finale. A similar 
squad of suicide commandos is found in the film The Dirty Dozen, in which a group of military 
criminals are dropped behind enemy lines to attack a meeting of German officers. The Dirty 
Dozen is based on the Filthy Thirteen, a demolition section of the 101st Airborne Division that 
served during World War Two. Lead by Jake McNiece, an officer of Choctaw heritage, the 
squad was famous for its lack of discipline, hygiene, and disinterest in following rules. Most of 
the squad perished while parachuting into France on D-Day. Inspired by McNiece, the squad was 
known for sporting Mohawk haircuts and donning war-paint before heading into combat.369  
“Young’s Scouts,” as the unit came to be known, were used much the way scouts had 
been used when Lawton was on the northern plains or in the southwest. They were independent, 
taking orders directly from Lawton and led by Young, a man Lawton called a natural leader. This 
independence was galling for some officers that had to interact with the scouts, but Lawton 
consistently backed them up in the face of criticism or discipline.370 They advanced a half-day 
ahead of the main body of soldiers, locating the enemy and sometimes engaging them. At this 
stage in the conflict the war was somewhere in between a series of pitched battles and the 
guerilla warfare that would later come to define the conflict. Young’s Scouts allowed Lawton to 
pursue the sort of smaller-scale objectives he was familiar with, aimed at disrupting the ability of 
Filipino revolutionary forces to maintain their day-to-day resistance to the US occupation. A set 
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of orders Lawton issued to Young’s Scouts could almost sound like they were setting out from a 
fort in the American west: 
Chief Scout Young was instructed to proceed on the afternoon of the 4th with the entire 
detachment of scouts in a northeasterly direction covering the country between San 
Rafael road and the Maasin River, for the purpose of locating and destroying all 
magazines, storehouses and caches of insurgent subsistence or other supplies. He was 
instructed to keep a careful record of stores destroyed, that his party would not carry 
rations, but would subsist on the country traversed by them, that the expedition should 
continue and that reports of progress be sent in at every opportunity practicable, and that 
his movements should be concealed from the enemy as much as possible, with whom no 
avoidable contact should be had, though he might when returning secure as many guns as 
possible from the insurgents. The usual instructions as to private persons and property 
were given.371     
Travel light, acquire food as you go, and seek and destroy the enemy’s supplies. Destroyed 
supplies and captured guns functioned as a quantifiable measure of progress against the so-called 
insurgency, something that body counts and occupied towns could not do. And although 
Lawton’s orders included cautions about respecting noncombatants and private property, looting 
and burning became hallmarks of the scouts and the US occupation of the Philippines in general. 
By drawing on the skills of frontiersmen like Young, Lawton instituted a set of military policies 
that would come to define the US counterinsurgency in the Philippines. 
 In what would become one of the primary occupations of the unit, Young’s first “rice 
burning expedition” involved the scouts creeping, as Kinne puts it, “Indian fashion” through the 
Philippines countryside, thirty paces apart.372 They appropriated food from Filipino villagers, 
captured prisoners, and searched the buildings they came across. In one house they captured a 
Filipino officer and two soldiers and forced them to shred their uniforms. The next day they 
discovered a series of rice-beds which were torn up and burned, drawing the attention of the 
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locals who proceeded to flee into the hills. In one storehouse the scouts found 10,000 bushels of 
rice, and later they found a cache with 20,000 bushels of rice, 50 gallons of kerosene, 100 
gallons of coconut oil, five tons of sugar as well as uniforms, cloth, sewing machines, and 
ammunition.373 Due to the large quantities of supplies they made camp and spent three days 
burning everything. The scouts then circled back towards Manila, floating down a river on a raft 
and cutting telegraph lines as they went. Lawton was happy with the expedition, which had 
resulted in destroyed supplies, several Filipino prisoners, and had demonstrated that the scouts 
could operate independently and quietly in the Filipino countryside.374  
The scouts had covered a large amount of territory in four days, which Lawton estimated 
would take a normal infantry regiment twice that amount of time. In his report Lawton recorded 
the destruction of 40,000 bushels of rice and 12,250 of corn, 250 pounds of tobacco, 30 jars of 
sugar, 283 uniforms, and assorted supplies. He also offered a ringing endorsement of the scouts:  
The services of these scouts have been from the beginning peculiarly valuable, and are 
daily increasing in value as a result of experience. The individuals detailed were in all 
cases men who had either lived for years on our Indian frontier, were inured to hardship 
and danger, and skilled in woodcraft and use of the rifle, or had demonstrated their 
service in these islands peculiar fitness for the work contemplated.375  
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For Lawton, the Indian frontier was both a training ground and instrument of validation. It had 
produced men suited to these seek-and-destroy missions and discursively validated the scout’s 
existence. They were Indian fighters – therefore they were effective Filipino fighters, effective 
counterinsurgents. Young certainly had experience in Indian warfare, and put that experience 
into practice. But many of the men in Young’s Scouts were too young to have directly fought 
with Native people. However, they came from North Dakota, from Oregon, from places recently 
taken from Native people. This history of colonial conquest clung to these men in the 
Philippines. Conscripted into a discourse of Indian Fighting, they enacted it in their actions. This 
aura possessed the ability to remake men into “old Indian fighters,” even young men like Kinne. 
It also seemed to endow the scouts with a certain bravura and recklessness which resulted in 
several highly risky actions that would lead to Young’s death and numerous Medal of Honor 
awards for the unit. 
Young’s Scouts could move quietly and quickly through the Philippines countryside, but 
that does not mean they avoided fighting. As Kinne noted in his diary, the entire North Dakota 
Volunteers were eager to get into the fighting and resented not being on the front lines in the 
beginning of their deployment. One soldier even wrote home to a friend that “most of the boys 
say as the cowboys of our North American Indian: A dead Philipino [sic] is a good Philipino.” 
This was not an empty threat – another soldier noted in his diary that “they caught a sharpshooter 
in the act of changing his uniform for a white suit and now he is a good Philipino [sic].”376 
Frequent references to “dead niggers” made throughout Kinne’s description of the scout’s 
operations attest to the racialized character of the war in the Philippines, which was based as 
much in anti-blackness and anti-Filipino racism as it was Indian-hating. 377 Young’s Scouts killed 
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numerous Filipinos on their expeditions, occasionally noncombatants.  Kinne’s diary notes 
several noncombatant casualties, in one instance the death of a woman holding a baby.  
On several occasions the unit threw themselves recklessly at the enemy. On May 12th and 
13th the scouts captured two towns against overwhelming odds. At San Ildefonso, the 25 scouts 
engaged in a daylong firefight with some 400 Filipino soldiers. In late afternoon the scouts 
charged the Filipino position, driving them entirely from the town with only one casualty. The 
next day at San Miguel the scouts charged a bridge into the city held by between 300-500 
Filipinos, scattering them in a sudden rush and then taking refuge in the church bell tower until 
reinforcements arrived.378 While crossing the bridge at San Miguel Young was shot in the knee. 
In his diary Kinne narrates Young’s injury like a heroic last stand out of a Frederic Remington 
painting or John Ford film: “As they reached the bridge in the center of the town, Young was hit 
in the knee with a Remington bullet and fell. He kept up the fire as long as he could see any 
niggers and then bound his knee. When they found him he was sitting up with his wound bound 
and surrounded by empty shells.”379 Another story of racial violence and bravery to amplify 
Young’s reputation, the mess of spent rifle shells a potent visual for the sort of long-odds the 
scouts’ mystique was built on.  
In a telegram praising Young and the scouts Lawton noted that the wound was not life-
threatening, likely to result in no more than a stiff joint.380 Captain William Birkhimer, in his 
report on the fight, called the charge of the scouts “one of the rare events in war where true valor 
asserts itself against overwhelming odds.”381 High praise, but the captain was tired of the 
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independent scouts, who were only supposed to reconnoiter the town, not attack it. Birkhimer 
gathered the scouts for a meeting and lectured them on military discipline and protocol, a speech 
that was not at all well received. Corporal Anders received instruction on the proper method of 
saluting a superior officer that was particularly unwelcome. Several of the scouts appealed to 
Lawton, who told Birkhimer to leave them alone. Ultimately Birkhimer and eleven of the scouts 
would receive the Medal of Honor for the charge at San Miguel, and Birkhimer’s attempted 
interference was negated by the general.382 The scouts would remain independent and informal. 
Lawton was confident that Young would return to duty, and predicted that “if we have 
guerilla warfare, he will be very useful,” even if Young was forced to go mounted from then 
on.383 However, Young’s stiff knee turned out to be more serious, and a day after his injury he 
died in Manila. The loss of their namesake certainly demoralized Young’s Scouts but the unit 
would continue to operate for the remainder of Lawton’s northern expedition. The scouts, led by 
Young’s replacement, Lt. J.E. Thornton, were instrumental in the capture San Isidro, the then-
current capital of the Philippine Republic, on May 16. At San Isidro Lawton’s campaign came to 
a halt. The general once more blamed Otis’ timidity, but the reality was that Lawton’s troops 
were suffering widespread illness, he had used up his supplies, and had no way to acquire more. 
Aguinaldo and the revolutionary government had eluded capture, and the Philippine 
Revolutionary Army, though battered, had not been destroyed.384 By June of 1899 the worn-out 
soldiers of the First North Dakota were running out of steam, and they would soon board a ship 
to return to the United States. Kinne would end his diary describing a barbecue in a park in 
Fargo, but the war was far from over.  
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Lawton himself would remain in the Philippines until his death in December of 1899. His 
time there would continue to be described in terms that sought to position the general and his 
troops as Indian Fighters, often in the face of increasing Filipino success in guerilla warfare. A 
June campaign lead by Lawton southward from Manila towards the town of Cavite initially 
failed to engage a single Filipino fighter, the US soldiers defeated by swamps, mosquitoes, and 
weather. Nonetheless, the press, tightly managed by Otis, reported that “Insurgents Flee as 
Lawton Advances.”385 When Lawton did manage to engage Filipino forces, Otis told reporters 
that Lawton’s troops had killed 400 “Indians” in a battle, and one newspaper proclaimed: 
“Success of the Moment Against Filipino Braves,” but the reality was that hundreds of Filipino 
soldiers managed to elude Lawton once more. 386 In the fall of 1899 Lawton and Otis would 
clash again when Secretary of War Elihu Root ordered the formation of scouting detachments of 
Filipino Macabebes, Spanish loyalists who were opposed to the Filipino revolutionary forces, 
over the protests of Otis. Lawton had spread the idea to his friends in Washington, which 
enraged Otis, but the idea of Native scouts would have appealed to Lawton, who had made such 
effective use of Apache scouts in the southwest.387 Indeed, a resonance of Lawton’s experiences 
in the Apache Wars would catch up with him when he was shot by a sniper and killed in the 
Battle of Paye on December 19th, 1899. The Filipino general in command was Licerio Gerónimo. 
And while this Filipino general did not do the actual shooting, his presence on the battlefield 
evoked the Apache leader Goyahkla (Geronimo), who Lawton had played a role in convincing to 
surrender 13 years before, a man still in US military custody at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.  
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   Like the journalists that had covered the war, the obituaries commemorating Lawton’s 
life emphasized his military career, particularly his role in the Indian Wars. According to these 
memorials it was Lawton’s past as an Indian fighter that had made him such an effective general 
in the Philippines. As one speaker at Lawton’s funeral put it, “having fought it out with the 
insurrectionary tribes for fifteen years, he was the picked man of men to track the Apaches to 
their last lair and to wrest the southwest from the terror of Geronimo and his band.” As another 
vividly said, ‘he hunted them off their feet.’” One of his obituaries noted that Lawton’s 
experience with Apaches made him especially competent when dealing with Filipino insurgents, 
“whom it required chasing to catch.” It was this tenacity and aggression in what the military 
termed “savage war” which made Lawton famous. One writer noted that he was “constantly in 
the field of action – here, there, and everywhere – moving rapidly and striking quick, decisive 
blows after the fashion which he had learned so well in the border wars of the west.” Lawton’s 
reputation in the Philippines was built on his Indian fighting prowess, and the troops there had 
anticipated his arrival. Rev. Peter MacQueen recalled the following conversation: ‘“Wait till 
Lawton comes,’ said a husky volunteer from the West; ‘he’ll rip this insurrection up the 
back.’”388 Being a frontier-experienced regular carried a great deal of military capital with the 
soldiers in the Philippines, and no general had more than Lawton. 
The Army’s inspector general went even further in his announcement of Lawton’s death. 
Rather than jumping from the Sonora Mountains of the southwest to the jungles of the 
Philippines, General Breckinbridge inserted Lawton into a centuries-old lineage of white 
militarism: 
The man of El-Caney is the man of the Mogollons, and the man of the Mogollons is the 
reincarnation of some shining, helmeted warrior who fell upon the sands of Palestine in 
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the first crusade, with the red blood welling over his corselet and his two-handed battle 
sword shivered to the hilt. The race type persists unchanged in eye, in profile, in figure. It 
is the race which in all centuries the Valkyrs have wafted from the war docks, have hailed 
from the Helmgangs, or helmet strewn moorlands – the white skinned race which drunk 
with the liquor of the battle, reeled around the dragon standard at Senlac, which fought 
with Richard Grenville, which broke the Old Guard at Waterloo, which rode the old slope 
at Balaklava, which went down with the Cumberland at Hampton Roads, which charged 
with Picket at Gettysburg, the race of the trader, the financier, the statesman, the inventor, 
the colonizer, the creator, but, above all, the fighter.389 
Lawton is presented as the inheritor of a Nordic and Anglo-Saxon martial tradition stretching 
from the Crusades, to the wars of nineteenth century Europe, to the Civil War (and noticeably, 
both sides of the Civil War). He is presented as a leader of the race of colonizers, and his 
prominence in both continental and overseas colonial violence made Lawton an ideal candidate, 
in both life and death, for writers wishing to draw a link between the conquest of Native people 
and the occupation of the Philippines. And as general Breckinbridge’s obituary makes clear, this 
was a racialized connection.390 Lawton was viewed as an expert in savage warfare, uniquely 
suited to subduing the Filipinos, just as he had the Apache. However, soldiers like Lawton were 
not simply exporting North American racisms to the Philippines. As Paul Kramer reminds us, 
much of the racialized violence US soldiers directed at Filipinos was the products of distinct, 
localized processes.391 But soldiers like Lawton were bringing with them a history of experience 
in colonial violence that shaped both their attitudes and their practices, their investment in 
defeating Filipino independence and their tactical approach to combat with people they deemed 
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racially inferior.392 The mobility of US colonialism had as much to do with how soldiers 
imagined themselves as it did with how they racialized their enemies.  
Young’s Scout’s and Lawton’s 1899 campaigns would prove to be highly influential on 
US military policy in the Philippines. As the conflict transitioned into a protracted guerilla war, 
the tactics Young and Lawton had developed became an integral part of the American 
counterinsurgency, focused on mobile seek-and-destroy operations, population and resource 
control, and the destruction of insurgent infrastructure and supplies. These were policies rooted 
in the experience and mystique that Indian warfare endowed in men like Lawton and Young. 
And as US tactics became increasingly brutal, those measures were justified by continued 
references to the frontier, references that would find increasingly literary forms. 
The Literary Lawton 
The Philippine-American War occurred amidst widespread concern about race, gender, 
sexuality, and social class. Writers, educators, and politicians in both the United States and 
Britain warned that white racial superiority and masculinity were under threat, eroding in the 
face of industrialization, poverty, urban overcrowding, immigration, women’s suffrage, and 
labor unrest. These fears were inseparable from global imperialism, particularly in the US. They 
helped motivate an aggressive foreign policy that many believed would reinvigorate a nation 
forged in the now-lost crucible of frontier expansion.393 In this context Lawton’s eulogies 
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celebrated him as a hero of white Anglo-Saxon militarism and masculinity, and this was a theme 
that authors of turn-of-the-century fiction literature for children would amplify. Lawton may 
have died in the Philippines, but a literary version of the general would return home and enter the 
pages of several novels. As Amy Kaplan has shown, fiction literature in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries is inseparable from the expansion of US empire. Popular genres like 
historical romances and travel stories celebrated white masculinity while both amplifying and 
reflecting American political desires for global expansion.394 Here I am concerned with a 
particular subset of this imperial literature, namely the children’s adventure stories which 
became very successful in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Marketed largely to 
boys, these stories sought to mythologize the now “closed” frontier and offer narratives with new 
venues for masculine development, often taking place outside the United States, and featuring 
boys roughing it outdoors while facing a variety of dangers.  
The narrators in these adventures paradoxically reflect on the loss of wilderness while 
celebrating the effects of US expansion, urbanization, and development.395 Readers learn the 
value of physical and moral strength as they traverse the newly forged networks of US empire. 
Racial and national superiority are celebrated as dangerous warzones like the Philippines 
transform into light-hearted arenas of American dominance. Unlike the historical romances 
Kaplan describes, in which the male hero performs and asserts his imperial masculinity for a 
female gaze, the boys in these stories are learning masculinity, and they do so through 
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participation in US empire. Intended for the next generation of soldiers, many of these stories 
include details about the military occupation of the Philippines, and they often narrate the 
Philippines-American War as an “Indian War.” As such, they transmitted a record of the conflict 
to an audience that would have been unlikely to receive more formal instruction if they entered 
the military.  
In the aftermath of the war in the Philippines the military largely failed to create any 
doctrine or educational record that would preserve institutional knowledge acquired during the 
occupation. Professional journals discussed the conflict sparingly, and the military censored 
several publications intended to transmit the lessons learned, likely due to the descriptions of 
harsh counterinsurgency tactics, the very measures that were currently under-fire by anti-
imperialist politicians.396 As a result, the record of US counterinsurgency in the Philippines was 
ephemeral in the early twentieth-century, and the children’s literature I highlight here became an 
unlikely venue for the transmission of the conflict’s history. In these stories the overtly racialized 
violence that the military attempted to downplay is refigured as a lesson in masculinity for young 
readers. Two prominent authors working in these genres were Elbridge Street Brooks and 
Edward Stratemeyer, both of whom wrote books about the war in the Philippines that featured 
Lawton prominently. In both stories young men become involved in Lawton’s campaigns of 
1899, where they interact with the general, Young’s Scouts, and other members of the US 
military. Lawton may have been larger than life, but after his death a literary Lawton would 
continue to develop the mystique of the Indian Fighter. 
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 Elbridge S. Brooks’ With Lawton and Roberts: A Boy’s Adventures in the Philippines and 
the Transvall” was published in 1900 soon after Lawton’s death. The story is a broad 
endorsement of empire, in which the US occupation of the Philippines is connected to European 
colonialism in southern Africa. The American and British generals, Lawton and Roberts, are 
introduced in the preface as “heroes of Anglo-Saxon blood.” Their intertwined stories are meant 
to unify Anglo-Saxons everywhere and to defend the cause of imperialism. Similar to politicians 
that sought to deny self-determination to colonized peoples, Brooks writes that “the Stars and 
Stripes in the Philippines, and the Union Jack in South Africa, are advancing the interests of 
humanity and civilization, and that untrammeled liberty to the barbarian is as disastrous a gift as 
are unquestioning concessions to a republic which has been a republic only in name.”397 This 
ambitious project is narrated through the story of 16-year old Ned, a California schoolboy who, 
on a dare, stows away on a transport ship headed to the Philippines. The precocious Ned is swept 
up in the US campaign, fights alongside Lawton and Young’s Scouts, and manages to play an 
integral role in the early months of the war in the Philippines. He then travels to South Africa 
and takes part in the Second Boer War before returning home a hero.  
 With Lawton and Roberts is a work of fiction aimed at adolescent boys, and men like 
Lawton become instructors for Ned, and by extension the reader. Foremost among Lawton’s 
credentials: he is the hero of the Apache wars. Ned discovers “that no work was too severe, no 
fighting too hot, no march too rapid, to baffle the man whom the Apaches used to call ‘man-
who-gets-up-in-the-night-to-fight,’ and whom the Filipinos dubbed ‘the sleepless one.’” Ned is 
also introduced to Young and his elite scouting unit, and together with Lawton they become a 
cautionary tale for the reckless teen. When he fails to follow orders and stumbles into a group of 
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Filipino revolutionaries, barely escaping with his life, Lawton warns Ned that he hasn’t had the 
same frontier experience. “Just you take a lesson from Young's scouts, lad, whom I am going to 
detail for service with Colonel Sinclair. They'll tell you that a woodsman knows before he 
feels… You ought to hunt Apaches a little while, then you'd get schooled to cautiousness.”398 
From Brooks’ story we learn a few things. First, that Lawton and Young Scouts were famous 
enough to justify an entire novel dedicated to their exploits. We also get a sense of how much the 
Indian Wars continued to influence cultural meanings around military violence in the early-
twentieth century. Journalists, politicians, and individual soldiers made sense of their actions in 
the Philippines by relating it back to the frontier. The same is true of the writers who translated 
the violence of empire into narratives for children and young adults. 
 Brooks does not confine himself to perpetuating a mythological frontier, transplanted to 
the Philippines. He is writing historical fiction and Ned’s adventure narrates Lawton’s northern 
expedition, the push out of Manila into northern Luzon in the spring of 1899. Lawton is “the 
gray-haired giant of the piercing eye and the tireless tactics,” swiftly taking town after town with 
the aid of Ned, whose experience of war is both light-hearted and exhilarating. Readers of 
Brooks’ story embark on an adventure in which the US soldiers, particularly Lawton and 
Young’s Scouts, form an invincible tide against which the routinely treacherous Filipinos can 
only flee. Filipino’s are sent to the “happy hunting grounds,” the stereotypical Native afterlife of 
dime novels and westerns. “Grim Indian Fighters” out-maneuver and out-fight their opponents in 
the towns of Baliuag, San Isidro, and San Miguel. Ned is instrumental in these fights, which 
made the real Young’s Scouts famous. He learns how to behave like “an old Indian-fighter,” and 
is taught to have “little respect for savage or half-civilized ‘hostiles.’”399 Even young boys like 
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Ned can become old Indian fighters, endowed with a practiced frontier brutality and the even 
older lineage of Anglo-Saxon white warrior-hood that so many writers were quick to position 
Lawton in. The overarching message is that violence is justified and necessary in the service of 
empire. Ned and his companions are continuously contrasted to the “savage” or “treacherous” 
Filipinos, who are kept in check only through the efforts of men like Lawton.  
At the end of the story Ned travels to southern Africa, where learns from a Filipino man 
that had also travelled there that Lawton had died. In a fit of rage, he mercilessly beats the man. 
Embarrassed, Ned is chastised by a British general for breaking camp discipline, who 
nonetheless commends Ned’s love for the now-dead Lawton. In Africa this Filipino soldier, who 
has opposed Ned throughout the story, is transformed into an ally. Removed from the defense of 
his own home and plugged into the global network of empire, his transformation is the final 
resolution of the story before Ned returns home: “‘We may never meet again, my brother,’ said 
the Filipino, as he stretched out a hand in farewell to the American. ‘But you have done me a 
good service. I hated you as an American invader; I love you as an American brother, and I shall 
go back to my own dear Luzon to work among my fellows for what I now believe to be our best 
and surest interest.’”400 By story’s end Ned has almost single-handedly converted this hardened 
Filipino insurgent into an enthusiastic booster for the US occupation. This was the final lesson 
from the literary Lawton, who earlier in the story had argued that the American way was to 
convert the Filipinos into friends rather than simply destroy them: “‘We wish to reclaim your 
people and not to revenge ourselves. A dead Aguinaldo would not be so great a feather in our 
caps as a contented and friendly Aguinaldo.’” Ned fulfills Lawton’s charge, ending the story 
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with the ultimate counterinsurgency fantasy, a hardened enemy transformed into a friendly and 
loyal subject of US power.  
 Few readers will recognize the name Edward Stratemeyer. But what about Franklin W. 
Dixon? Victor Appleton? Carolyn Keene? Perhaps if you think back to the books you read as a 
child these authors might ring a bell. Those names stand in for the ghostwriters of some of the 
most enduringly popular children’s literature ever published, in The Hardy Boys, Tom Swift, and 
Nancy Drew respectively. Edward Stratemeyer was the creator and initial author of all three of 
these characters, as well as numerous other popular series in children’s literature. Through his 
Stratemeyer Syndicate he published more than a thousand books and helped to define the genre 
of children’s literature and series fiction.401 And while Stratemeyer is mostly known for his 
sleuthing teenagers, his first successful hardcover novels were a series of stories about the 
Spanish-American War. Beginning with Under Dewey at Manila, Stratemeyer published six 
stories about the war in which young men are paired with top military leaders, including Lawton, 
MacArthur, and Otis. To prepare for the stories Stratemeyer read military reports in an effort to 
be historically accurate. The fifth in the series, The Campaign of the Jungle; or, Under Lawton 
Through Luzon, closely follows Lawton’s “southern campaign” towards Laguna de Bay and his 
“northern campaign” towards San Isidro, primarily in April and May of 1899.  
 Like Brooks, Stratemeyer’s story is an endorsement of US militarism in which Lawton’s 
history as an Indian Fighter gives definition to his campaigns in the Philippines. In the preface 
Stratemeyer writes that Lawton’s northern campaign “was one of the most daring of its kind, and 
could not have been pushed to success had not the man at its head been what he was, a trained 
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Indian fighter of our own West, and one whose nerve and courage were almost beyond 
comprehension.”402 The Lawton of Stratemeyer’s story is larger than life, just as he was in media 
depictions of his actual military service. The narrator introduces him as the captor of Geronimo 
and recycles the story that his Apache name was “man-who-gets-up-in-the-night-to-fight.” The 
novel’s main characters, Larry and Ben, are in awe of the general from the moment they see him. 
At one point Larry assures his companion that ‘“a soldier who has whipped the Apache Indians 
isn’t going to suffer any surprise at the hands of these Tagals, no matter how wily they are.’”403 
Apache people remained the benchmark against which cunning and savagery were measured, 
and Lawton’s success in the southwest served as an endless endorsement of his ability to beat 
Filipino opponents. At one point Ben tells a fellow soldier that ‘“I never heard of such a 
campaign.’” His companion replies that, “‘General Lawton puts it down as a regular Indian 
campaign.’” Just a regular Indian campaign, one in which soldiers like Lawton and Young’s 
Scouts, who also make an appearance in the story, base their ability to defeat insurgents on their 
experiences as Indian fighters.  
Conclusion 
On May 30th, 1899, Kinne and the rest of Young’s Scouts, recently returned to Manilla after the 
end of Lawton’s Northern Expedition, celebrated Decoration Day (the precursor to Memorial 
Day) by adorning Young’s grave with flowers. Kinne wrote that: 
Decoration Day seemed the most like Sunday of any day we had spent on the Islands. 
Being on the floral committee to decorate the graves, I was busy early in the morning, 
and after getting bouquets from the natives, who made up the floral monument for 
Young's grave, I went to the bamboo barracks, where the Scouts assembled to march to 
Battery Knoll where Young was buried. Chaplain Stull of the 2nd Oregons read some 
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Scripture and spoke a few words, and we put our decorations on the grave, after which a 
picture was taken of it with the boys around.404 
The flowers, scripture, and crisp new uniforms in which the scouts were photographed should 
not give the impression they had lost their rough edge. One of the first things they did upon 
return to Manilla was head to a market and sell off a captured pony and cart for $250, which was 
divided among the men. The independent scouts seemed to take their cues from their namesake, 
even after his death. In the following pages of his diary Kinne recaps, with no small amount of 
admiration, the winding career of Young, who had served as an Army scout in the Nez Perce 
War, prospected in Montana and California, served as a captain of the King’s Guard in Korea, 
organized a mining company in China, fought for the Chinese in the First Sino-Japanese War, 
before heading to the Philippines to prospect for gold.405 It’s hard to imagine a man more 
enmeshed in the overlapping networks of colonialism, imperialism, and global capitalism at the 
turn of the century. Young’s tenure in the Philippines helps to connect the Philippines-American 
War to continental US colonialism in the nineteenth century, and demonstrates the persistence 
that discourses of “Indian fighting” exercised in a supposedly post-frontier US culture.  
By June of 1899, John Kinne, the rest of the 1st North Dakota, and many of the other 
young men who had volunteered for the Spanish-American War were nearing the end of their 
service in the Philippines. However, the war was far from over. Kinne and several of his fellows 
spent their final month on the outskirts of Manilla attempting to root out persistent Filipino 
revolutionary forces and guerillas on the Morong peninsula. Many of the men in Young’s Scouts 
had been reassigned back to their original regiments with assurances that they would get “special 
mention to the secretary of war.” The soldiers of the 1st North Dakota who had been in Young’s 
Scouts were promptly chosen as scouts for their old regiment, a clear indication that these men 
                                                 




had built a reputation in just a few short months. For Kinne this was a welcome assignment as it 
promised a relief from the more onerous guard duties and the opportunity for increased freedom. 
Kinne seems to have taken advantage. The final pages of his journal juxtapose a sometimes 
holiday-like atmosphere alongside a series of tense firefights. On several occasions Kinne goes 
duck hunting and canoeing on the nearby lake, but the scouts also lost their third commander of 
the war, J.H. Killian, during a skirmish in early June (Young’s successor, J.E. Thornton, had 
been reassigned earlier).406   
 As the 1st North Dakota and other volunteer regiments prepared to return home to the 
United States, the War Department appointed J. Franklin Bell, a rising star in the Army, 
commander of the 36th US Volunteer Infantry, the first of the new volunteer regiments in the 
Philippines. Bell was given permission to recruit officers and soldiers already in the Philippines, 
and Kinne notes on June 20th that “Bell came out from Manilla looking for recruits for his 
regiment of sharp-shooters.” It is likely no coincidence that Bell targeted the 1st North Dakota, a 
unit that had contributed many soldiers to Young’s Scouts. Bell was a similarly offensive-
minded officer who, like Lawton, was a veteran of the Indian Wars. He would go on to organize 
his own scouting units that served in ways similar to Young’s Scouts. They performed 
reconnaissance, advanced ahead of troop columns, and conducted search-and-destroy 
missions.407 Bell’s later campaigns in the Philippines are celebrated by contemporary military 
historians as some of the most effective examples of counterinsurgency warfare in US military 
history, a lineage that grew out of Lawton’s use of Young’s Scouts.408 
                                                 
406 “John B. Kinne Diary,” 69-72.  
407 Edgar F. Raines, “Major General J. Franklin Bell, U.S.A.: The Education of a Soldier, 1856-1899,” The Register 
of the Kentucky Historical Society 83, no. 4 (1985): 315–46, 340-343. 
408 Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare. 
183 
 
At least one of the men in Kinne’s regiment that had also served in the scouts, James 
McIntyre, put in for a transfer to Bell’s new regiment. Kinne, anxious to return home to North 
Dakota, chose not to. On June 22nd, after several more days spent duck hunting, Kinne narrates 
the final firefight of his time in the Philippines with a more literary voice: 
The next day a few of the scouts were out and shot at some natives who were crossing an 
opening, stirring up a regular hornets nest of them. The rest hurriedly went out to where 
they were and we got a few very good shots at the “Gugus.” They dropped a few pretty 
close to us but none of us were hit… We heard the war whoop [sic] of the Filipinos. It 
was a long drawn out oh---ah---oh, and sounded savage enough echoing and re-echoing 
among the hills and valleys around.409  
It is clear when reading Kinne’s journal that Indians were never far from his mind during his 
deployment to the Philippines, and this final skirmish fittingly ends with a savage war-whoop 
that echoes through the hills and valleys. The casual way in which he describes “shooting at 
some Natives” capture both the uncertainties of the guerilla warfare that was coming to define 
the conflict, and the dynamics of US imperial violence in which Filipino people, ostensibly the 
beneficiaries of the United States’ benevolent assimilation, found themselves under a general 
threat of violence. The “Oh---ah---Oh” that seems to have sent a shiver down Kinne’s spine, 
capturing the feeling of savage warfare, demonstrates one final time that US soldiers in the 
Philippines often narrated their experiences as an “Indian War.” This chapter has shown that an 
exploration of the interaction between imperial culture and military violence allows us to see the 
connections between the violence of US settler-colonialism and the Philippines-American War. 
“Indian fighting” was not the only lens through which US soldiers understood their time in the 
Philippines, but it was prominent and powerful, able to enmesh the soldiers in one of the United 
States’ most enduring narratives about violence. Lawton’s strategies and tactics, most 
prominently the creation of Young’s Scouts, were the product of material conditions, 
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institutional training, and these very cultural ideas: the discourse that framed the war in 
“frontier” terms. These are the narratives and stories that influence and define US militarism on 
the global scale. They have not gone away, and the war and occupation of the Philippines was 
one of the first conflicts that cemented “Indian fighting” as an important structuring narrative of 




















Chapter 4. Narrating Empire in Global Indian Country 
Introduction 
“Savage warfare was never more beautiful than in you.” 
- Charles King 
Arizona Territory, November 1st, 1874. Twenty-Five or so men of the 5th US Cavalry are 
relaxing, trying to find some shade from the oppressive heat. They are chasing a group of Tonto 
Apache who ran off a herd of cattle and killed a settler before fleeing into the mountainous Black 
Mesa region. Their leader, First Lieutenant Charles King, has reconnoitered ahead with some 
Apache scouts. The second in command, Lieutenant George Eaton, relaxes with a copy of James 
Fennimore Cooper’s Last of the Mohicans, an iconic portrayal of Native people in American 
literature. Cooper’s novels, which center on the woodsman Natty Bumpo, otherwise known as 
Hawkeye or Leatherstocking, would have resonated with men like Eaton serving on the front line 
of the Indian Wars. At the core of Cooper’s novels was an anxiety over the degeneration of 
frontiersmen into uncivilized denizens of nature. Although such men were necessary to the 
colonial process, they were, according to Cooper, dangerous, in too-close contact with an 
undeveloped wilderness and the Native people that inhabited it.410 Cooper’s frontiersmen could 
be admired for their Indian-like skills but they were a vanishing breed, much like the Indians, 
and had to step aside and make room for civilization. As he reclined in the shade and read 
Cooper’s story Eaton may have imagined himself as the inheritor of Leatherstocking’s legacy, a 
skilled warrior that had shed the rough buckskin of the frontiersman and replaced it with the 
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professionalism of the modern Army, able to challenge Indian warriors on their own ground 
without sacrificing the trappings of civilization.    
Perhaps he was reading the passage where Huron warriors led by the novel’s antagonist 
Magua ambush a column of British soldiers. Suddenly Eaton heard a few scattered shots from 
the direction King had taken, followed by an eruption of gunfire. He quickly gathered his troops 
and rushed towards the shooting, finding a badly injured King being carried, under fire, by 
Sergeant Bernard Taylor.411 Eaton’s literary repose had turned into the real thing. While 
scouting, King had encountered the hostile Tonto Apache, who shot several arrows at King, one 
slicing the flesh near his left eye. Gunfire followed the arrows, which King answered, hitting one 
of the Apaches hidden among the rocks. However, as he tried to reload King was struck in the 
right arm and was forced to make a haphazard retreat, his injured arm dangling uselessly at his 
side. Sergeant Taylor would eventually find the wounded King and, ignoring his superior 
officer’s orders to leave him to his fate, struggled down the mountain where he was eventually 
met by Eaton and the rest of the command.412 Taylor earned a Medal of Honor for his rescue, and 
King earned an injury that would trouble him for the rest of his military career. 
Eaton’s story about reading The Last of the Mohicans before an ambush blurs the line 
between the literary and the real. Out of moments like this the conflicts known as the Indian 
Wars have blossomed into one of the most enduring cultural tropes of US history, proliferating in 
literature, film, television, video games, sports, and more. Charles King, the man Eaton rescued 
that day in Arizona, was integral to the process of translating the violence of settler-colonialism 
into a flexible and mobile discourse and imprinting it on American culture. Part of the reason 
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that “Indian Country” and the “savages” that inhabit it have shown up in almost every US 
conflict, from the Philippines to Vietnam to Iraq, is because of men like Charles King. King was 
both a soldier and chronicler of empire. He fought in the continental US and the Philippines and 
turned that experience into a collection of stories that helped to influence the Western genre. 
Through writers like King, Indians, and the soldiers they fought, became one of the central 
images of US militarism, a symbiotic discourse that has continued to structure how the United 
States has viewed enemies and its own soldiers.  
Born into a military family in 1844, King graduated from West Point in 1866 and was 
stationed in New Orleans during Reconstruction. In 1874 King was transferred to the 5th US 
Cavalry and joined them in Arizona Territory, beginning a period of frontier service that would 
spawn his literary career.413 King participated in George Crook’s campaigns against the Apache 
in the southwest and later joined the general on the northern plains for the large-scale operation 
targeting the Lakota, Cheyenne, and their allies in 1876, the same campaign that resulted in the 
defeat of Custer’s 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn. There King witnessed his lifelong friend 
“Buffalo Bill” Cody in action as a scout for the 5th Cavalry and participated in several famous 
fights, perhaps most notably the fight at Warbonnet Creek where Cody would claim he “took the 
first scalp for Custer” in a fight with Cheyenne warrior Yellow Hair.414 
The fight with the Tonto Apache in November of 1874 would leave King with a lasting 
injury to his arm, but he remained in the army until 1879 when the pain finally forced him to 
retire. After his discharge King joined the Wisconsin National Guard, taught military science at 
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the University of Wisconsin, and began a writing career to earn extra money. However, his 
military service would continue in 1898 with the onset of the Spanish-American War, when he 
was commissioned as a Brigadier General of Volunteers and commanded a brigade during the 
early stages of the US occupation of the Philippines. In 1904 King returned to the National 
Guard and would remain involved until 1931 when he finally retired, two years before his death 
in 1933.415 During his life King wrote more than 60 books, mainly dealing with frontier violence, 
Army life, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. His writing has not entered the canon 
of great American literature, with its cumbersome focus on sentimental love stories and valiant 
frontier soldiers. However, his influence on the Western genre has been significant. Owen 
Wister, largely credited as the father of the Western, wrote that King “opened for us the door 
upon frontier military life.”416 Where writers like Wister mythologized the cowboy, King made 
the soldiers of the regular Army his focus, valorizing the men who fought in the Civil War, 
Indian Wars, and the Spanish-American War. King also influenced the early days of film. In 
1911 he sold the rights to several of his novels, and in the 1920’s four more of his books were 
adapted to film. King even collaborated with Buffalo Bill on his series of Indian Wars films, 
serving as a screen-writer.417 Through his writing King helped cement the Indian wars as an 
enduring literary construction. But unlike most who wrote about those conflicts King actually 
fought in them, and because he fought overseas in the Philippines his writing forms a bridge 
across which the tropes of frontier violence migrated overseas, where they developed into a 
central metaphor for US military violence. King was one of the most prominent examples of US 
soldiers narrating their overseas experiences as Indian warfare.  
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This chapter will follow King’s writing from Arizona to the Philippines, exploring the 
ways in which soldiers like King framed their experience as agents of US empire through 
references to frontier violence. In King’s writing Native people are positioned as the iconic 
enemies of US expansion, and are then translated into a mobile set of representations that are 
applied to a range of enemies, foreign and domestic. Jodi Byrd has argued that “Indianness” 
functions as a transit of empire, a set of ideas, discourses and practices that translate colonized 
subjects into “Indians” in order to justify the spread of US empire. Following Byrd, this chapter 
will show how Indianness (and Indian fighting) became a vehicle for the spread of US military 
violence, the lens through which US soldiers understood their enemies and themselves. These 
colonial continuities are used, in King’s writing, to justify the policies of the Philippines-
American war, a war that is now remembered, particularly in the US military, as the most 
successful counterinsurgency in American history.418 This chapter charts these continuities 
through space and time, showing how King can move, for example, from justifying colonization 
by describing the horror of Apache torture, to later justifying US troop’s use of torture through 
references to the colonization of Native people. I will begin with King’s early writing before 
moving overseas to the Philippines, charting the author’s relationship to the controversies that 
accompanied the United States’ first sustained, overseas counterinsurgency. 
Imagining Apacheria 
Unsurprisingly, King’s fight at Sunset Pass, which led to the injury which forced him to 
begin a writing career, looms large in his canon. He first wrote about the fight in a short story in 
his collection Starlight Ranch, and would later write an entire novel about an Apache ambush 
titled Sunset Pass. The Apaches who fought on both sides that day at Sunset Pass became the 
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focus of many of King’s novels; increasingly they appear as the specters that haunt the edges of 
civilization, invisible up to the moment they attack, shadows of violence that could manifest in 
actual Apache people but also in Mexicans and Filipinos. The Indians of his writing became 
increasingly abstracted over the course of King’s career, serving as flexible antagonists that 
could be transposed onto other groups of people and transported overseas, a literary companion 
to US empire. 
Charles King first explored the fight that resulted in his injury in a short story titled, “The 
Worst Man in the Troop,” in the collection Starlight Ranch. The story features fictionalized 
soldiers that undergo a pursuit and fight nearly identical to the one King and the 5th Cavalry 
experienced in 1874. In the story King’s Yuma Apache scouts are fearful and timid, unwilling to 
do their jobs and fleeing at the first sign of trouble. Perhaps they were simply unwilling to walk 
into an obvious ambush, but it allows King’s narrative to focus on the exploits of the soldiers. 
The story is straightforward, with the Tonto Apache ambush suddenly revealed in the form of an 
arrow “photographed as by electricity on the retina.” Mr. Billings, the fictional King, returns fire 
and sustains the same arm wound that interrupted King’s real career. As he attempts to escape, 
the maligned sergeant O’Grady, the “worst man in the troop,” rescues the fictional King and 
carries him down the mountain. Once they meet up with their reinforcements, the hostile Apache 
are swept away and the story ends. In the narrative the fight is largely a device that allows 
Sergeant O’Grady to put to rest his bad reputation and prove his worth. King retells the fight in 
straightforward and literal terms, but he would later resurrect the story in the form of a novel. 
In Sunset Pass King utilizes his experiences fighting Apaches to develop a far more 
embellished narrative. The story centers on Captain Gwynne, a widower, and his children Ned 
and Nellie. The family is headed back east to Pennsylvania from Arizona Territory accompanied 
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by their nurse “Irish Kate,” their driver, an African American man known only as “Jim,” a 
“swarthy Mexican” named Manuelito in charge of the mules, and a retired soldier named Pike. 
King’s characters conform to the racist stereotypes of the day, the brave Captain Gwynne and 
Pike contrasting to the cowardly Manuelito, the crass “Irish Kate,” and the lazy “darkey Jim.” 
However, even the characters that King maligns in his writing get to stand together with the 
white settlers in their opposition to the Native threat. The small party is stalked and ambushed by 
a hostile group of Apache who force a final confrontation in a cave. Captain Gwynne and Jim 
barely manage to hold them off before they are rescued from their last stand by US soldiers.419 
In Sunset Pass King’s Apache begin to take on their exaggerated literary form. US 
soldiers had a respect for Apache martial skills mixed with a widespread belief in their racial 
inferiority, and in King’s writing these two traits combined to begin to form the mythic image of 
the “Apache,” a literary figure that would take on a ponderous cultural weight, overshadowing 
the experiences and struggles of actual Apache people. They became one of the quintessential 
and enduring figures of insurgency. King’s Apache are at times dirty, then sleek. They are crafty 
and calculating, but they do not “have sense enough” to rush the cave and use their superior 
numbers to overwhelm the defenders. In the novel “no human being on earth can follow an 
enemy like an Apache.”420 These expert trackers pin down Gwynne’s party and capture 
Manuelito, who they proceed to torture. They dance and sing a “devil-inspired chant,” burning 
Manuelito with “jeering laughter and fiendish yells.” Their “savage song” drowns out 
Manuelito’s shrieks, after which they turn their attention to the trapped family.421 Gwynne, Pike, 
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and Jim spare their family a similarly barbaric fate by holding on until reinforcements arrive. 
Even Gwynne’s young son manages to kill an Apache attacker, yelling “papa, I shot an Indian,” 
and earning the admiration of the soldiers.422 The novel makes clear that the Apache are a threat 
looming at the edges of civilization, but one that can be overcome by individual bravery and the 
constant presence of the US Army. Like most literary Indians these Apaches are powerful, 
frightening, and exist to be killed. Every character, even the youngest, gets a shot.  
King would further develop his literary Apache in Foes in Ambush, written two years 
after Sunset Pass. Having already covered the dynamics of an Apache attack, Foes in Ambush 
turns the Apache into a universal threat. The story centers on the robbery of an Army paymaster 
and the kidnapping of the daughters of a prominent settler by Mexican bandits, the Morales 
gang, although Apaches continuously lurk at the edges of the story as possible culprits. They 
have become, in King’s writing, the benchmark against which frontier violence is measured, a 
shadowy threat more so than a literal menace as in Sunset Pass. Much of the novel takes place at 
night to escape the Arizona heat, Apaches being the only humans “impervious to the fierceness 
of its rays.” They are “no more human than so many hyenas,” and the novels characters are 
constantly looking over their shoulders expecting them to attack. Even once it becomes clear that 
the Morales gang of Mexican bandits are responsible for the theft and kidnapping they are 
measured against the Apache.423  
Midway through the story the Morales gang attacks a settlement where US soldiers are 
sheltering. The soldiers manage to fight off the initial attack and the Mexicans are transformed, 
through their subversion of civilized warfare, into Indians: 
And then it was that the inhuman brute gave the order to resort to Indian methods, and 
even old Moreno begged and pleaded and blasphemed all to no purpose. Furious at their 
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repulse, the band were ready to obey their leader’s maddest wish. The word was “burn 
them out.”424 
From the moment the Morales gang resort to “Indian methods” they are marked off in the story 
as unredeemable. They leave the settlement in ruins and begin a haphazard flight for the safety of 
their hideout. The remaining soldiers, anxious to rescue the captives and avenge those killed by 
the bandits, promise vengeance. One soldier remarks that “it’s worse than Apaches, lieutenant, 
and there’ll be no use trying to restrain our fellows when we catch the blackguards.” By resorting 
to “Apache” methods the bandits have forfeited the privileges of civilized restraint and will now 
be dealt with harshly. King’s narration makes it clear that if the gang had stopped at the murder 
of a several soldiers few in Arizona or Mexico would have made a great effort to stop them. It is 
the attack on white womanhood and the adoption of Indian methods which renders them fully 
irredeemable: “But in the deed of rapine that made them the captors and possessors of those 
defenceless sisters each man had put a price upon his head, a halter round his neck, for ‘Gringo’ 
and ‘Greaser,’ American and Mexican alike, would spring to arms to rescue and avenge.”425 
Although the story largely pits Mexicans against US soldiers and citizens, the transformation of 
the Morales gang into “Apaches” unites the two sides of the border, bringing them together to 
face the Indian threat, real or otherwise. They remain Apaches for the rest of the story, 
“scattering like Apaches” when the soldiers overtake them and recover the captive women. Here 
is one of the first steps in a mobile Apache discourse that could be applied to Mexicans, and later 
Filipinos, Iraqi soldiers, and even members of Al Qaeda.  
As the bandits are chased towards the Mexican border a small group of soldiers, as well 
as the rescued daughters, take shelter in the all-too-familiar mountain cave. Despite having 
firmly established the Mexican bandits as the antagonists King continues to dangle the threat of 
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Apache attack. Sergeant Wing, a hero of the story, fears that “unseen Indians would come 
skulking, spying, ‘snaking’ upon their refuge.”426 Smoke signals are observed in the desert, and 
the anxiety of the group begins to grow about the possibility of an Apache attack. Wing rides out 
to protect some soldiers separated from the main group, observed crossing the desert, sure that 
there are Apaches lurking in the rocks, and is predictably ambushed and injured by gunfire. 
“Blindly he searched for dusky Apache skulking from rock to rock,” but all he sees are men on 
horseback, not the expected Apache threat. Again, using an Apache bait and switch, other 
members of the Morales gang attacked the soldiers, one of whom was a relative of sergeant 
Wing. Again and again the reader is told to expect Apache violence, only to have that 
expectation subverted. 
In the final moments of the story it is almost as if King is unable to help himself, 
inserting an Apache attack that has no relationship to the overall plot. Having alluded to an 
Apache threat throughout, the feared Indians finally make an appearance at the end, serving to 
unite soldiers and criminals against the common indigenous foe. The “fury of the Apaches” 
descends on those trapped in the cave, “savage war” ensues, and one of the Mexican captives 
pleads for release: “Senor Teniente, I pray you unloose me and let me help. The Apache is our 
common enemy.”427 Together the US soldiers and Mexican bandits hold off these Apaches that 
have materialized out of the desert to hijack the story’s narrative. As in Sunset Pass, a last stand 
is made in the entrance to a cave, and just when hope seems lost and the Apaches set fire to the 
cave entrance the group is rescued by the US Army, the Mexican traitor having redeemed 
himself by giving his life in the defense. In the end, it was always Apaches, no matter who was 
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threatening King’s characters. This would hold true, even when King left the continental US 
behind at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Authoring Empire 
In early 1899 Charles King returned from a short deployment to the Philippines. His 
health had forced the general to make an early exit from that conflict, and on his way home to 
Milwaukee he stopped off at Chicago and talked to a reporter from the Chicago Daily Tribune. 
King argued that the US should send an additional 60,000 troops to the islands, a force that 
would enable General Otis “to crush out anything approaching organized opposition.” Predicting 
a lingering guerilla conflict, King extolled the virtue of a particular subset of soldiers that had 
been under his command: “I want to say a word for the Western volunteers. Three regiments of 
them were in my command—the First Washington, the First California, and the First Idaho. 
Better soldiers the world never saw. They were uniformly cheerful in the face of most 
discouraging conditions, and never failed to show dash and gallantry.”428 It is unsurprising that 
these westerners resonated with King, the author of so many works of Western and frontier 
fiction. The mystique of Indian Fighting clung to these men, just like it had clung to the men in 
Young’s Scouts, imprinted not just on the American military imagination but on their physical 
bodies. King, recounting the fighting around Manilla at the start of the conflict, remembered one 
officer “who had already won a name for daring and skill in the face of a savage enemy. A Sioux 
bullet at the bloody fight at Wounded Knee eight years ago drove fragments of his watch through 
his body, but in no way impaired his efficiency or daunted his nerve.”429 Like his superior officer 
Henry Lawton, King expected his western soldiers to perform in the Philippines. They must 
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have, for King would not only sing their praises in the press, but continue his literary arc by 
penning several novels that take place in the Philippines, novels that continued his interest in 
Western themes.  
King’s writing after he returned from the Philippines bridges continental US expansion 
and the overseas colonialism of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In his novels 
King emphasizes the Indian-fighting lineage of the soldiers who find themselves in the 
Philippines. These warriors had honed their skills “in the hardy, eventful and vigorous life of the 
Indian frontier.”430 In one of his novels, a group of American soldiers are caught in an ambush, 
and a frantic officer yells out “Those fellows have had no Indian campaigning or they’d have 
never got into such a box.”431 The literary King needed “Indians” to face his newly transnational 
Indian fighters. In an article he wrote for The Atlanta Constitution, King reflected on the racial 
character of Filipino people, “fanatical as the turk,” “more superstitious than the negro,” sneaky, 
half child and half devil. However, this mishmash of racist caricatures was secondary to King’s 
primary interest in Filipinos: their fighting prowess. And on that topic, King notes that Filipinos 
were “an enemy as utterly without conscience and as full of treachery as our Arizona Apache.”432 
This was a comparative framework King would continue. Indeed, Indians, and specifically 
Apaches, became a lens through which King’s experiences in the Philippines were refracted 
when he composed his novels.   
In Found in the Philippines, (which he wasted no time on, beginning to write on the 
voyage home), which is largely concerned with a convoluted love story, King also narrates the 
beginning of the Filipino military resistance to the US occupation. As the first shots are fired 
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around Manila, US troops faced “thickets of bamboo that fairly swarmed with Insurgents.” They 
possessed an “Indian-like skill in concealment” that frustrates the US soldiers.433 But King also 
began to consolidate and advance a new argument that was, according to Richard Slotkin and 
others, actually very old: that soldiers themselves could be caught up in the imaginative world of 
colonial representation. King denigrates Filipinos and calls them “little brown men,” and thinks 
of the so-called “insurgents” as Indians. But King noticed—and imagined—the ways that US 
soldiers were also beginning to assume an imagined “Indianness.” During a tense battle near the 
end of Found in the Philippines a group of US soldiers is pinned down by Filipino fire. They 
attempt to charge the Filipino position, “yelling like Apaches,” and the story’s hero (whose 
father once commanded at Fort Apache in Arizona) is lost in the chaos, sustaining an injury that 
he barely notices in the fury of the attack.434 “Apache” had become an increasingly flexible 
descriptor in King’s writing, appropriate for limited use to describe the more audacious actions 
of US soldiers. 
This connection between continental expansion and the war in the Philippines was based 
in King’s lived experience. He commanded troops in both contexts, and understood his time in 
both arenas as linked. In the Philippines he was a Brigadier General in the First Brigade of the 
First Division, serving under Henry Ware Lawton. King celebrated Lawton as “our famous 
Indian campaigner,” someone that the “old frontier cavalry swore by.”435 Kings troops were 
volunteers and militia from western states like Colorado, the Dakotas, Montana, Nebraska, 
Kansas, and more, men who had lived through conflicts and wars with Native nations.436 King 
even saved a newspaper article about his service in the Philippines which made that connection 
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explicit: “Captain Charles King’s heroes fought Sioux, Apaches, and other barbarous foes, 
always against powerful odds, and always with triumph. The accounts from Manila indicate that 
he can enact the fighting parts he has been so fond of creating on paper.” It even relays an 
episode in which King lead an assault similar to what the officers in another of King’s novels, 
Comrades in Arms, hoped to unleash: “The dark-skinned Natives, who outnumbered his brigade, 
were not unlike Apaches or Sioux, and General King was not unlike the fighting heroes of his 
books. He charged the Filipinos and drove them into the Pasig river.”437 This was a battle in the 
earliest stages of the war, on the outskirts of Manila, and it was one of the bloodiest of the entire 
conflict. As the newspaper account makes clear, the Indian Wars were the imaginative frame 
through which Americans interpreted the service of men like King while they fought in the 
Philippines. King later remembered the fight as a short and violent affair in which “little mercy 
was shown” to the overrun Filipinos where the fighting was hottest. Many Filipino soldiers were 
driven into the river to drown or be shot in the back. Hundreds of Filipino soldiers were killed, 
hundreds more captured, and a surrendered general told King that the Americans were relentless 
in a way that the Filipino soldiers were unaccustomed to. The battle launched King, Lawton, 
MacArthur, and the rest of the US soldiers in the Philippines into the aggressive initial campaign, 
a campaign that would come under increasing criticism after King left the islands.438  
King seems to use frequent references to the Indian Wars to make the patterns of guerilla 
warfare in the Philippines feel more familiar to his readers. In A Conquering Corps Badge, and 
Other Stories of the Philippines, Filipino tactics and the Army’s response are compared to what 
King calls “the old time Indian business.” An aging officer named Major Bellingham, returning 
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from a scout through the countryside, is ambushed by Filipino revolutionaries who surround the 
Americans and shoot them to death. At this point King gives the readers a familiar, and oft-
criticized, pattern from nineteenth century military policy on the frontier: “Then came the old 
time Indian business over again. Cross went out to ‘pursue and punish;’ gave the poor mutilated 
remains Christian burial; sent a scrawl to Coates bidding him break the news to Mrs. 
Bellingham, that the major's remains would hardly bear transportation, and to look sharp to his 
own sentries lest the Tagals give him a touch of the same treatment.”439 The “old Indian 
business” refers to the frustrations of frontier officers, who viewed themselves as caught between 
encroaching settlement and Native peoples, forever reacting to Native attacks with punitive 
columns of soldiers.  
These complaints betray a deeper effect of settler-colonialism: the tensions between 
elimination and incorporation embodied in the military’s multiple roles as a force of conquest 
and an apparatus of governance. Military policies thus occur in a liminal space between waging 
war and punishing crimes, King’s “old Indian business” of forever chasing after Native 
ambushers and raiders. In an 1869 letter from General Philip Sheridan to one of his subordinate 
officers, Benjamin Grierson, Sheridan complains about Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa-Apache 
raids into Texas. He instructs Grierson to hang anyone guilty of murder and arrest those guilty of 
robbery, and offers an appraisal of Indian policy: “The trouble heretofore with Indians has been 
caused by the absence of all punishment for crimes committed against the settlements. No 
people, especially those in a savage state, can be expected to behave themselves where there are 
no laws providing punishment for crimes.”440 This is the sort of attitude King is tapping into in A 
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Conquering Corps Badge, the colonizer’s frustration in being unable to enforce an imperial 
normalcy combined with an unwillingness to concede the martial legitimacy of Native 
resistance. There is, according to King, nothing else to do but bury the bodies and once more 
chase down the duplicitous “Amigos” who feign sympathy to the American occupation only to 
rise up at the slightest opportunity.  
King plays with and reinforces some of the gendered aspects of colonialism in his 
Philippines stories. He contrasts the wives of US Army officers, and the tempering they received 
along the US frontier, with Filipino men, as a mechanism of racialized emasculation in A 
Conquering Corps Badge. When a US occupied town faces the threat of Filipino revolutionary 
resistance, Miss Bellingham, the focus of the stories love triangle, is more than prepared for 
Filipino violence: “Army girls, frontier bred as are most of them, have seen too much of the 
American savage to scare easily at the puny Malay. Bessie Bellingham had been one of the best 
shots with a little Smith & Wesson in old days at Fort Custer. She had a heavier pistol now and 
well knew how to use it.”441 Native “savages” are used as a contrast to the Filipinos of King’s 
story. And while the white women in his novels tend to conform to the gendered and gentile 
norms of the period, largely serving as passive love interests for his fictional soldiers, King does 
not hesitate to mobilize their participation in military settler-colonialism as a way to further 
racialize Filipino men as cowardly, diminutive, and weak.  
The threat that Indian men supposedly held for white womanhood found its way into 
Captured: The Story of Sandy Ray, in which Gertrude, a white woman, is threatened with the 
possibility of being captured by Filipinos. Her companion, the soldier Sandy Ray, watches as “in 
her dilating eyes there came a look of infinite horror, of dread unspeakable.” As their enemies 
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draw closer Gertrude throws herself at Sandy’s feet and begs him for a knife. Confused, the 
soldier protests that he could never take on that many men with a single knife. “Oh, can’t you 
understand… Mrs. Blake told me – your regiment – never let a woman fall into the hands of the 
Indians. Isn’t this as – as horrible? Oh, you will not! You shall not!”442 The infinite horror – the 
sexual threat of non-white men, serves as a linkage in King’s story between continental 
expansion and the occupation of the Philippines. In both contexts, the presumed racial inferiority 
of Native people and Filipinos justified US expansion and occupation, and specifically justified 
colonial violence. Filipino sexuality as a threat would in turn refract back to the United States in 
the twentieth century. Anti-immigrant violence against Filipinos was driven in part by the 
“racial-sexual threat” that Filipino men supposedly posed to white women. Amy Kaplan has 
shown how the “anarchy of empire” causes disruption and change in the metropole as much it 
does on the colonial periphery, but King’s writing narrates this process as a three-step 
transference, where frontier racism travels overseas only to travel back to the continental United 
States, reformulated through overseas colonialism.443 
Using the Indian Wars to Justify Torture 
Even the more controversial violence of the Philippines campaign is filtered through a 
frontier lens in King’s writing. In Comrades In Arms the story follows a group of soldiers from 
their posting near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in 1897 to the Philippines. Once 
overseas, the men encounter the “savage” violence that they no longer find in the west. The 
Native people in King’s story are now pacified, the soldiers only needing to “keep a fatherly eye 
on them.” One of the story’s antagonists even considers using “the renegade Sioux” to run off a 
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woman attempting to extort money, but rejects the plan as “ever since Wounded Knee they had 
been timorous.” Gone are the dangerous, skulking Indians of King’s frontier-era stories. Instead, 
King uses these scared and pacified Sioux as a contrast to the “swarthy throng” of the overseas 
foe.444 The safety King’s soldiers experience in Dakota Territory contrasts to the danger they 
face in the Philippines. As the soldiers in Comrades in Arms work to justify the increasingly 
harsh measures they employ, the reader is reminded that they travelled overseas from a territory 
marked by exceptional violence that had effectively ended Native resistance. Indeed, Comrades 
in Arms turns into an impassioned defense of the more brutal elements of the US occupation.  
Comrades in Arms chronicles the transition from the initial, more conventional campaign 
of the US troops in the Philippines to the guerilla warfare that began in late 1899 and spread 
throughout the islands. King participated in the initial campaign, but he observed the later years 
of the occupation from a distance. He uses the story in Comrades in Arms to address the charges 
of excess, torture, and illegality that slowly began to filter into the American press and 
government. Ultimately the story becomes a defense of torture and American counterinsurgency 
policy, a defense that King undertakes through a comparison to continental colonialism and the 
Indian Wars.  
The Army worked hard to censor the press in the Philippines, and largely succeeded in 
keeping descriptions of torture, murder, and property destruction away from the American public 
until 1902, when the war (or at least the official version of the war) was nearly over. Anti-
imperialist groups and politicians made sporadic efforts to document abuses and disseminate 
them, but President McKinley, and later President Theodore Roosevelt, along with Secretary of 
                                                 




War Elihu Root, vigorously defended the US military’s conduct in the Philippines.445 In 
February of 1902 Root informed the United States Senate Committee on the Philippines that 
most reports of atrocities had been either “unfounded or grossly exaggerated.” He went on to 
justify what he argued were sporadic instances of illegal conduct by US troops by attacking 
Filipino conduct during the war:  
The war on the part of the Filipinos has been conducted with the barbarous cruelty 
common among uncivilized races, and with general disregard of the rules of civilized 
warfare... That the soldiers fighting against such an enemy, and with their own eyes 
witnessing such deeds, should occasionally be regardless of their orders and retaliated by 
unjustifiable severities is not incredible… The War in the Philippines has been conducted 
by the American army with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare, with 
careful and genuine consideration for the prisoner and the noncombatant, with self-
restraint, and with humanity.446 
Root is attempting to have it both ways: US troops had conducted themselves legally and with 
restraint, but even if there had been instances of “unjustifiable severities” they were, in fact, 
justified by the barbarous and uncivilized nature of the Filipinos. His choice of the word 
“barbarous” is calculated. Root attached a copy of General Orders 100 to his report to the 
Philippines Commission, the document that governed the conduct of US soldiers during war, 
particularly with regard to prisoners and guerillas. Known as the Lieber Code, the document was 
careful to differentiate between the civilized warfare of the European tradition and the 
“barbarous armies” of “uncivilized people,” and allowed for retaliation against the “barbarous 
outrages” that US troops might face.447 
 By April of 1902 the pressure on the administration began to mount as the number of 
court-martials and testimony alleging atrocities and torture by US soldiers increased. In 
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Comrades in Arms, which was published soon after the war was officially ended, King blames 
the press and anti-imperialist politicians for the protracted guerilla warfare that followed the 
initial successes of the campaign in the Philippines. According to King, criticism of the war and 
the conduct of US soldiers had emboldened the Filipino resistance to the occupation. His writing 
echoes the frequent complaints of the frontier army and predicts the more hawkish discourses of 
the Vietnam War. Press, humanitarians, and a meddlesome government stood in the way of 
victory for the US military: 
Then campaign orators and anti-administration papers denounced and dis owned the 
deeds of the soldiery; revived and restored the spirit of rebellion, and the misguided 
natives, hearing and permitted to hear only these treasonable vaporings, believing the 
nation spoke and not a bigoted few, took heart and arms again, and in many a province 
and many a distant isle fell upon the far-separated detachments, ofttimes with fatal effect. 
Here the story is mirroring reality, as Filipino revolutionaries had tried, unsuccessfully, to 
intensify the war in order to influence the election of 1900 which pitted the incumbent pro-
imperialist William McKinley against the anti-imperialist populist William Jennings Bryan. 
According to Comrades in Arms these criticisms had “incited the Filipino to renewed and 
desperate effort.” King even blames anti-imperialists for the death of Henry Lawton, who died in 
battle in December of 1899: “Lawton had died in December, pierced by a bullet, as he himself 
had expressed it, that might as well have been aimed by one of his own people.”448 These 
excoriations of anti-imperialist sentiment are combined with racialized descriptions of Filipino 
guerillas as “as screaming, screeching, triumphant host,” and just like the American generals 
who fought the war, the officers in King’s story decide to intensify the occupation.  
In his novel King relates criticism of the Army directly to the frequent complaints 
officers in Indian Country made about eastern newspapers and reformers. For soldiers like King 
the enemy was not only Indians (or Filipinos), but a hostile press, meddlesome religious 
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activists, and government intrusion into military affairs. As the Philippines campaign intensifies 
a soldier in the novel cautions his superior officer to reign in his more aggressive impulses. 
‘“You know the orders, sir,’ said his staff officer dryly. ‘I used to think we were up against the 
press, the pulpit, the people, and the Indians, too, when we had our annual run for the scalp 
dancers, but that was a simple proposition as compared to this.’” “It isn't the men—it's the 
measures," another officer responds. “It's like the orders we used to get long days ago at 
Laramie, when the Sioux had scalped our herders: ‘make every effort to arrest the murderers, but 
be sure to do nothing to excite the Indians.’”449 For these soldiers in King’s story it is the Army 
against everyone else, called upon to do a difficult job but then criticized when they attempt to 
do it correctly. This was a pervasive attitude in the frontier military, one King was intimately 
familiar with and sympathetic to. The soldiers were willing, but held in check by half-measures.  
It is hard to fathom the massacre at Wounded Knee, which King references earlier in the 
story, as being a half-measure.450 Nonetheless, King’s fictional soldiers long for the opportunity 
to strike out at their Filipino enemies as they used to on the frontier. King himself longed for that 
opportunity. In a letter to his daughter while stationed near Manilla he wrote that US soldiers had 
orders to avoid all conflicts before the war broke out in early 1899. King clearly found those 
orders frustrating, telling his daughter that “I dare say these little Filipinos think they’ve got the 
Yankees scared half crazy – when the fact is it is galling… to keep our own tempers and our men 
from rushing the insurgent lines and ‘eating them up.’”451 Racial superiority drove this 
frustration. References to Filipino men as diminutive and cowardly, along with a variety of racial 
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slurs, fueled the desire of US soldiers to conduct an aggressive campaign. King’s desire to “eat 
them up” is an early iteration of the United States’ military hubris, the faith that overwhelming 
firepower, technology, and strength can easily overwhelm any foe, a belief that guerilla fighters 
have been challenging since the war in the Philippines and continue to do so. 
 Particularly frustrating for the novel’s soldiers are the dynamics of the US occupation in 
which Filipino guerillas move through the country unseen, embedded in the general population. 
US soldiers were forced to constantly patrol through the countryside and occupy towns, 
uncertain of the hostility of the Filipinos they encountered. King’s soldiers again understand their 
frustrations in terms drawn from their experiences in Indian country:  
You are trying to carry out your orders, but you can't, because of your instructions—the 
one blocking the other just as the War and Interior Departments used to keep us between 
two fires on the Indian frontier. You know there are hundreds of Mausers and thousands 
of Mauser cartridges cached somewhere in that village. You know that presidente knows 
all about it, too, but the only way you can prove it is to rip things to pieces until you find 
them, and you are forbidden to rip.452 
In King’s narrative it took actual Indian Fighters to resolve this quandary, just as real-life 
generals like Lawton, MacArthur, Chaffee, and King himself aggressively pursued an end to 
Filipino resistance. Near the end of the story the American occupation intensifies: “Then at last 
there began a new dispensation. New district commanders stepped into the field, some from the 
regulars, some from the national volunteers. They were men chosen because of certain traits of 
strenuous, vehement energy that had marked them in other sections and at earlier stages of the 
game.” Colonel Langham, the story’s hero, is one of these “vehement and strenuous men,” 
molded in frontier service and happy to “rip.” Now the Philippines campaign had the men it 
needed, men who “belonged to the heroic age when results, not means, were of first 
consequence.” And freed from restraint, Colonel Langham and this new cohort of strenuous men 
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clamp down on the Filipino population in a way similar to the escalation that happened in the 
real Philippines war, complete with widespread destruction, death, and torture.  
King describes Langham as the man who “swept the big island from end to end until he 
had scourged it clean,” surrounding and occupying town after town, capturing insurgent leaders 
and using the water cure to reveal the location of weapons caches.453 This was the pattern of the 
actual US occupation from late 1900 to 1902. Take the following example from the diary of 
Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes dated January 20, 1901:  
At 4:00 a.m., the troop started on a hike to San Pedro Tunasan, 2 ½ miles. Surrounded the 
town at a gallop, although Private Flannery, C troop, nearly spoiled things by firing a 
shot. Then we rounded up all males, and Major Miranda, former insurgent officer but 
now an informer in our pay,-- picked out a dozen as insurgents. After Miranda had 
administered the so-called “water-cure” to several of these, we succeeded in obtaining 3 
guns, 1 revolver, 4 bolos.454 
Rhodes, who was stationed on the Pine Ridge reservation in 1890 when the US Army massacred 
hundreds of Lakota Sioux at Wounded Knee, narrates his troop’s tactics in the Philippines in a 
way that evokes the Indian Wars: they surround the town at a gallop, although the surprise is 
nearly spoiled when someone fires an errant shot. Rhodes also notes the frequent use of the water 
cure in his diary, which by that point was a widespread and standard element of the 
counterinsurgency.  
Ultimately King deploys Indian Country in this novel as a defense of torture. Colonel 
Langham’s tenure in the Philippines culminates in a general court martial, the main charge of 
which is that his troops regularly tortured Filipinos. King’s narrative describes Langham’s 
tactics, in one episode occupying a Filipino town and demanding intelligence from a local leader. 
Langham’s men administer the “water cure,” a torture technique which involves force-feeding an 
                                                 
453 King, Comrades, 306-309. 
454 Charles Dudley Rhodes, “Diary of Charles Dudley Rhodes,” The Charles D. Rhodes Papers, 1940-1949, Box 1, 
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individual an excessive amount of water until their stomach becomes distended, and then 
applying sudden pressure to the abdomen. The victim feels as if they are drowning and 
experiences pain in the stomach and internal organs from the pressure of the water.455 King goes 
out of his way to make the torture seem benign:  
The tube of the funnel went into his mouth; cool water into the bowl of the funnel, and 
the presidente had either to swallow or choke. It didn't hurt; it was simply inconvenient. 
Few men care to be made to drink when they do not wish to. One swallow led to another, 
and still the presidente held out. No one further touched or hurt him. The discomfort 
arose from having to absorb more water than the system had room for, even after 
swelling visibly. When finally he began to run over, the presidente was lifted to his feet 
and asked very civilly would he now point out the assassins, and the ammunition?456 
“Cool water” and the mere “inconvenience” of the water cure in King’s retelling attempt to 
portray the practice as far more benign as it was in reality. The water cure was hardly a gentle 
procedure. It was a mechanism of torture designed to inflict pain and coerce information, and in 
addition to the damage to the stomach and internal organs, could result in teeth getting knocked 
out and slashes and trauma to the limbs as the victim was held down.457 Langham’s methods 
convince the presidente to talk, and word begins to spread about these increasingly aggressive 
counterinsurgency tactics: “The story went swiftly from town to town that at last the Americans 
were led by an officer who couldn't be fooled, and who carried a funnel. The mere exhibition of 
that suggestive implement told further presidentes what to expect. And so ended the triumphant 
defiance of Samar and its modern Samaritans.” During the proceedings of the court martial King 
once more suggests that the victims of the water cure had “been no more than temporarily 
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inconvenienced,” the aggrieved Langham the victim of jealous subordinates eager to bring about 
his downfall. 458  
King paints the members of the court martial as largely sympathetic to Langham and his 
tactics, veterans of Indian Country themselves that understand the demands of savage war:  
Some of them, West Pointers and Indian fighters of the line, chosen, because of their 
energy in that line, to command volunteer regiments against the Insurgent Islanders, had 
been heard to say that the only way to thrash Indians or Islanders was to tackle them 
Indian or Island fashion, which was not with gloves, or close observance of a General 
Order devised for use in battling a civilized and not a savage foe. Some few of them had 
gone so far as to profit by Pat Langham's example.459 
This entire section of King’s story, which otherwise is concerned with Langham’s attempts to 
win over the daughter of a fellow officer, is a forceful defense of Army tactics, torture, and the 
necessities of “savage war.” When fighting Indians or Filipinos the Army was justified, 
according to these men, in removing their gloves and exercising a severity beyond that allowed 
by the formal rules of war. It is a defense that echoes the justifications of President Theodore 
Roosevelt, who argued in 1902 that “the army, which has done its work so well in the Philippine 
islands, has… been cruelly maligned even by some who should have known better… The 
temptation to retaliate for the fearful cruelties of a savage foe is very great, and now and then it 
has been yielded to.”460 King’s (and Roosevelt’s) frequent references to savagery are more than 
just a reference to a central question of military law: whether the enemy’s actions justify an 
extreme response. They show the ongoing influence the cultural discourse around “savagery” 
had in determining US military action. Indians lurked even in the shadowy recesses of military 
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law, a potential indictment that more often was invoked as a justification. Against the savage the 
exception became the rule. 
 King turns criticism of Army conduct into a ringing denunciation of anti-imperialists, 
Indian sympathizers, and civilian interference with military policy. In Comrades in Arms the 
overwhelming majority favor aggressive tactics to subdue “savages” but are drowned out by a 
loud minority that controls the press and the halls of government. One of Langham’s superiors, 
and the father of his love interest, offers a forceful defense of Army tactics in the Philippines, but 
to no avail.461 Protocol prevails and Langham is punished:  
Belden's plea was eloquent and forcible, but—orders are orders. No matter that our 
people, soldier or civilian, were shot from ambush, boloed in cold blood, trapped in pit-
falls, flayed, flogged, and tortured to slow and cruel death; no matter that officials, sworn 
to loyalty, should give refuge to assassins, should conceal them, their arms, and their 
supplies —should laugh and lie in the face of the officers sent in search— the law and the 
prophets, the press and the pulpit held that only by the rules of civilized war should even 
savages be handled.462  
King clearly feels betrayed, just as he and his fellow officers in Indian Country felt betrayed in 
their 19th century wars with Native people. “Just as in the days of the Indian wars the good folk 
farthest removed from the scene were loudest in denunciation of the troops at the spot. To these 
latter it was death if they lost, and defamation if they won. The men who put an end to the most 
savage and intractable side of the insurrection were summoned in turn to take their 
punishment.”463 Langham becomes a sacrifice to the demands of savage warfare, a hero willing 
to use extreme tactics in pursuit of ends which, according to King, justify the means.   
                                                 
461 In the cases that did come before a court martial US officers were hesitant to return guilty verdicts and largely 
sympathetic to officers that used torture techniques. Einolf, America in the Philippines, 49. 
462 King, Comrades, 320-321. 
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 King is simultaneously removed from and adjacent to reality in Comrades in Arms. There 
was widespread torture in the Philippines, in addition to other forms of controversial violence.464 
And the rise of torture by US forces corresponds to the moment in King’s narrative when the 
men of “strenuous, vehement energy” took over the occupation and proceeded to “rip” their way 
through the Filipino countryside. According to Christopher Einolf’s meticulously researched 
chronology of American torture in the Philippines, the use of torture by US troops and allies 
began after the conventional phase of the war ended in late 1899. As guerilla warfare spread 
throughout the islands so did a variety of forms of torture including beatings, slow hangings, and 
the water cure. The techniques spread slowly at first, but saw increasing usage in late-1900 when 
Filipino forces launched a surprising counter-offensive. General Arthur MacArthur responded by 
authorizing full use of the penalties for guerilla warfare outlined in General Orders 100, the so-
called Lieber Code developed during the Civil War, which outlined harsh penalties for non-
uniformed guerilla fighters.465 By 1901 the water cure was widely used, most visibly by Major 
Edwin F. Glenn, likely one of the inspirations for the court martial of Langham in Comrades in 
Arms. One of the few officers to face a court martial for the use of torture in the Philippines, 
Glenn, somewhat paradoxically, had a law degree and expertise in the rules of warfare, which he 
seems to have used to justify the use of the water cure.466  
                                                 
464 In many instances torture was justified or encouraged through racial and exterminationist language. In addition to 
King’s references to the Indian Wars, many soldiers understood Filipinos through the lens of anti-black racism. A 
marching song composed by a US soldier encouraged the troops to “Get the good old syringe boys and fill it to the 
brim; We’ve caught another nigger and we’ll operate on him; Let someone take the handle who can work it with a 
vim; Shouting the battle cry of freedom.” Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government, 138-141. 
465 General Orders 100 (The Lieber Code) forbids torture, but leaves open the possibility of retaliation as a response 
to “barbarous outrages,” and denies fighters who are not members of organized, hostile armies the privileges of 
prisoners of war. Such men “shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.” 
466 Einfolf, America in the Philippines, 37-67; Allan W. Vestal, “The First Wartime Water Torture by Americans,” 
Maine Law Review 69 (2017): 1–66, 17-21. 
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Some officers, such as Glenn and Jacob “Hell Roaring” Smith, famous for his orders to 
turn the island of Samar into a “howling wilderness” and kill every Filipino male over the age of 
ten, did face prosecution or censure.467 But the criticism of the military’s conduct was not 
restricted to strident anti-imperialists in the US. The Army’s top general, Nelson A. Miles, a 
fellow Indian Fighter who had done his fair share of complaining about civilian criticism of 
military conduct, himself criticized Army abuses in the Philippines. Miles toured the islands in 
1902 and published a report focused on the dispersion of US troops, their condition, the progress 
of the war, and other concerns. A special section of Miles’ report addressed the accusations of 
US atrocities in the Philippines, accusations Miles found credible. He detailed several meetings 
with Filipino community leaders and was introduced to people that had been tortured with the 
water cure. In one community, he met local leaders and was informed that fifteen people from 
the area had been tortured with the water cure; one man had been tortured and then confined to a 
burning building, where he died. Miles saw burned out fields, destroyed towns, and heard stories 
of US officers known for their extreme tactics.468 The Miles Report became a minor controversy 
when anti-imperialist Herbert Welsh accused Secretary of War Root of suppressing the report 
and organized a letter writing campaign.469 According the War Department the report had been 
published in full and edited for brevity by various newspapers, but the zealous Welsh went ahead 
                                                 
467 King may be referencing the case of Major Edwin F. Glenn, a military lawyer and intelligence officer in the 
Philippines who was tried in a military court on charges of torture and killing surrendered Filipinos in 1902. Glenn 
had commanded a mounted intelligence unit that went from town to town administering the water cure to extract 
information. In his testimony, Glenn did not deny administering the water cure but argued that it was humane and 
justified, a necessary element of the counterinsurgency campaign. He was found not guilty. See Einolf, American in 
the Philippines, 1-2, 167-168.  
468 Miles, The Philippines Reports. 
469 Welsh’s accusation was seemingly unfounded, as the report had already been supplied to various newspapers. 
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with his campaign and sent assistants to gather testimony from soldiers who had served in the 
Philippines.470    
 What the testimony demonstrates is that the water cure was anything but benign, contrary 
to King’s depiction. Testimony offered by Herbert Yenser, a private in Company E of the Eight 
Regiment Regulars, related an instance of the water cure at the town of San Pueblo in Laguna 
Province. Members of the 7th Cavalry captured a Filipino revolutionary soldier while sleeping. 
He was brought before the leader of the regiment, Colonel Baldwin, and when he refused to offer 
any information the colonel said “take him away.” Yenser reportedly crept into a loft 
overlooking the guard house and through cracks in the boards saw a Maccabebe scout attached to 
the 7th Cavalry administer the torture. According to Yenser:  
First a pipe was placed in the Victim’s mouth and then water poured in until his abdomen 
became much distended. Then the men jumped with both feet upon the victim’s stomach 
with such force that the water spurted from his mouth over three feet in the air. The 
second time this operation was performed blood also came out with the water.471 
A similarly gruesome testimony was offered by Daniel F. Murphy of G Company, 3rd and 4th 
Cavalry. Like Yenser he attributes the torture to another unit of soldiers, who captured a Filipino 
soldier and subjected the man to the water cure near a stream.  
The man was laid down and a canteen of water being procured from the stream he was 
made to drink until he would give information. The victim shouted and screamed and 
tried to kick but they ‘held him.’ The man had to be held down because of his struggles 
and he would keep constantly vomiting the entire contents of his stomach… The soldiers 
kept pouring water from the tin cup until the man ‘gave in.’472 
Perhaps the most inflammatory witness interviewed by Welsh and his associates was 
Charles S. Riley, who would later testify before the Senate Philippines Investigating Committee 
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about the widespread use of torture by US forces. Riley testified that he had witnessed Captain 
Edwin Glenn oversee the administering of the water cure to Tobeniano Ealdama, the presidente 
of the town of Igbaras. After several minutes of torture Ealdama answered the questions that 
were put to him through a translator, and was allowed to dress. However, moments later more 
information was demanded and, refusing to answer, the presidente was once more tortured. 
Pinned down at the arms and legs, multiple syringes were inserted into his mouth and nose, and 
water, this time mixed with salt on the suggestion of an American surgeon, Dr. Lyons, was 
forced into him. Ealdama reportedly confessed to alerting nearby Filipino revolutionary soldiers 
of the arrival of US troops. Riley testified that while that was the only instance of the water cure 
personally witnessed, other soldiers under Glenn freely discussed multiple instances in which the 
torture had been used to procure information. Based on the “confession” of Ealdama, Glenn led 
the troops into the nearby mountains in search of insurgents, and upon returning to Igbaras he 
ordered the entire town burned to the ground. According to Riley’s testimony this was “on 
account of the exposition of the affairs of the morning, the information received from the 
presidente.”473  
The Miles Report was only one example of the widespread backlash to US atrocities in 
the Philippines, and King’s writing in Comrades in Arms is a clear attempt to counter such 
criticism. The Roosevelt administration managed to contain most of the fallout from the torture 
scandal, and the president declared the war officially over on July 4th, 1902. Like most 
occupations, Filipino resistance continued, particularly in the Moro regions in the southern part 
of the Philippines. But the Philippines commission passed the Brigandage Act in November of 
1902 which defined remaining resistance to US authority as “banditry” and “ladronism,” 
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categories even more illegitimate than insurgency. This attempt to inject a colonial normalcy in 
the islands was furthered by the establishment of the Philippine Constabulary, a police force 
under Commission control that Paul Kramer calls “a colonial army in police uniform.” When the 
US assumed control of the Philippines they had turned anticolonial resistance into an 
insurrection; the creation of the Constabulary now turned insurgency into mere criminality. The 
majority of US troops returned from the islands, having suffered minimal consequences from the 
torture scandals King so vociferously critiques in Comrades in Arms. 474 
Conclusion 
In August of 1899, following Charles King’s return to the United States, Henry Lawton 
wrote the following letter to the general:  
I cannot express to you how much I regret the necessity for your return to the United 
States at the time you did. I want to say to you that you are the only General officer 
whom I know who possesses that peculiar faculty or that magnetism which attracts men 
to him; you are the only one of all the General officers who has excited among the men of 
his command any great amount of enthusiasm. I remember when you left your launch to 
come aboard the gunboat just before the attack on Santa Cruz, that a cheer went up from 
all the men in the transports; and you seem to possess that peculiar dash and spirit which 
carries men who follow you along with you with enthusiasm. 
King reciprocated Lawton’s enthusiasm, writing years after the general’s death that Lawton was 
“a glorious soldier, and we of the old frontier cavalry swore by him.” 475 Recall the earlier report 
in which Lawton lauded Young’s Scouts for their “peculiarly valuable” service. “Peculiar” 
functions as a coded signifier for Indian Fighting, at this point more a general counterinsurgency 
strategy and supporting discursive mythology. “Peculiar” serves to remove that fighting into a 
state of exception in which “savage” tactics can be used to defeat savages and reconstitute a 
civilized social normality. King’s familiar use of the word “old” traffics in just that nostalgia for 
Indian Fighting which clearly was not a nostalgia but rather a material fact of developing US 
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counterinsurgency strategy.  Soldiers like King and Lawton thought fondly on their “old” Indian 
Fighting days even as they translated that experience into a coherent program to defeat Filipino 
revolutionaries. Nostalgia masked the continuities at work in military strategy. The reputation of 
both men was built on their role in the conquest of Native people in the continental US, which 
informed their subsequent history as soldiers, writers, and objects of a frontier mythology that 
became infused into the US military. 
Yes, both Lawton and King fought Apaches and Filipinos. But when you dig into their 
histories a more complicated process of cultural formation emerges. Lawton, King, and their 
peers from the frontier army moved overseas to the Philippines and in the process made “Indian 
Fighting” a structuring narrative of US military violence. They were discursively positioned as 
Indian fighters and they willingly filled that role, narrating their time in the Philippines as an 
Indian war, and in King’s case further cementing that connection in a literary canon which 
played a significant role in the development of the western genre. The first counterinsurgency 
fighters of the twentieth century were Indian Fighters – tactically, discursively, and in the 
imaginations of those who viewed the frontier as encompassing the entire globe. For 
contemporary theorists of counterinsurgency, the “Indian Wars” and the Philippines-American 
War have emerged as the main usable history of US counterinsurgency. The lives of King and 
Lawton demonstrate that counterinsurgency in US history is not a neutral descriptor of a 




Chapter 5. America’s Counterinsurgency-Culture and the War on Terror 
Introduction 
Indian Wars everywhere? In the conclusion to his Strategy Research Project thesis at the US 
Army War College, Lieutenant Colonel Michael G. Miller reflects on the similarities between 
the Indian Wars and the War on Terror: 
When it comes down to it, humans will fight to defend their survival interests. It’s not a 
stretch when looking at an early photo of military officers sitting in a circle with Indians 
having council or “pow-wow” over some grievance; just as we have seen young officers 
doing in Afghanistan with the local tribal elders. The times, places, names and 
combatants are different, but the human nature of the conduct of insurgent war remains 
the same. Clearly then, Red Cloud’s War and the Indian Wars in general can provide us 
with many lessons learned to help in the fight against insurgents of the 21st Century.476  
Miller proposes a striking visual continuity: the frontier soldier transplanted to the mountains of 
Central Asia, dual images that evoke the colonial nostalgia of continental expansion and the 
imperial ambitions of the War on Terror. This has proven to be an attractive comparison, one that 
Miller and a host of US soldiers, strategists, and military theorists have made in the years since 
the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Unprepared to fight a counterinsurgency, the military grasped for a history and practice of 
irregular war that could function as an alternative to the failures of the Vietnam War, an 
institutional scar so deep that the armed forces worked to forget what they had learned (and not 
learned) in Southeast Asia.477 In the effort to (re)learn counterinsurgency, the Indian Wars 
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became a potent well of military and cultural knowledge to draw from. Baghdad, like other 
occupied zones before it, was “Indian Country,” and the Apache Wars became the focus of 
military study at places like the Command and General Staff College and the War College. The 
colonial violence of US continental expansion has always hung like a cloud over the US military, 
but in the decade after 9/11 the cloud seemed to burst.478 
This chapter will explore the ongoing influence of continental expansion on the US 
military, particularly the development of an American “counterinsurgency-culture” that 
continually frames counterinsurgency warfare as an “Indian war.” As a particular manifestation 
of militarization, counterinsurgency-culture acts broadly, on a national scale, and institutionally, 
within the different branches of the US military. It is expressed through everything from 
continual references to Indian Country by soldiers and civilians, to the military publications that 
compare nineteenth century Native fighters to contemporary insurgencies in places like Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Scholars such as John Dower, Michael Sherry, and Aaron O’Connell have explored 
the pervasive influence of militarism and militarization on US culture, with Sherry defining 
militarization as “the process by which war and national security became consuming anxieties 
and provided the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life.”479 
Counterinsurgency-culture is a part of the militarization Sherry outlines, and his definition is 
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Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 15.  
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useful in that it combines the material and the discursive. We should avoid a false division 
between the material manifestations of militarization (munitions factories, declarations of war, 
and soldiers in combat) and the ideologies and discourses of militarism that shape a given state 
or community. Rather, we should emphasize the interconnectedness of what Wayne Lee calls the 
cultural and the operational.480 Militarization certainly shapes politics and economics, but it also 
exercises a cultural influence on the stories and beliefs transmitted about war and violence.  
Discourses, in turn, shape human actions, including the actions of soldiers, through a 
process that Mary Renda calls “cultural conscription.” Renda, drawing on feminist critic Joan 
Scott, views discourses as historically situated structures of beliefs, terms, statements, and ideas. 
Discourses are shaped by power and are thus uneven; some carry more weight than others, and 
discourses of militarization have been a potent force in the United States. These militaristic 
discourses shape and are shaped by US culture, a process that is ever-shifting and dynamic.481 
This flexibility is important, because it is what has allowed ideas and representations about 
Indians to continually give definition to American counterinsurgency-culture across three 
centuries up to the present. Dower, Sherry, and O’Connell focus mostly on the twentieth century 
and more recent US history, but we might think of the related ideologies of manifest destiny, 
Indian-hating, and playing-Indian as a particular form militarism that has shifted over time, 
becoming an increasingly cultural preoccupation once Native military resistance ended. As the 
United States transitioned from continental expansion into a more global form of militarization, 
the discursive baggage of the Indian Wars—“Indian Country,” the surround, the ambush, the 
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savage, the warrior, the guerilla, and more—were all were grafted onto US militarism, 
particularly in the province of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. This happened despite a 
lack of doctrinal continuity from the Indian Wars within the US military. What this means is that 
soldiers have continued to image their enemies (and themselves) as Indians, even as the Indian 
Wars were absent from formal training and strategy.  
In what follows, I will investigate how and why the Indian Wars continues to be an 
alluring object of study for contemporary military professionals, both as a source of strategic 
insight and a set of ideological rubrics that help soldiers to make sense of foreign and domestic 
conflicts. In the nineteenth century the US Army developed and codified an approach to Indian 
Fighting that combined indiscriminate violence with biopolitical measures aimed at regulating 
and controlling Native life. This proto-counterinsurgency doctrine, a blend of material practices 
and cultural attitudes, travelled overseas to the Philippines and was used to devastating effect 
during the US occupation of the islands. However, the US military did not maintain a strategic or 
tactical continuity around “Indian fighting” and counterinsurgency after the occupation of the 
Philippines. It was in cultural venues, both within the military and without, that the Indian Wars 
persisted. 
In the years after World War I most of the previous generation’s Indian Fighters retired 
from the Army. Many lived long enough to see their frontier service translated into one of the 
most enduring and definitive representations of the American experience. The Indian Wars were 
the stuff of nostalgia and the culture industry. Former officers discussed their role in these 
conflicts in historical societies like The Order of the Indian Wars, but not the pages of field 
manuals or strategic documents. This makes situating the Indian Wars in the chronology of US 
militarism difficult. They seem to predict the development of counterinsurgency warfare in the 
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twentieth century, but they left only a fleeting institutional record, making it a challenge to draw 
a direct line between the practices of nineteenth century soldiers and their modern counterparts. 
The connections are more convoluted, weaving in-and-out of civilian and military culture, 
leaving behind traces in military practice that emerge and disappear. The US military spent much 
of the twentieth century disavowing the importance of counterinsurgency. And yet, modern 
soldiers continue to talk about the Indian Wars and to see them as a tool for understanding the 
War on Terror.  
This raises several related questions. To what extent do the Indian Wars influence 
contemporary warfare, with such an amorphous record of strategic and tactical continuity? Given 
the nineteenth century historical precedents for counterinsurgency that I uncovered in the 
previous chapters, is there a consistent ideological orientation towards colonized populations, a 
counterinsurgency-culture, expressed through military violence, which can account for this gap? 
Is the intellectual approach to warfare championed by contemporary counterinsurgents seriously 
engaging ideas such as “culture,” “human rights,” and other social scientific and humanistic 
questions? What follows is a brief survey of the fluid movement of the Indian Wars throughout 
American culture during the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the enduring hold these 
conflicts have held on the US military. After, this chapter will show how the War on Terror has 
moved Native people back to the forefront of US military discourse as a set of strategic lessons 
for modern counterinsurgency warfare. In doing so, I demonstrate the influence of cultural 
attitudes and ideologies on the supposedly cold calculation of “strategy.” When contemporary 
soldiers and theorists talk about “culture,” whether the culture of nineteenth century Native 
peoples or the modern enemies of the US military, they are more often referring to a particular 
discourse about an indigenous culture. This is the foundation of counterinsurgency-culture: a 
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colonial discourse about race and indigeneity standing in for a serious engagement with Native 
peoples and their culture. Ultimately, I will outline the contours of America’s counterinsurgency-
culture and the role that Native people and the Indian Wars have played in its development. 
When we go looking for strategic continuity between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, 
we find that counterinsurgency is as much about a cultural attitude towards ones enemies as it is 
about applying a technical form of warfare. And those attitudes have colonial roots.  
Twentieth-Century Indian Wars 
Founded in 1896 by Colonel B.J.D. Irwin, the Order of the Indian Wars served to 
“perpetuate the memories of the services rendered by the military forces of the United States in 
their conflicts and wars against hostile Indians within the territory or jurisdiction of the United 
States, and to collect and secure for publication historical data relating to the instances of heroic 
service and personal devotion by which Indian warfare has been illustrated.”482 A military 
society with elaborate ceremonies and traditions, the organization met yearly to induct new 
members, honor those that had passed away, and to listen to papers delivered on relevant 
historical topics. The tone of the meetings was largely nostalgic; nowhere in the record of 
proceedings does the discussion situate the Indian Wars in relation to twentieth-century conflict. 
In his address at the 1921 meeting Charles King declares that “it is all a memory now, but what a 
memory to cherish!” He goes on to argue that  
A more thankless task, a more perilous service, a more exacting test of leadership, 
soldiership, morale and discipline no army in Christendom has ever been called upon to 
undertake than that which for eighty years was the lot of the little fighting force of 
regulars who cleared the way across the continent for the emigrant and the settler… 
There never was a warfare on the face of the earth in which the soldier, officer of man, 
had so little go gain, so very much to lose.483  
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Although the order has continued into the present in a reduced form, the 1941 meeting was the 
last in which a major address was given and published. As recorded in the proceedings,  
Before they were to meet in session again – and none knew the next meeting was to be 
the last – the United States was to enter into World War II after an attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii. The end of an era had been long in coming. The Indian fighter was no 
longer the subject of hero worship by the young, of admiration by the middle-aged and of 
envy by his peers. The remaining Order of Indian Wars membership – by virtue of a 
sneak attack – became ancient history, and no longer just history… It was an unfitting 
death of an image so long loved, admired and respected by Americans.484 
For the Order, the Indian Wars were the stuff of nostalgia and myth, the translation of the real 
experiences of the order’s members into a heroic narrative about US history. The tone is almost 
petulant, the attack on Pearl Harbor becoming the final nail in the coffin of public interest in the 
lingering nostalgia for frontier violence, the racialized “sneak attack” refigured as a hallmark of 
Japanese aggression rather than Indian treachery. For this organization of annual dinners and 
contrived ceremonies an era was over, but the Indian Wars had penetrated most aspects of 
American popular culture, and were still present in the military, baked into the language of 
conflict in persistent ways.  
 As the “Order” spent the first half of the twentieth century hosting nostalgia-filled 
dinners and lamenting the demise of the frontier hero, their still-enlisted peers in the military 
were kept busy with the nearly continuous conflict of the World Wars and the smaller 
interventions, policing actions, and occupations that placed US soldiers all over the globe. And 
while the Order worked to preserve the memory of the Indian fighter, the military did little to 
translate that experience, and the subsequent experience in the Philippines, into any sort of 
permanent counterinsurgency doctrine. The Indian Wars left almost no doctrinal impact on 
military education.485 Soldiers in the Philippines did not receive training in counter-guerilla 
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measures and had to rely on their experiences in wars with Native people. As a result, the 
Philippines-American War saw some limited continuity of tactics and strategies, but no 
widespread application of the already-amorphous “Indian fighting” that had dominated the 
previous decades. It was up to individual officers to apply their experiences as they saw fit, 
experiences that were filtered through a colonial mythology that was deeply entangled with the 
more pragmatic side of combat, as I showed in the previous two chapters.  
The Philippines-American War has been largely forgotten in US historical memory. That 
amnesia has extended, in part, to the US military. In the aftermath of the war in the Philippines 
the military failed to create any doctrine or educational record that would preserve lessons 
learned during the occupation. Military professional journals discussed the conflict sparingly. In 
the years after the war soldiers at places like the War College or the new school at Fort 
Leavenworth did not receive instruction in guerilla warfare, even though that type of combat had 
defined the war in the Philippines.486 An official history was commissioned by the government, 
written by Captain J.R.M. Taylor and titled The Philippine Insurrection Against the United 
States. However, it was repeatedly censored by Secretary of War Taft and other government 
officials, for fear that it would harm the ongoing colonial relationship that the US had with the 
Philippines government. Taylor was largely critical of Filipino revolutionaries, and while he 
included a discussion of US tactics, politicians that blocked publication worried that the book 
would reignite the debates over US atrocities in the conflict.487  
The Philippines Insurrection was not the only casualty of political censorship following 
the war. In 1902, Captain M.F. Davis compiled a collection of telegraphic circulars and orders 
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issued by General James Franklin Bell, regarded as one of the most successful US generals in the 
Philippines, while commanding troops in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Mindoro. A 
record of Bell’s orders and strategic thinking was in high demand from soldiers anxious for a 
counterinsurgency manual. In his introduction to the pamphlet, Davis noted that frequent 
requests from Army officers, both those who had served under Bell and others, led to his 
compiling the documents for distribution. The orders cover in detail Bell’s approach to 
counterinsurgency, including the reconcentration of Filipino populations, the destruction of food, 
supplies, and dwellings, the treatment of prisoners, and the execution of insurgents.488 The 
document was never distributed outside of the Philippines, likely due to the descriptions of harsh 
counterinsurgency tactics, the very measures that were currently under-fire by anti-imperialist 
politicians.  
Bell was aware of the discomfort counterinsurgency warfare engendered in civilian 
observers, and even some of his soldiers. In an address to his officers when he took command of 
Batangas, Bell noted that he much preferred a policy of conciliation but warned that they would 
“unquestionably be required, by a sense of duty, to do much that is disagreeable.”489 Ultimately 
Bell’s counterinsurgency manual never saw widespread distribution nor application, and has only 
recently been revived by the Army’s Combat Studies Institute and published in a series of 
strategic essays inspired by the War on Terror.490 Army historian Andrew Birtle calls the 
Telegraphic Circulars a lost “gem” of counterinsurgency theory, similar to George Crook’s 
Resume of Operations Against Apache Indians, another proto-counterinsurgency document that 
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failed to make inroads into US military doctrine.491 The resurrection of Bell’s Telgraphic 
Circulars in the context of the War on Terror is somewhat ironic given his prescient analysis: 
“Judging from experience in this war, a much greater length of time is always required to settle 
claims and outstanding obligations of the government, after a campaign is concluded, than is 
required to successfully conclude the campaign itself.”492 Clearly this has been an elusive lesson 
for the US military, a reminder of the imperial hubris that encouraged George W. Bush to declare 
“Mission Accomplished” in Iraq in 2003. 
In the years after the Philippines-American War the Army would return to its consistent 
focus on large-scale conflict, and it would be in the Marine Corps where guerilla conflict and 
irregular warfare would find some doctrinal footing, culminating in the Small Wars Manual, 
published in 1940, which chronicled the Marines’ experiences in the occupations and 
interventions of the early twentieth century in Central American and the Caribbean.493 This 
document joined an emerging canon of strategic writing on counterinsurgency warfare, primarily 
from European writers chronicling the struggles of colonization and decolonization in places like 
Algeria and Malaya.494 This writing, particularly the work of French strategist David Galula, 
influenced US soldiers and politicians promoting counterinsurgency warfare in the decades after 
World War Two. There are traces here and there, but it cannot be said that Indian warfare made a 
great impact on American military doctrine in the twentieth century. 
The ephemeral traces of Indian warfare in US military doctrine contrast sharply to the 
near-permeation of frontier mythologies into a militarized US culture. Although there was little-
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to-no strategic continuity linking the Indian Wars to twentieth-century conflict, Indian people 
and the mythologies of colonization continued to give definition to America’s 
counterinsurgency-culture, from the Native soldiers who routinely found themselves tapped for 
“scouting missions” in World War One, to the guerilla-fighting US Army paratroopers adorned 
in war paint that fought in World War Two.495 Indeed, culture and doctrine are not discrete 
categories. Aaron O’Connell has shown how the unique culture of the US Marine Corps 
bolstered their reputation and influenced broader military doctrine and strategy. Militarism is not 
simply technical, doctrinal, or political. Culture plays an important role, from war stories, to the 
development of new military technologies, a reliance on military metaphors, and the growth of 
military prestige. The marines that O’Connell writes about utilized their institutional culture to 
push the US military towards irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping during the 
Cold War, the very skills they had developed in the first part of the twentieth century. They 
would be utilized by US counterinsurgents with increasing frequency starting in the 1960’s.496 
 America’s counterinsurgency-culture expanded during the Cold War, highlighted by John 
F. Kennedy’s “new frontier.” A slogan for the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy introduced 
his “new frontier” at the Democratic National Convention that year: 
I stand tonight facing west on what was once the last frontier. From the lands that stretch 
3000 miles behind me, the pioneers of old gave up their safety, their comfort and 
sometimes their lives to build a new world here in the West… Today some would say 
that those struggles are all over—that all the horizons have been explored—that all the 
battles have been won—that there is no longer an American frontier. But I trust that no 
one in this vast assemblage will agree with those sentiments. For the problems are not all 
solved and the battles are not all won—and we stand today on the edge of a New 
Frontier—the frontier of the 1960's—a frontier of unknown opportunities and perils—a 
frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats.497 
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A central element of the “new frontier” foreign policy was an emphasis on counterinsurgency as 
a means to counter the Soviet Union and the revolutionary struggles underway all over the globe. 
Reference to the frontier put those conflicts, and the US response, in terms that the nation could 
understand: the world was a dangerous and turbulent place, and only a vigorous US foreign 
policies backed by strategic military power could prevent the slide towards chaos. This framing, 
a conceptual outgrowth of colonial expansion, racialized global revolutionary activity as 
dangerous, backwards, and savage. As US counterinsurgency developed under Eisenhower and 
expanded under Kennedy, a central tenant was that so-called insurgencies had to be the result of 
external foreign influence – in most cases from the USSR. This effaced the presence of a local 
political culture responsible for the upheaval; such erasure has been a consistent element of US 
counterinsurgent thinking going back to the Indian Wars.498 And, as Richard Slotkin has shown, 
the conscription of Cold War-era counterinsurgency into a frontier mythology revived that 
particularly American fantasy of the not-quite-Indian warrior, “who combines the amoral 
pragmatism and technical expertise of the gunfighter with the skill in handling natives that 
belongs to the ‘man who knows Indians.’”499 The Indian Fighter is not-quite-Indian, just as the 
counterinsurgent is not-quite-insurgent. America’s counterinsurgency culture celebrates the 
country’s own insurgent past while often actively working against other revolutions; just as it 
combines Indian-hating with a culture of playing Indian.  
The cultural politics of Cold War counterinsurgency was defined, in part, by references to 
continental colonialism. Nowhere was this more evident than in Vietnam. It was common for US 
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soldiers in Vietnam to refer to enemy territory as “Indian Country.” This was only one dimension 
of a conflict intersected by the United States’ history of colonialism, anti-black racism, and race-
war in Asia during the Philippines-American War and World War Two. Questions of race were 
an intimate part of day-to-day life during the war in Vietnam. Take the following exchange 
during the Dellums Committee Hearings into war crimes in Vietnam. In response to a question 
from the congressional panel about the effect of anti-Vietnamese racism on the race relations 
among US soldiers, Gary Battles relates a story that occurred while he was pinned down in a 
foxhole with two other soldiers, one a black man, the other a Native man from Arizona: 
Mr. Battles: It so happens that I was with a guy from Arizona, who was an Indian, and 
this colored person and I were in the same foxhole, the three of us, and things were pretty 
bad and we felt we were going to be wiped out. 
So we got down into some conversation like, “You black bastard, what’s going to happen 
now?” He sort of hit me on the shoulder and the Indian says, “Look, you both came to my 
country.”  
Mr. Burton: What was that last part? 
Mr. Battles: The Indianhead said, “Look, you both came to my country.” I’ll tell you, I’m 
not a bit proud that I am white. But it is a racist war.500 
This Native soldier, who is reduced to an “Indianhead” in the story (a reference to Indian sports 
mascots), manages to leverage a critique against both US colonialism and the war in Vietnam, 
binding the two together. The full dimension of the colonial entanglements at play in that foxhole 
are perhaps lost on Mr. Battles, who nonetheless is aware of the degree to which racial ideas 
shaped his experience of Vietnam, with both his fellow soldiers and the enemy. During the 
congressional investigation of the My Lai massacre, Colonel K.B. Barlow similarly referred to 
“Indian Country” as the area “where most everyone is enemy and the U.S. forces dealing more 
directly with the guerillas and local Viet Cong forces that habitually operate in the areas 
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occupied by the civilian populace.”501 Indian Country was the location of guerrilla warfare and 
unseen enemies, the realm of ambushes and insurgents embedded in noncombatant populations.  
In the twentieth century Indian Country moved overseas to places like Vietnam, but the 
language of settler-colonialism has proved adaptable to non-military (and paramilitary) contexts 
as well. Look no further than the New York Police Department’s infamous 41st Precinct in the 
Bronx, better-known by its nickname Fort Apache, likely a reference to the John Wayne film of 
the same name. According to legend the precinct got its nickname on a busy night in the early 
1970s. With the phones blaring, a harassed desk lieutenant answered a call and quickly hung up, 
saying “I don't have time for that. This is Fort Apache.”502 Stories about one of New York’s most 
violent police precincts spawned books, a Paul Newman movie, and an enduring legend about 
urban unrest in the 1970s. In the introduction to his book Fort Apache, former officer Tom 
Walker remembers the precinct as “a place that found it’s only equal in the grassy plains of 
Custer’s last stand, a precinct that came to be affectionately known to the four hundred police 
officers who manned this historic and tiny outpost as Fort Apache.”503 For Walker his small 
corner of New York City was equivalent to Custer’s last stand, otherwise known as the Battle of 
Little Bighorn in which a coalition of Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho people, along with their 
allies, annihilated George Armstrong Custer’s 7th Cavalry. The supposed “last stand” is perhaps 
the most well-known manifestation of an iconic ideological twisting of US settler-colonialism in 
which invasion is reframed as a last stand or surround. A military column attacking Native 
people becomes an enduring figure for surrounded, heroic, and doomed soldiers.  
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Similarly, Walker narrates his police force as an embattled unit maintaining a tenuous 
control over the uncivilized urban masses. They are the occupants of a police station covered in 
Apache arrows. He writes that “the only vestige of civilized authority here was the police 
department. The people struck me as being rather primitive in their approach to city life.”504 
These “last stands,” whether on the plains of Montana or the streets of New York City, are 
explicitly racialized, with the supposed threats posed by indigeneity, blackness, and immigrant 
populations justifying military (and paramilitary) responses. The racial discourse of “Fort 
Apache” justifies the cowboy-authoritarianism of NYPD policing that Walker narrates. As 
Jordan Camp has shown, anxieties over the restructurings and growing inequalities of capitalism 
during the 1960’s and 70’s were transformed into consent for increasingly harsh regimes of law 
and order, what Camp calls “a long counterinsurgency against the Black freedom, labor, and 
socialist alliance that took shape in the struggle to abolish Jim Crow racial regimes.”505 Here the 
histories of slavery and colonization are intertwined, as American counterinsurgency-culture 
works to normalize the repression that emanates from the racial violence that created the United 
States. Extending Camp’s claim, given the persistent hold that “Indian Country” has held on 
military imaginaries, it seems that there has been an even longer counterinsurgency waged 
against Indians both real and imagined, and the various Fort Apaches of Arizona, New York, and 
Iraq exemplify that history. Counterinsurgency keeps dragging Indian Country to the forefront of 
US military discourse. Indeed, in some cases it seems that defining a population as “Indians” is a 
prerequisite for prosecuting a counterinsurgency. 
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Author Elliot Ackerman, a veteran of the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, notes as much in 
an interview for the LA Review of Books. His novel, Green on Blue, is told from the perspective 
of an Afghani militiaman named Aziz, whose only interaction with the United States is through a 
Special Forces soldier named Mr. Jack, an adviser to Aziz’s unit. Mr. Jack names the squads he 
advises the “Tomahawks” and the “Comanches,” and he adorns their trucks with war paint. Aziz 
notes that Mr. Jack “had great affection for the American West… He thought we Afghans did 
not understand what it meant to be named after the Indians of his country, but we understood. To 
us, it seemed a small, but misguided sort of insult. For our tribes had never been conquered.”506 
Ackerman, in the interview, notes that while the American West was not “front and center” 
while he wrote the novel, “the American counterinsurgency campaign was, and so by default, the 
Indian Wars became a layer in understanding how Americans behave in these types of wars. The 
common thread between Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq to the Indian Wars is 
counterinsurgency.”507 In other words, it was counterinsurgency which motivated Ackerman to 
inject the resonances of Indian Country into his novel, resonances that would have been familiar 
to a veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Afghanistan becomes a literary Indian Country in another novel inspired by the War on 
Terror, Wynne’s War by Aaron Gwyn. In an interview Gwyn notes that he “always wanted to 
write a Western, but I wanted to write a contemporary Western, and I didn’t know how that 
could happen. I always imagined it would have to be Mexico or South America. Then I read 
Doug Stanton’s book [Horse Soldiers, about horse-riding Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan] 
and I thought, ‘It’s on.’”508 In conversations with veterans Gwyn kept hearing that Afghanistan 
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looked “like a Western, especially eastern Afghanistan, it looks like Monument Valley. And I’m 
just thinking, wow, these guys are doing this hardcore shit in this place that looks like a John 
Ford film.”509 Gwyn, who grew up in Oklahoma, makes the connection between Afghanistan and 
Indian Country explicit: “Oklahoma is not the West… It’s not the South, it’s not the Southwest, 
it’s not the Midwest, it’s its own thing, and what it really is is Indian Territory, the place all the 
Native Americans are pushed after the White Man has gobbled up everything else… So I wanted 
to write about Afghanistan as though it were Oklahoma, and Oklahoma as though it were 
Afghanistan.”510  
In the years after the terror attacks of September 11th the Global War on Terror has 
brought Indian Country once more to the forefront of military discourse. For soldiers and 
military theorists this has resulted in a blurring of the lines between culture and strategy. There is 
not a clear strategic continuity in the history of US counterinsurgency warfare. It is the cultural 
representations of Indians, the films, novels, the Fort Apaches and the paratroopers in war paint, 
that have enabled the modern US military to seek a usable history in the violence of continental 
expansion. It is America’s counterinsurgency-culture, not its counterinsurgency theory, that 
enables the endless repetition of Indian Country, Indian Country, Indian Country. But of course, 
culture and strategy, ideology and the material are never fully separate. And the remainder of this 
chapter will explore how these cultural resonances influence, and in some cases stand in for, 
military strategy. Indeed, Indian Country and Native people have never been more prominent in 
the literatures of US military strategy and theory. And this has everything to do with the 
centrality of colonialism to the history of US counterinsurgency warfare. 
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Colonialism and Counterinsurgency in US Military Theory 
In a prescient analysis, a 1995 Master of Military Arts and Science thesis completed at 
the US Army Command and General Staff College warned that “the Army’s next adversary may 
very well be much like the plains Indians… One of the problems of today is that our military is 
convinced that there is no one in the world that can match our military. The leaders of the Indian 
Wars thought the same thing.”511 Ten years later, if you were to peruse the strategic writing 
coming out of the various US military command schools, the prediction would seem to be 
confirmed: the military’s next adversaries were just like Indians, and the United States had once 
again underestimated the enemy’s ability to confound the nation’s seemingly overwhelming 
military power. As soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq talked about the dangers of Indian Country, 
strategic publications, conferences, and research coming out of places like the US Army War 
College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and 
the US Army Combat Studies Institute were suddenly paying increasing attention to the United 
States’ history of colonial violence. Soldiers and historians could no longer complain that the 
Indian Wars had been ignored in US military doctrine. Indians were everywhere, and it had 
everything to do with the rise of counterinsurgency warfare.  
In 2006 the US Army and Marine Corps published Field Manual 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency. Designed to address a twenty-year doctrinal gap, the manual was a frank 
admission of the failures of the War on Terror. It acknowledged the US military’s long history of 
excellence in conventional warfare and simultaneous unwillingness to address the unique 
demands of unconventional warfare, a blanket term for the various interventions, occupations, 
and small-scale conflicts that have been the quiet and continuous subtext to the more visible 
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history of the Civil War and the World Wars. In his forward to the published edition, Lieutenant 
Colonel John A. Nagl acknowledged that “the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq 
in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it.” The enemy in Iraq “waged war 
from the shadows” and confounded a military more equipped for large scale conventional 
warfare against organized armies.512 The military was unprepared not because this was an 
entirely new form of warfare, but because of an institutional amnesia and rejection of 
counterinsurgency history. 
In Nagl’s view the Vietnam War was to blame. The Army had “purged itself” of irregular 
and unconventional warfare in the aftermath of Vietnam, unwilling to incorporate the lessons of 
that conflict. This had left the military unprepared for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as 
various military institutions scrambled to update everything from strategies to basic equipment. 
This included one of the military’s primary institutions of doctrinal development and higher 
education. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth rushed a temporary 
counterinsurgency manual out in 2004, and in 2005 Lieutenant General David Petraeus returned 
from a celebrated tour in Iraq to assume command of the CAC and oversee US Army doctrinal 
development. This may have seemed like an odd posting for an Army general fresh from the 
front lines whose star was on the rise, but it demonstrated the military’s commitment to 
developing an updated approach to counterinsurgency warfare. 
Petraeus and his Marine Corps counterpart General James Mattis moved quickly to 
produce an updated counterinsurgency field manual, involving civilian journalists and workers at 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the process. The result was Field Manual 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency. The manual touched a nerve, and was downloaded millions of times when 
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first made available online. The University of Chicago Press released a commercial edition 
featuring an expanded introduction by academic Sarah Sewall, who called the manual an 
unprecedented collaboration between military and civilian thinkers, with an emphasis on human 
rights and population security.513 The interest in the new manual was part of a broader 
outpouring of academic and military writing on counterinsurgency and the United States’ history 
with irregular warfare in the years after September 11th, a history that remained largely invisible 
to the broader public outside of the experience with Vietnam. The manual acknowledged as 
much in the overview of section one: “For more than two centuries, the United States military 
has been called upon to defeat insurgencies like the Whiskey Rebellion in the eastern United 
States, the Native Americans on the western plains of the United States, the Boxer Rebellion in 
China, Pancho Villa in Mexico, Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, and the Viet Cong in 
Vietnam.”514 In spite of this lengthy history, the manual argued that US counterinsurgency skills 
had atrophied, the lessons and experiences of this centuries-long history of irregular warfare 
forgotten. The failures of Vietnam loomed large, a scar on the collective memory of the US 
military and particularly the practice of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. To excavate a 
usable history of counterinsurgency the Indian Wars and the war in the Philippines emerged as 
the counters to Vietnam; successes in irregular warfare that could serve as a blueprint for the 
War on Terror.  
 The Combat Studies Institute at the CAC, the same organization that published the field 
manual on counterinsurgency, issued a series of papers on the Global War on Terror in which the 
Indian Wars figure prominently as the US military’s earliest experience with counterinsurgency. 
These publications draw a link between Indian fighting and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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The study In Search of an Elusive Enemy: The Victorio Campaign by Kendall D. Gott makes this 
connection explicit. The introduction to the text, which deals with the US Army campaign to 
capture or kill Apache leader Victorio and his followers, argues that the case study has extreme 
relevance for the contemporary Army:  
The commanders of the 9th and 10th US Cavalry Regiments faced a skilled adversary who 
used unconventional tactics and methods as well as an international border to seek 
sanctuary. However, it could just as easily have featured the stories of Osceola, 
Aguinaldo, Pancho Villa, or Osama Bin Laden. The similarities to challenges that US and 
coalition forces face in Afghanistan and Iraq are striking.515  
This sketches a long narrative of US counterinsurgency, which stretches from the Seminole Wars 
of the early nineteenth century, to the Apache Wars, the war in the Philippines, violence on the 
border with Mexico, all the way to the hunt for Osama bin Laden. While the comparison to Bin 
Laden in part evokes the contours of war in the rugged environments of Afghanistan, it also 
traffics in the image of the Apache war leaders as intractable and particularly vicious enemies of 
the United States, a connection that was similarly recycled in 2011 when Bin Laden’s code name 
was “Geronimo” during the operation that accomplished his death, much to the disgust of 
Apache people.516  
 Another publication in the Global War on Terrorism series titled “Circle the Wagons: 
The History of US Army Convoy Security” draws similar parallels between the War on Terror 
and the Indian Wars. Focused on the rise of attacks on transport convoys in Iraq, the author, 
Transportation Corps historian Richard Killblane, sketches a history of US Army convoy 
security with a focus on the lessons learned (and then forgotten) in Vietnam. But Killblane’s 
title, “Circle the Wagons,” is not a casual metaphor, and he spends a portion of the study on the 
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Army’s experience in the Indian Wars. Killblane calls continental expansion a guerilla war, and 
he shows how Native attacks on convoys, the archetypal “ambush,” became a recurring 
American trope. “Circle the Wagons” went from an anti-Indian tactic to a figure of speech. In 
many ways this was how “Indian Country” became such an enduring descriptor for enemy 
territory: “Before and after the Civil War, the Army fought a guerrilla war against Indians on the 
prairies and deserts of the western and southwestern United States. From the moment the wagon 
train left the fort’s security, it faced the constant threat of ambush by hostile war parties. From 
then on, ‘Indian country’ has referred to a contested area without any secure rear area.”517  
Killblane offers a convincing history for the origin of Indian Country’s enduring appeal 
for soldiers, and just as “Circle the Wagons” draws a comparison between the Indian Wars and 
the Iraq War, so too did “Indian Country” become a common way to describe the increasingly 
hostile landscape of the War on Terror, particularly Iraq. In a presentation at the 2006 Combat 
Studies Institute Symposium, at which Petraeus was the keynote speaker, Lieutenant Colonel 
Peter Newell discussed the efforts to build up the Iraqi Security Forces and remarked that “I 
can’t tell you how many of my own soldiers, my Iraqi soldiers, were ambushed on the way home 
for relieve, or on their way back to work, only because they lived on in what we considered 
Indian country.”518 Conceptualizing enemy territory as Indian Country was nothing new. What 
changed in the years after 9/11 was the degree to which Indian Country, and the Indian Wars 
more broadly, were taken up in strategic and military-intellectual spaces like Fort Leavenworth. 
These papers from the Global War on Terrorism Series are just one example of the military’s 
newfound interest in the Indian Wars. However, the most extensive example is the various 
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Master’s Thesis projects that officers rising in the ranks have produced at the military’s various 
institutions of higher education and training. The remainder of this chapter will focus on these 
documents. 
The Fort Apaches of Iraq, the Geronimos of Pakistan, and the transportable Indian 
Countries surround US troops wherever they go in the world, validated by strategic writing that 
has rediscovered the always-insurgent-Indians as a mechanism through which to understand the 
War on Terror. These include thesis projects written by US military officers at places like the US 
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth (for Majors) and the US Army 
War College at the Carlisle Barracks (for Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels), and at similar 
schools run by the other branches of the military. These projects represent the academic and 
professional interests of rising officers in the US military and thus offer a window into the 
historical, theoretical, and practical concerns of military leaders.519 Consistent with the broader 
military discourse around the War on Terror, recent projects often emphasize counterinsurgency, 
guerilla combat, and irregular warfare. Indians both real and imagined figure prominently in 
these texts.  
In the years since September 11th the volume of projects that consider US continental 
expansion and wars with Native people has increased. The number of theses completed in the 
Master of Military Arts and Science program at the US Army Command and General Staff 
College that mention the phrase “Indian Country” since 2001 is equal to the number for the 
1970’s, 80’s, and 90’s combined. The increase is even more dramatic for monographs written by 
students at the School for Advanced Military Studies, a program for higher ranking officers. 
Since 2001 the number of projects at the SAMS that mention the phrase “Indian Country” was 
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58, compared to just 13 in all the years prior to 2001. To pick a more specific topic, the number 
of SAMS monographs that mention celebrated Indian Fighter George Crook since 2001 are 
thirteen, compared to just three in all the years prior. These increases mirror the increase in 
projects that discuss counterinsurgency warfare more generally at military command schools. I 
do not want to give the impression that every student is writing a thesis focused on the Indian 
Wars. In fact, topics vary widely. The point is that the number of projects that engage the Indian 
Wars has increased, in some cases sharply, with the advent of the War on Terror.520 Like the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual these projects acknowledge the challenges posed by the Global 
War on Terror and argue that the Indian Wars contain valuable lessons for the modern military, 
particularly in regard to counterinsurgency warfare. The remainder of this chapter will focus on 
several characteristics that are common to these studies: an uncritical use of the word “insurgent” 
that positions Native people as the always-insurgent foils to US militarism; an emphasis on 
historical lessons that paradoxically render counterinsurgency ahistorical and apolitical; and a 
form of counterinsurgency “culture talk” in which simplistic readings of insurgents as primitive 
or tribal supposedly offer special insight into counterinsurgency, best exemplified by widespread 
interest in the (in)famous Indian fighter George Crook.   
Always-Insurgent Indians 
In many ways Indians have always been insurgents to the colonists of North America. 
Hundreds of years before the words “guerilla” and “insurgent” saw widespread use the Native 
peoples of North America were described by European colonists as skulking, elusive, and 
savage, language that predicted the way in which various insurgencies throughout history have 
been characterized. Portrayed as internal threats to an always-already established colonized 
                                                 




reality, Native people were the specters at the edges of colonial expansion, a constant menace 
both material and existential. Few of the fighters that have been labeled insurgents have been 
able to shake these enduring tropes of elusive and supposedly uncivilized violence, the hallmarks 
of the insurgent.  
It is no coincidence that depictions of violent Indians both predate and predict the terms 
in which later insurgents have been described. “Insurgent” is, or at least should be, a highly 
contested category. The technical definitions of “insurgency” applied by governments and 
militaries fall woefully short of describing the complicated cultural and political dynamics of 
rebellions, anti-colonial movements, civil-wars, military occupations, and the host of diverse 
conflicts lumped together as “insurgencies.” But that is precisely the point – if Indians were 
some of the first insurgents, then “insurgent” must be a deeply colonial concept that is 
normalized as a neutral descriptor, just as the ongoing colonialism of the United States is 
normalized at the expense of Native sovereignty. Insurgency typically carries competing claims 
of sovereignty and political authority defined by the imposition of imperial power. It is not 
simply that we should challenge the word “insurgent” for political reasons (although that may 
often be a valuable project); it is that the history of this category, particularly as used by the US 
government and military, emerges from the process of continental expansion and settler-
colonialism, and carries with it colonial logics and ideologies. Now, more than ever, Indians are 
simply and uncritically “insurgents” in military writing, particularly writing that attempts to 
apply historical lessons to the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The term does not have 
be to nuanced, massaged, or argued for. Ongoing Native sovereignty, the reality of conquest, and 
the historical obfuscation of Native independence and political superiority at different points in 
history are submerged when Indian = insurgent.  
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 As one writer put it in a thesis submitted less than a year after September 11th, “As the 
United States engages in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, it is prudent that military leaders 
relook [sic] the lessons of America’s Indian Wars… if insurgency is becoming the predominate 
[sic] form of warfare for third world countries, American senior leaders must understand its 
nature.”521 The increasing preoccupation with insurgency as well as guerilla, asymmetric, and 
irregular warfare drove these military officers to seek out historical examples to apply to 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader War on Terror. Writers have noted the ways in which 
“terrorist” became at once increasingly broad and narrow after the September 11th, applicable to 
a range of different groups and individuals, but defined almost entirely in Muslim and Arab 
terms.522 The same could easily be said of “insurgent,” which became a shorthand for those 
contesting US occupations or allied governments all over the world. These writers, then, were 
not only looking for historical examples of counterinsurgency or guerilla warfare; they were 
looking for historical examples of insurgents.  
A Master’s Thesis completed at the Command and General Staff College a year after the 
surge of troops into Iraq in 2007 explicitly connects contemporary insurgency to indigenous 
resistance to colonialism. The author argues that insurgency defined the entirety of North 
American colonization: “From the first European settlers to set foot on the North American 
continent, the conflict with Native Americans was a counterinsurgency war that ran parallel to the 
development and westward expansion of the United States. It was not just a conflict that was defining 
the American experience; it was a key formative experience for the U.S. Army during the first 115 
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years of its existence.”523 Nothing normalizes the conquest of North America like situating Native 
people as insurgent to colonial invasion from the moment settlers set foot on the continent. 
Numerous scholars have dissected the ideologies and practices of manifest destiny, the doctrine of 
discovery, and the various legal, political, and ideological structures that divested Native people of 
their land. These are persistent, indeed, persisting concepts which continue to legitimize the 
occupation of Native land. This thesis, and many like it, is not simply historical but comparative. It 
attempts to glean a usable history from colonialism for application to the War on Terror. The way in 
which Indians-as-insurgents are discussed in these texts thus speaks to how “insurgents” were 
uncritically conceptualized by soldiers waging the War on Terror. It was enough to resist US political 
authority to be labeled an insurgent, a categorization which jettisons historical contexts of invasion, 
conquest, or empire. The history of Indian warfare has been responsible, in part, for carrying this 
ideological construction through US history into the present. Despite their pretention to making a 
strategic argument, many of these writers are simply recycling frontier mythology. 
As Indians were increasingly remembered as insurgents, indigenous sovereignty, 
something Native nations continue to retain, was transformed into a rebellion against US 
political authority. Operation Neptune Spear, the 2011 mission in which Osama Bin Laden’s 
mission codename was “Geronimo,” was not the only instance in which a Native leader was 
compared to an international terrorist. As one Lieutenant Colonel put it in a research project at 
the US Army War College: 
Both the Apaches and the Islamists possess a charismatic group of leaders. The Apaches 
were led by Cochise, Natchez, Victorio, Geronimo and others, names that still echo 
throughout the world. Today the leaders include Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and 
dozens of others unknown to most American citizens but important in their regions 
stretching throughout the Middle East, Asia, Europe and pockets of the United States. All 
these historical and current leaders preach a fantasy ideology that seek to have the US 
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depart from “their” territories and for “the people” to return to an imagined life that is 
forever gone.524 
This grouping of Apache, Taliban, and Al Qaeda leaders is not a casual analogy; all are 
described as preaching a “fantasy ideology” in which claims to “their” territory are specious and 
illegitimate. In other words, Apache leaders, according to the writer, like the leaders of the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda, desire to return to a primitive way of life incompatible with a US-
dominated modernity. This sort of linking of counterinsurgency to supposedly primitive or anti-
modern cultures will be a recurring theme of these documents.  
Military historians spent the twentieth century lamenting that the Indian Wars made little-
to-no doctrinal impact on the US military. And yet this flood of strategic writing focused on the 
Indian Wars was able to effortlessly resituate the Indian Wars as America’s counterinsurgency 
history. As one Army War College study puts it, “The United States has a history of military 
operations in a counterinsurgency from which to draw lessons and look for best practices… The 
lessons learned from the Indian Wars recognize the multifaceted approach necessary for 
counterinsurgency operations, but specifically disrupting the Indians from within gets at the type 
of operations that keep the United States from looking like an oppressor.”525 These oblique 
references to “disrupting from within” and not looking like the oppressor gesture towards the 
doctrinal development the US Army underwent in the nineteenth century, development that was 
masked in ways this project attempts to make visible.  
The frontier Army fought Indians, but they were perhaps even more concerned with 
governing Indians, with control, regulation, and cultural transformation.  As the above-quoted 
author puts it, “During the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century, the United States adapted 
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tactics to the conflict and developed principles for fighting a counterinsurgency. Primary 
principles were close civil military coordination, firm and fair governance, and reform of 
education and business.”526 In other words, the nineteenth century US military was developing 
the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency that found primacy in the 
counterinsurgency field manual, they simply did so decades before the term was invented. 
Crucially, these elements that most resonate with contemporary military officers, the population-
centric measures, are the elements of settler-colonialism still very much in effect, a structural and 
ongoing occupation beyond what the US achieved in either Iraq or Afghanistan. However, civil-
military coordination was never as cohesive as this author seems to think. In fact, government 
institutions and the US Army were frequently at odds. We might more accurately say that the 
military attempted to take on those governing measures usually reserved for civil authorities. 
Here the connections between the Indian Wars and the War on Terror again reads more like déjà 
vu than continuity. Fair governance, business reform, and functioning civil infrastructure were 
certainly not hallmarks of the US occupation of Iraq, particularly in the early stages. 
Some of the Master’s Thesis projects make this connection between ongoing settler-
colonialism and global counterinsurgency explicit. As one officer put it in their thesis for the 
Command and General Staff College: 
The United States government still manages the consequences of it [the Indian Wars] today 
through the United States Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs. While 
Native American tribes may no longer have the capacity to fight a protracted insurgency 
against the United States government, significant issues still occur, even as late as 2016, 
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demonstrated by the large-scale protests of the Dakota Access pipeline by the Standing Rock 
Sioux.527 
This writer frames ongoing-colonialism as an ongoing counterinsurgency, and the extreme, 
militarized response to the Standing Rock protests supports this conclusion, at least from the 
perspective of US government and capital interests. As scholars have shown, global empire 
always “comes home,” and so does counterinsurgency.528 The lines of militarized SWAT police 
officers facing down water protectors at Standing Rock reinforce this reality. 
Ahistorical History Lessons 
US Army Combat Studies Institute publications open with the phrase “The Past is 
Prologue!” – A motto that encapsulates an institutional desire to apply historical examples to 
contemporary conflicts. As the 2006 Atlas of the Sioux Wars, published by the Combat Studies 
Institute, argues, “while historical analogies are always fraught with danger, many of the 
difficulties faced by US soldiers fighting today parallel the tactical and operation dilemmas faced 
by soldiers fighting during the Indian Wars. Our goal is to learn from the experiences of 19th-
century soldiers.”529 This is a desire echoed by most military graduate theses that discuss the 
Indian Wars. They seek to retranslate the Indian Wars back from an enduring cultural trope into 
a usable military history. This move is intended as a corrective to both the lack of doctrinal 
development that occurred during the nineteenth century and the broader military amnesia 
around small-wars and counterinsurgencies. The Indian Wars are a ready example on which to 
draw, viewed, for the most part, uncritically as a success. They offer up seductive comparative 
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frameworks to wars in places like Afghanistan or Iraq: deserts, mountains, and tribes. The Indian 
Wars become case-studies; they offer historical examples that can be applied to the present. 
Critically, the “case” almost always has to do with perceived tactical or cultural similarities 
divested of political and historical context. In other words, these are historical case studies 
outside of history. As Laleh Khalili shows in her careful historiography of Western 
counterinsurgency doctrine, counterinsurgency rejects politics and history, turning insurgency 
into a series of technical problems to be solved, removed from their historical context.530 To 
Khalili’s analysis I would add “culture” as an object of counterinsurgency problem-solving. The 
ready comparison that strategic writing makes between Arizona and Afghanistan, between the 
northern plains and the streets of Baghdad, has more to do with cultural ideas about Native 
people and the Indian Wars than it does actual history. It betrays the ways in which cultural 
depictions of Indians structure the American discourse around insurgency. 
 A recent Master’s Thesis completed at the Command and General Staff College argues 
that “The history of the United States provides many examples, which yield fruitful insight into the 
very nature of Irregular Warfare, perhaps none more so than the struggle to subdue the Native 
Americans in the American West.”531 The author, like many other modern counterinsurgents, 
elevates the Indian Wars to the primary example of irregular warfare in US history. Many of the 
theses use a similarly simplistic compare-and-contrast formula to offer recommendations for the 
War On Terror, peppering their highly technical accounts with words like “tribal,” “civilized,” 
and “primitive.” These words traffic in a long history of Native representation that serves to 
collapse the distance and difference between nineteenth century North America and twenty-first 
century Afghanistan: 
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In both the Indian Wars and Afghanistan, the United States has been far superior 
in numbers, technology, and wealth. The enemy in each case was cunning and 
ruthless, and seemed to adroitly counter our main advantages in a manner that 
suited their strengths. The enemy in both cases was a tribal based society with a 
warrior ethos that put a premium on fighting ability. These cultures liked to fight: 
whether against tribal competitors or when appropriate united against a common 
invading foe. It cannot be assumed that as in most civilized societies, the populace 
even desires a peaceful solution. When war is all that is known, it becomes the 
norm. If it is a culture’s nature to be warlike, then it is extremely difficult to 
change. The United States government took a similar approach in each case by 
attempting to apply western models of governance, when in reality those models 
would never work. These tribal societies were primitive, and existed for hundreds, 
if not thousands, of years without a semblance of an organized governing body.532 
These reductive comparisons between Native people and the various anti-US forces in 
Afghanistan rely on a simplistic and erroneous understandings of tribal societies. Indeed, the 
above-quoted passage does not cite any secondary literature for the conclusions drawn about the 
inherently warlike societies of Afghans and Native peoples in North America. And while we 
might not hold a Master’s Thesis project to the same standards as a published piece of 
scholarship, this mode of  historical comparative analysis is consistent across much of the recent 
literature on counterinsurgency. These writers, COINdinistas as they are often known, tend to 
flatten out the diverse histories and motivations of groups that have found themselves defined as 
insurgent to US authority. In the above example, the invasion and conquest of North America is 
invisible, as is the complicated colonial history of Western and Soviet influence on Afghanistan. 
Instead, the differences are rendered as cultural; insurgent tactics emanate from a societal warrior 
ethos. These depictions of Native people are amplified by the deluge of movies, television, 
novels, art, and other cultural representations that have proliferated images of violent Indians in 
US culture. As Hannah Gurman has argued, a perception of threat, criminality, and potential for 
violence, relative to US interests, functions as the true barometer for insurgency in much of the 
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literature on counterinsurgency.533 And Native people are the original, enduring threat in the 
colonial imaginaries of the United States.  
Even when military studies of counterinsurgency history attempt to focus on technical 
comparisons they serve to reinforce the overwhelmingly cultural place that the Indian Wars 
occupy in US military doctrine. As one study of the Nez Perce argues,  
The insurgents and terrorists in today’s GWOT are often similar to the Nez Perce of old. 
They take advantage of the local lay of the land. They use local transportation, in this 
case indigenous vehicles, versus the horses of old, but the parallels are evident. Today’s 
terrorist feed off of the local population similar to how the Nez Perce fed from the land. 
The similarities could go on and on, but the key point to focus on is how the US military 
must NOT be like the US Cavalry of old in pursuit of the Nez Perce.534 
This particular officer is highly critical of the US military’s approach to the war with the Nez 
Perce in 1877, cautioning that this particular conflict should offer lessons on what not to do in 
Afghanistan. Focused less on cultural differences and more on tactical and strategic practices, 
this study seems, at first glance, to jettison some of the cultural baggage that defines modern 
counterinsurgency theory focused on the Indian Wars. The author notes that the US Army 
underwent an internal evaluation of the pursuit of the Nez Perce, publishing a collection of 
recommendations for cavalry training solicited by General Oliver Otis Howard.535 However, the 
thesis cites an 1862 cavalry manual titled Cavalry Tactics as the source of these 
recommendations, a manual published fifteen years before the Nez Perce War occurred.536 
Perhaps a simple citation error by the thesis writer, this mistake nonetheless emphasizes the 
fleeting-to-nonexistent record that the Indian Wars left in written US military doctrine. Howard’s 
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recommendations made it into a report that was then published in the Army and Navy Journal, 
but ultimately they had little impact, failing to become permanently entrenched in written or 
institutional doctrine.537 They certainly were not published in a manual that appeared fifteen 
years earlier. This confusion emphasizes the difficulty that contemporary soldiers have in 
applying “lessons” from the Indian Wars to the War on Terror. We should view these sorts of 
comparative analysis cautiously, attentive to the ways in which they rely on culturally-
constructed ideas about Indians-as-Insurgents to compensate for the lack of an institutional 
record on Indian Warfare.  
 The historical lessons that officers attempt to glean from the Indian Wars are not only an 
academic exercise. They are studies undertaken by soldiers with combat experience, who pursue 
their Master’s research with an eye towards lessons applicable to future deployments and 
conflicts. This is the approach taken by a 2009 Master’s thesis written at the Naval Postgraduate 
School titled “The Future of Raiding: Lessons in Raiding Tactics from the Indian Wars and Law 
Enforcement.” In this study the Indian Wars and police techniques for disrupting street gangs are 
used as historical examples relevant to the War on Terror. The thesis argues “through the study 
of the Indian Wars from 1800–1890, and law enforcement raiding techniques used against gangs 
in the United States, that utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the correct time and place 
under the appropriate circumstances can significantly disrupt or destroy networked terrorist 
organizations.” The purpose is technical and attempts to deploy historical analysis in pursuit of 
strategic and tactical ends. The author has combat experience, having deployed for forty months 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2007 in conventional and Special Forces operations. 
The study is thus personal for this particular officer: “One aim of this thesis is to explore raiding 
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techniques that may be used in specific situations to help units like the ones to which I have been 
assigned.”538 The author continues to be involved in the Army’s developing counterinsurgency 
programs. These include the Security Force Assistance Brigades, designed to provide advice and 
assistance in the development of security forces in partner nations.539 This particular thesis thus 
offers a window into how an officer involved in the ongoing development of US 
counterinsurgency doctrine understands the Indian Wars in relation to the War on Terror.  
 “The Future of Raiding” draws a number of lessons from the Indian Wars that center on 
acceptable limits for military violence. The author grapples with many of the same questions that 
nineteenth century Army officers and politicians had to face, and arrives at similar conclusions 
that reframe the logic of defensive conquest that accompanied continental expansion into a 
modern biopolitical security discourse: US foreign wars and interventions are supposed to make 
the world safer, not more violent. Just as nineteenth century writers elevated Native people to a 
physical and existential threat that served to justify the invasion of Native land, the War on 
Terror has mobilized discourses of security to justify invasion, occupation, and the suspension of 
the rule of law in places like Guantanamo Bay, while simultaneously framing counterinsurgency 
around questions of development, aid, and “winning hearts and minds.”540 In the global discourse 
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of the War on Terror violence is pursued not solely to defeat enemies, but to make the world 
safe; you kill so that all may live. The author of “The Future of Raiding” argues that  
We should always look to historical cases to find ways to improve our current techniques. 
It may be necessary to kill a large number of one’s enemy in order to defeat his will to 
fight… It is also important to treat civilians as well as captured enemy personnel with 
humanity. Taking family members captive, as the Plains Indians did so frequently, may 
be a logical and humane way to force terrorists to surrender (while this method may be 
called into question by current international laws of war). Finally, the ruthless cavalry 
techniques used against the Indians may be justified in some cases when it is required to 
kill your enemy and defeat his way of life in order to preserve your own.541 
In this fascinating passage the writer flirts with captive taking as a counterterrorism measure but 
ultimately dismisses it as a likely violation of the rules of warfare. However, we might question 
whether captive taking was restricted to the Plains Indians (it was not) or whether the United 
States refrained from a modern analog to captive taking (it has not). However, the interesting 
portions of this argument deal with killing; the necessity of killing large numbers of the enemy, 
and the latter claim that it may be required to kill your enemy in order to preserve one’s own way 
of life. In one paragraph we thus are taken from a sovereign formulation of total warfare (kill to 
eliminate the enemies' will to fight) to a biopolitical formulation (kill the enemy to preserve 
life).542 This experienced counterinsurgent thus links the violence of the Indian Wars directly to 
the War on Terror and does so in a manner that emphasizes the biopolitical logic behind 
counterinsurgencies both in the nineteenth and the twenty-first centuries. The Indian Wars 
instituted a biopolitical logic into US colonial violence that persists, both in cultural depictions of 
“Indianness” and in the material conditions of ongoing US colonialism.  
 The history lesson is that increasing brutality may be the only way to handle outlaws and 
insurgents. The author argues that “the Indian wars offer an underutilized wealth of information 
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concerning how governments should handle outlaw groups,” and later concludes that “Killing 
Indians in sufficient numbers and with increasing brutality after the Civil War did eventually 
break the will of most nomadic tribes, and caused them to move to reservations and live under 
United States protection and rules.”543 Examples including the Sand Creek massacre and the 
attacks on Lakota and Cheyenne during the winter of 1876 are used to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of this counter-raiding strategy, in which Native populations were targeted directly 
with violence. The author concludes that the indiscriminate violence of the Indian Wars “should 
never again seem to be necessary, but in dealing with people who believe their atrocities are 
justified by a higher power, such as salafi jihadists, this may be more applicable than most 
Americans realize.544 The enemies of the various wars under the umbrella of the War on Terror 
cannot be reduced to salafi jihadists, and the consistent refrain of “terrorist” functions as a 
racializing move that helps to resolve the tension between liberal norms of government and the 
illiberal practices such as indefinite detention and extrajudicial killing.545 Racialized enemies can 
be subjected to exceptional forms of state violence in the service of protecting an amorphous 
global population, a discursive move that relies on simplistic notions of culture. 
Counterinsurgency Culture Talk 
In a 2005 issue of the Military Review, the professional journal of the US Army, 
anthropologist Montgomery McFate lamented that “once called ‘the handmaiden of colonialism,’ 
anthropology has had a long, fruitful relationship with various elements of national power, which 
ended suddenly following the Vietnam War. The strange story of anthropology’s birth as a 
warfighting discipline, and its sudden plunge into the abyss of postmodernism, is intertwined 
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with the U.S. failure in Vietnam.” In the conclusion to that same article, McFate argues that the 
“DOD yearns for cultural knowledge, but anthropologists en masse, bound by their own ethical 
code and sunk in a mire of postmodernism, are unlikely to contribute much of value to reshaping 
national security policy or practice.”546 It may sounds strange to hear an anthropologist, a 
discipline that is no stranger to theory, bemoan the “abyss of postmodernism” and bemoan the 
decline of social scientific collaboration with the US military. However, Montgomery McFate is 
something of an outlier among twenty-first century anthropologists, intimately connected to the 
US military and the network of think tanks, private contractors, and policy groups that permeate 
America’s militarized culture. Currently a professor at the US Naval War College, McFate 
contributed to Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and helped develop the US Army’s 
Human Terrain System, which placed social scientists inside military units.547 The HTS ended in 
2014 and was a source of continuous controversy, including a 2007 statement from the executive 
board of the American Anthropological Association calling the program incompatible with 
disciplinary ethics.548 A longtime participant and advocate for social scientific collaboration with 
the US military, McFate’s efforts to incorporate “cultural knowledge” into the War on Terror and 
the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq was one element in a surge of what we might call 
“cultural thinking” in the US military since 2001.  
In the same 2005 article McFate argued that coalition forces in Iraq “have been fighting a 
complex war against an enemy they do not understand. The insurgents’ organizational structure 
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is not military, but tribal. Their tactics are not conventional, but asymmetrical.” The answer, 
according to McFate, was increased attention to culture as a key military focus:  
Countering the insurgency in Iraq requires cultural and social knowledge of the adversary. 
Yet, none of the elements of U.S. national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, or 
economic—explicitly take adversary culture into account in the formation or execution of 
policy. This cultural knowledge gap has a simple cause—the almost total absence of 
anthropology within the national-security establishment.549 
McFate was not alone in calling for increased attention to culture as a key component of the 
burgeoning counterinsurgency revolution in the US military, even if she may have been a 
minority among academic anthropologists. This preoccupation with culture would be enshrined 
in the counterinsurgency field manual published in 2006, which declared that “cultural 
knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency.”550 However, the military’s 
increasing attention to culture as a key component of warfare was not without critics, both within 
the military and without. In 2007 a group of anthropologists formed the Network of Concerned 
Anthropologists, and, similarly to the aforementioned statement from the American 
Anthropological Association, questioned the ethical and academic implications of 
anthropologists participating in US military operations, what some dubbed “mercenary 
anthropology” and famous anthropologists Marshall Sahlins called “a planetary strategy of 
research and destroy.”551 Anna Simons, an anthropologist and professor in the Department of 
Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, took aim at both “parachute 
anthropologists” and “concerned anthropologists” in a 2011 article, decrying the former for 
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overselling the usefulness of anthropology to counterinsurgency warfare, and the later for having 
a political axe to grind, too caught up in theoretical “naval gazing.”552  
 These controversies over the use of “culture” as a crucial element of US military strategy 
provide some context for my focus in the remainder of this chapter: military writing that 
emphasizes the importance of cultural understanding in both the Indian Wars and the War on 
Terror. Culture, understood in simplistic terms, is an attractive concept for the counterinsurgency 
experts of the War on Terror, because if violence and resistance can be understood in cultural 
terms it allows strategists to downplay or ignore the political and historical context of the various 
organizations, military and paramilitary forces, and resistance movements that are positioned as 
insurgents to the United States and its allies. It comes as no surprise that Native American 
peoples, perhaps the archetypal “savage” of the western colonial imaginary, have proven such an 
attractive comparative framework for analyzing the cultural aspects of the War on Terror. These 
arguments, couched in the language of military strategy, engage in what Mahmood Mamdani 
calls “culture talk.” These are discourses that de-politicize and de-historicize entire groups of 
people, focusing instead on a supposed “cultural essence” which explains any number of actions, 
including terrorism. Culture talk tends to position populations as either premodern or anti-
modern, tribalists and fundamentalists opposed to a “modernity” that is code for US global 
hegemony. Two of the most visible originators of culture talk are Bernard Lewis, who coined the 
phrase “clash of civilizations” in his 1990 article “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” and Samuel 
Huntington, who, expanding Lewis’ argument, wrote in his 1993 article “The Clash of 
Civilizations” that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily 
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ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating 
source of conflict will be cultural.”553  
 The infusion of social scientific thinking into the US military approach to 
counterinsurgency is its own form of culture talk. In the strategic turmoil that resulted from the 
growing resistance to the occupation of Iraq, culture was elevated to a near-mythical key to 
counterinsurgency success, both as a method to “win hearts and minds” and to better deploy 
military violence in the complex environments of the War on Terror. Whereas Mamdani’s 
“culture talk” is the stuff of international studies and public policy, the culture talk of 
counterinsurgency has attempted to transplant academic discourse into the blood, sweat, and 
violence of the War on Terror. The counterinsurgency field manual includes extensive discussion 
of culture, race, ethnicity, and other categories of social organization and difference. But despite 
celebration of the field manual’s academic rigor, scholars have questioned just how scholarly the 
document’s deployment of social scientific thinking really is. David Price has noted numerous 
instances of the manual’s authors directly quoting academic work without using quotation marks 
and the widespread use of unacknowledged source materials. This simplistic regurgitation of 
anthropological concepts does little more than legitimate military occupation: critiques of 
colonialism, empire, power, and cultural domination can be discarded, and basic instruction in 
local manners and customs is translated into a more effective form of conquest and 
occupation.554 The culture talk of counterinsurgency, unsurprisingly, has served as a popular way 
to connect the Indian Wars to the War on Terror in recent military strategic writing. North 
American colonialism is the first and most enduring conquest that the US military has ever been 
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involved in, and perhaps no group of people has had their diverse cultures subjected to 
investigation, critique, and mythologizing than Native people.  
Characteristic of these arguments is the idea that improved cultural understanding will 
translate into success in warfare. This is how culture talk divests analysis of political and 
historical context. According to a 2013 study titled “Savages in a Civilized War: The Native 
Americans as French Allies in the Seven Years War, 1754-1763,”  
The modern army officer can learn much from the study of the French and Indian War. 
While a scholar would most likely focus on the British as the victors, the French, in 
defeat, also hold many valuable lessons for today’s soldier. These are lessons that we see 
executed day after day in the hybrid battlefields of Afghanistan and other places where 
the light footprint combined force will be used with an allied partner force. We find that 
knowledge of culture, of understanding your allies, and the very nature of warfare in your 
environment is key.555 
This study examines the French army’s cooperation with Native allies during the conflict, allies 
who wage a form of “savage frontier warfare” that French officers often found distasteful. The 
author compares this history to contemporary partner forces in place like Afghanistan, who are 
deemed, through comparison to Native people, to be similarly savage and irregular, requiring a 
unique approach that begins with cultural understanding. He argues that “understanding an 
irregular force’s culture is crucial for success.”556 This is another way of saying that irregular 
warfare is a cultural practice, a primitive practice. Irregular warfare is “cultural,” it is backwards, 
and it requires special understanding that focuses on culture and not political context. 
Much of the counterinsurgent culture talk deals with so-called “tribalism.” For these 
writers tribalism creates irregular warfare; in other words, insurgency emanates from the tribal 
(subtext: primitive) social structure of enemies in places like Afghanistan. Perhaps nowhere is 
this culture talk more prominent than the thesis titled “A Study of the Need for Cross-Cultural 
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Capability Development in the Members of the United States Military.” Cultural understanding 
is held up as the solution to the problems of colonial violence, capable of avoiding conflicts like 
the Nez Perce War and the Trail of Tears. Like others, the author emphasizes that 
unconventional or asymmetrical warfare demands a particular approach to culture: 
“Understanding how culture influences the many dimensions of society has become increasingly 
more important as military actions continue to expand outside the margins of symmetrical 
warfare.”557 
The “tribalism” of Native peoples and groups in Afghanistan and Iraq forms the basis for 
these comparisons. As one study argues,  
The American Indian Wars share some similarities with the Global War on Terror. The vast 
number of Indian tribes is comparable to the variety of terrorist groups that make up al 
Qaeda, as well as those groups not affiliated with al Qaeda. Additionally, the diversity of the 
tribal cultures of Indians is similar to the cultural differences faced throughout the Muslim 
world. Just as a Sioux is not a Cheyenne, Cherokee, or Apache, neither is an Arab the same 
as a Persian, Malaysian, or Balkan Muslim.558 
At no point in this study is “tribe” or “tribalism” defined through reference to other scholarship. 
The reference to tribal diversity has the opposite effect, “tribalism” itself being far more 
important than actual differences between Cheyenne and Apache (or Arab and Malaysian 
Muslims). Another study titled “There Shall We Be Also: Tribal Fractures and Auxiliaries in the 
Indian Wars of the Northern Great Plains” elevates conflict with “tribes” to a central component 
of US military history. The author argues that the United States has a continuous history of 
dealing with so-called tribal societies: “From its beginning in the American Revolution to its 
current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States (US) Army has had to deal with tribal 
societies. In order to succeed in tribal societies it is essential that the US Army understand tribal 
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structures and the fractures in tribal societies that present opportunities and possible 
solutions.”559 According to this study the Indian Wars offer perfect examples of tribal warfare to 
draw on: “The Indian Wars on the Great Plains from 1865-1890 clearly demonstrated that natural 
fractures and structures of tribal societies provide opportunities for the use of tribal 
auxiliaries.”560 
The author arrives at the conclusion that tribes are fractured, and therefore open for 
exploitation through their lack of cohesion. This is consistent across many of these documents 
that discuss culture, particularly in the research that discusses the use of Native scouts by the US 
Army. According to the author, tribes are defined by their fractured nature, a lack of cohesion 
that the counterinsurgent can exploit: “One has to look no further than the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to see that tribes play a significant role in current operations. Tribal rivalries and 
competition play a critical role as each tribe decides to support either the insurgency or the 
United States (US). A common technique developed in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the use of 
tribal auxiliaries or militias to assist in providing security and stability.”561 This mirrors the 
frequent incredulity with which US settlers viewed Native resistance: in other words, how come 
Native tribes do not unite against us? This sort of viewpoint divests Native people (and all tribal 
people) of complicated motivating factors based on politics, economics, and more. 
In this same thesis tribalism is linked to counterinsurgency, and insurgency is projected to 
be the future of warfare. Thus, tribalism is the future of warfare: 
The current conflicts and the fact that tribal societies dominate large portions of the world 
indicate that the US Army needs to consider multiple ways to deal with conflict and 
issues in tribal societies. US Army doctrine is lacking when it comes to dealing with 
tribal structures or the possibility of using tribal auxiliaries. It should be an element of 
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any doctrine that discusses counterinsurgency, irregular, or guerilla warfare as tribal 
societies dominate many regions of the world in which the US could use tribal auxiliaries 
to support these styles of warfare. Current doctrine on counterinsurgency, guerilla 
warfare, and foreign internal defense mention the population or indigenous forces as 
critical, but do not go into the depth or discuss how to exploit tribal societies.562 
A thesis titled “Tribal Identity and Conflicts with Tribes” completed at the War College similarly 
argues that tribes are the future of warfare: “the preponderance of conflicts in our nation’s future 
will be against foes of a tribal nature. As such, it is not likely that these tribes will possess the 
assets or size of a nation-state. Understanding the tribal foe, their culture, and unique identity 
will be critical to strategic success for the United States.”563 These tribes are understood to be 
outside of time, history, and politics: “Tribes operate outside modern political, economic, and 
military systems.”564 For this author tribes exist at the fringes of a modernity they oppose. The 
argument is that the US military simply has to understand why tribes do what they do, no matter 
how irrational or barbaric it may be: “One of the issues the nation clearly has difficulties with is 
seeing things as our enemies see them. This is not to say that we should lower ourselves to their 
“barbaric” standards (though that is an option.) Rather we should attempt to understand why they 
do what they do. It is hard to be empathetic with a group that hunts down and tortures members 
of another group - particularly when both groups have the same language and similar customs 
and rituals.”565 Given that these tribal peoples supposedly operate outside the confines of politics 
or economics, the author attempts to apply a cultural frame of analysis to their “barbaric” 
practices. One is left to wonder where that metric leaves the United States. History tells us that 
killing and torture are not restricted to America’s “primitive” enemies.566  
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Some of these military documents take seriously Native resistance to colonialism and 
acknowledge the pressures that resulted from conquest. The writer of a thesis titled 
“Uncomfortable Experience: Lessons Lost in the Apache War” is an example, noting, for 
instance, the influence that the reservation system had on Nazi Germany. But attention to 
conquest only goes so far. While discussing the invasion of Apache land in the southwest the 
author uses “lack of cultural understanding” as the reason that Apache people did not want to be 
removed to remote and unhealthy reservations. Culture becomes another way to get around 
talking about conquest. It is unlikely that greater understandings of Apache culture would have 
prevented Apache resistance to invasion. This sort of analysis is applied to the occupation of 
Iraq, and similar conclusions are drawn: “At the highest levels, the United States’ removal policy 
shares many parallels with the Bush administration’s decision to implement de-Ba’athification 
and disband the Iraqi national army in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom. In both instances, 
the government failed to recognize the implications of their decisions, which were based on 
gross over-simplifications of cultural understanding.”567 One is left to wonder whether the 
presence of several anthropologists in the Bush administration would have resulted in a different 
geopolitical trajectory. It seems unlikely. But the pervasive idea that “cultural understanding” 
can minimize missteps in warfare shows just how deeply rooted counterinsurgency-culture is in 
the legacy of colonialism. Simplistic discussions of culture narrow the frame, reducing largescale 
questions of imperialism and conquest down to communities and individuals. The question 
becomes: “how can we keep them from resisting,” rather than “why are they resisting?” 
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The Quintessential Counterinsurgent  
No frontier officer gets more credit for understanding Native culture than George Crook, 
a US Army General who served all over the United States during the Indian Wars. The editor of 
Crook’s autobiography calls the general “the acknowledged master” of Indian fighting. Robert 
M. Cassidy, a veteran of the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, refers to Crook in his 2008 book 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror as “the quintessential counterguerilla 
leader.568 Crook has proven a popular topic for US military officers that study 
counterinsurgency. He is the focus of more research projects completed by officers than any 
other topic from the Indian Wars and is mentioned in several of the publications from the Global 
War on Terrorism series from the Combat Studies Institute. Crook is something of a 
counterinsurgency legend in military Master’s Thesis projects, a mythical frontier officer that 
demonstrates practical and tangible lessons for modern counterinsurgency. A study from 2001 
titled “General Crook and Counterinsurgency Warfare” argues that “General Crook was one of 
the few senior officers who spent the majority of his military career conducting 
counterinsurgency operations. He left a written record of that history, a record that did not make 
its way into doctrine.”569 Due to this lack of doctrinal continuity, more than a historical lesson, 
Crook is rendered as the precedent for contemporary counterinsurgency warfare. That same 
Master’s Thesis claims that:  
The antecedents of how the U.S. Army conducts its stability and support operations in the 
present day can be directly related to how the military conducted operations against the 
Indians in the nineteenth century. The current emphasis in stability operations on 
mobility, continuous operations, small unit leadership, and self-sufficiency are all directly 
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related to the U.S. Army’s experience fighting the Indians. This continuity of experience 
needs to be understood by the military.570 
But are they directly related? This entire project has focused on how the Indian Wars, while 
exercising a powerful and continuous hold on the US military, failed to make a lasting impact on 
military doctrine during the nineteenth century. This “continuity of experience” did not receive 
broad acknowledgement in the US military until the twenty-first century. Crook even wrote up a 
detailed “resume of operations” that outlined his approach to Indian warfare, defending his use 
of Apache scouts and his actions during the campaigns against Geronimo and the Chiricahua 
Apache. However, the military refused to publish the Resume, recognizing that it was Crook’s 
attempt to defend his actions and unwilling to aggravate an already bitter debate over Crook's 
and Nelson A. Miles’ responsibility for ending Apache military resistance.571 Crook ultimately 
self-published his Resume of Operations Against Apache Indians, 1882-1886 in limited 
quantities, but it has remained a scarce item, and certainly never entered formal US military 
doctrine. 
Nevertheless, contemporary counterinsurgency thinkers hold Crook up as a crucial part of 
America’s counterinsurgency legacy: 
Crook had a clear and definitive set of operational and tactical procedures to conduct 
counterinsurgency operations that he developed through experience and experimentation. 
These counterinsurgency procedures, though never written down or codified, were passed 
on to following generations of army officers as a successful way of conducting a 
counterinsurgency campaign. Whether it is MacArthur on Luzon or Pershing in Moroland 
and Mexico, one can see the outline of Crook’s techniques in these successful campaigns. 
A generation of officers served with Crook in the southwest, where they gained an 
appreciation of the complexities of combating an insurgency and the knowledge on how 
to solve those complexities and gain success in a counterinsurgency environment. This is 
the legacy that Crook left the United States Army.572 
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It is reasonable to assume that officers like MacArthur and Pershing carried an influence from 
Crook’s southwestern campaigns with them across borders and overseas. Many of the officers 
who served under Crook and Miles in the southwest went on to lead the US Army during the 
Spanish-American War, the Philippines-American War, and World War One. But once these 
officers left the military Crook’s knowledge would have left with them, so we can question just 
how much of a legacy Crook left behind. It is more accurate to say that there is a renewed 
interest in George Crook, interest driven by Crook’s reputation as a frontier officer willing to 
take Native cultures seriously.  
Take, for example, this analysis of Crook in a Master’s Thesis completed by a Marine 
Corps Major at the USMC Command and Staff College titled “Redskins in Bluecoats: A 
Strategic and Cultural Analysis of General N/A George Crook's Use of Apache Scouts in the 
Second Apache Campaign, 1882-1886”573:  
During General George Crook's Second Apache Campaign (1882-1886), his unique 
approach to the use of Apache scouts and his culturally sensitive leadership were so 
misunderstood by his contemporaries that it eventually led to his resignation of command 
and the imprisonment of all Chiricahua Apache scouts who faithfully served the US 
Army following General Nelson Miles' successful completion of the Apache 
campaign.574 
The author’s emphasis on culturally sensitive leadership evokes the sort of culture-talk discussed 
in the previous section, providing the basis for Crook’s attractiveness as a historical example of 
counterinsurgency. According to this study, and others, Crook understood Apache people, at 
least more than his peers, making him the ideal counterinsurgency example for the War on 
Terror. As the author notes, this sort of cultural sensitivity is essential in a war with “indigenous 
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peoples” with whom the US military alternates between combat and the provision of 
humanitarian assistance: “The military, as an organization, is more understanding of the cultural 
dimensions of warfare today and how this makes a huge impact on the success of its current 
campaigns.”575 The bulk of the study focuses on Crook’s success utilizing Apache scouts in his 
operations. Crook did not attempt to turn Apache warriors into US soldiers; rather, he utilized 
their unique skills and experience in traveling and tracking in the arid southwest, and they proved 
extremely effective in enabling the US Army to track down and engage resistant Apache 
bands.576 The Army’s use of Native scouts generated plenty of resistance but Crook consistently 
defended the practice, and ultimately was vindicated by the integral role Apache scouts played in 
the final surrender of Geronimo and other Apache holdouts in 1886. As Crook argued in his 
Resume of Operations, “there has never been any success in operations against these Indians, 
unless Indian scouts were used either as auxiliaries or independent of other support.”577 At the 
very least, Crook was able to convince Apache individuals to enlist in the military and serve 
effectively, a cross-cultural step that many of his contemporaries balked at. Crook’s use of scouts 
is given particular weight for the supposedly “cultural” effect they have. As the thesis “Major 
General George Crook's Use of Counterinsurgency Compound Warfare during the Great Sioux 
War of 1876-77” argues, “A highly skilled conventional force fighting an insurgency will often face 
significant cultural, ethnic, linguistic and physical challenges. An irregular, indigenous force can fill 
the gap and meet many of these challenges by working in concert with the conventional force.”578 
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Crook is also famous as one of the more Native-friendly US generals, which, at least 
comparatively speaking, has some basis in reality. For example, when he resumed command of 
the Department of Arizona in 1882 he issued a general order that, among other directives, 
proclaimed that “officers and soldiers serving in the department are reminded that one of the 
fundamental principles of the military character is, justice to all—Indians as well as white men—
and that a disregard of this principle is likely to bring about hostilities, and cause the death of the 
very persons whom they are sent here to protect.”  Crook also ordered his officers to observe 
“the strictest fidelity” and to address Native complaints quickly and fairly.579 
 But we should not exaggerate Crook’s cultural sensitivity. In his Resume of Operations 
he calls the Apache “savage and brutal by instinct” and “tigers of the human race.”580 Similarly, 
in an article for the Journal of the Military Service Institution, Crook, in multiple places, 
compares the Apache to wolves and coyotes: “the Apache can be compared most aptly to the 
wild animal he fittingly calls his cousin—the coyote. The civilized settlements are his sheep-
folds, and even supposing that a toilsome campaign results in destroying forty out of a band of 
fifty, the survivors are as much to be dreaded as ever, until the very last one can be run down, 
killed or got under control, and taught to labor for his bread.”581 Crook certainly was not the only 
American in the late-nineteenth century to denigrate Apache people in racialized, bestial 
language. He was typical in that regard, no matter his reputation as a scholar of Native culture 
and a defender of Indian rights. And that is precisely the point: counterinsurgency culture-talk, 
whether in the nineteenth or twenty-first century, does not necessarily translate into empathy, 
respect, or an erosion of racist caricatures and depictions. And this is a crucial reminder: 
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conquest when prosecuted with greater cultural awareness is still conquest. Strategy is not the 
same as ethics, and cultural understanding does not necessarily translate into empathy. 
According to the contemporary counterinsurgents that lionize Crook, it is the general’s 
adaptability and cultural understanding that led to his success, a blueprint for the modern 
military: “General George Crook’s ability to adapt to his enemy, and his understanding of the 
nuance and context required to fight a war against an unconventional foe, in what amounted to a 
true clash of civilizations, are the lessons that are as applicable to the modern United States 
military as they were on the American frontier.”582 Another study offers greater detail, 
emphasizing Crook’s ability to overcome tactical and cultural barriers posed by differences in 
language, culture, social organization, government, and religion.583 But even these more 
technical descriptions are combined with similarly racialized cultural moves. In a 2003 US Army 
War College Strategy Research Project titled “Lessons Learned from MG George Crook's 
Apache Campaigns with Applicability for the Current Global War on Terror,” we get a particular 
kind of cultural comparison: “Both the historical and current enemies have cadres of fighters 
who believe death in battle is to be sought out and embraced. These fighters make no distinctions 
between military forces and unprotected populations except to seek out vulnerable populations 
and to avoid pitched battles. Both enemies seek to fight a technologically simpler fight, and to do 
so in a manner that seeks to minimize the strengths of US forces.”584 The lesson is that 
understanding Apache people, represented here as death-obsessed obstacles to progress, will lead 
to a smoother form of conquest. This analysis reduces the invasion of Apache land to a clash of 
cultures, with Crook positioned as an expert on Apache people. In Crook the proponents the 
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humanitarian violence of counterinsurgency find a historical precedent. One officer, defending 
Crook’s conduct in the Battle of the Rosebud during the 1876 campaign against the Lakota, 
Northern Cheyenne, and their allies, counters the oft-cited belief that Crook’s strategic blunders 
ultimately resulted in the defeat of Custer at the Little Bighorn. Arguing that Crook’s increasing use 
of Native auxiliaries was key, he argues that “the measure of Crook’s campaign was not whether the 
Sioux were decisively defeated on the battlefield but whether or not the Sioux insurgency was 
defeated. Annihilation and destruction of the Sioux was not the desired endstate. Instead, the 
government’s desired endstate was, as Secretary of War Belknap described, ‘to compel these Indians 
to return to and remain upon their reservation.’”585 However, as I have shown in chapter two, 
strategies that fall squarely into the category of “annihilation” were absolutely compatible with 
compelling Native people to accept reservations. Mass destruction of Native life as a means to gain 
control of Native life became central to US military policy in the nineteenth century.  
Conclusion 
Indian Country, Indian Wars, Indian Country, Indian Wars... Perhaps at times this chapter has 
felt like a vinyl record locked into a single groove, endlessly repeating the same loop. I have 
emphasized this litany of Indian war resonances in order to explore the ways in which colonial 
violence continues to structure American counterinsurgency-culture. Permit me two more utterances 
from these endless Indian Wars. The first comes from Allan R. Millet, a retired Marine Corps 
colonel. In 2001, referring to the difficulties of conducing military operations in the mountainous 
terrain of Afghanistan, he argued that “It’s like shooting missiles at Geronimo… you might get a 
couple of Apaches, but what difference does that make?”586 Here is a juxtaposition of the United 
States’ absurd technological superiority and the disposable life of the Apache/Afghanis. Each 
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Tomahawk cruise missiles costs more than one million dollars, so why bother launching them 
into the mountaintops if all the US military has to show for it are a few enemy casualties, 
particularly if Geronimo/Bin Laden continues to escape? The arithmetic of colonial necropolitics 
allows for such calculations, and Indian people remain the rubric through which US imperialism 
imagines such hostile terrains, impenetrable even to the destruction of flying tomahawks. This is 
Indian Country as the place of imperial intervention, a site of violence and danger, forever the 
frontier of US militarism.  
 This chapter has been almost entirely focused on the ways in which non-Natives have 
twisted and shaped images of Indian people and histories of colonialism to serve the imaginative 
needs of US empire. It seems appropriate to end with a Native voice, in this case a Native 
veteran named Sergeant Eli Painted Crow, who served twenty-two years in the US Army, 
including a final tour in Iraq. The following is an exchange with journalist Amy Goodman on the 
news program Democracy Now! from 2007. 
Amy Goodman: How did you end up becoming a peace activist, Sergeant Painted Crow?  
 
Sgt. Eli Painted Crow: Well, this is very important for me, because being Native, I don’t 
see this as a war, number one. I see this as an invasion that’s committing a genocide to a 
nation, to a people. I see that we are over there, and we are doing the same thing that we 
did here with the indigenous people of this land, calling it democracy, calling it freedom. 
Well, it isn’t freedom if it’s imposed. And what I learned about the Iraqi people, while I 
was there, was they’re very much like the indigenous people here. They have clans, they 
have circles, they have their ceremonies, they have their drum. There are so many 
similarities, and it just really hurt me to realize that here I’m a survivor of this attempted 
genocide on my people — and I say “attempted,” because we’re still here, even though 
they want to say we’re not, we’re erased, we’re not even in the history books —- and 
here I am over there doing the same thing that was done to me, and so I –  
 
Amy Goodman: You said that in the military they refer to Iraq as “Indian country”?  
 
Sgt. Eli Painted Crow: Well, they referred to — what they said in the briefing, they called 
enemy territory “Indian country.” And I’m standing there, just listening to this briefing, 
and I’m just in shock that after all this time, after so many Natives have served and are 
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serving and are dying, that we are still the enemy, even if we’re wearing the same 
uniform. That was very shocking for me to hear.587 
Sergeant Painted Crow’s story about standing in a briefing and hearing the phrase “Indian 
Country” says more than any amount of analysis could. What must it feel like for Native soldiers 
to hear the phrase “Indian Country” while deployed, describing the very territory in which they 
risk life and limb? Historians of North American colonialism often talk about “facing east from 
Indian country,” inverting common narratives of US history in an attempt to capture the 
perspective of Native people facing a settler-invasion.588 Native soldiers serving in places like 
Afghanistan and Iraq face Indian Country from Indian Country, and are uniquely positioned to 
recognize these imperial geographies for what they are: sites of invasion and conquest. 
 I have shown how counterinsurgency theory, particularly during the twenty-first century, 
has relied on comparisons between the Indian Wars and the War on Terror. Indian people have 
been positioned as the eternal-insurgents of US empire, the barbarians at the gate from whom 
counterinsurgency warfare supposedly keeps the world safe. These are comparisons that 
perpetuate colonial narratives of US history and legitimate racialized forms of violence. 
However, Sergeant Painted Crow twists these comparisons in her description of Iraq. Her list of 
similarities between Native North Americans and Iraqis—clans, circles, ceremonies, drums—
serves as a critique of the US invasion and occupation, rather than a blueprint for more effective 
conquest. Iraq is not like Indian Country because it is full of savages, guerilla fighters, rugged 
terrain, and recalcitrant tribal peoples. Iraq is like Indian Country because both have experienced 
the full force of the United States’ militarized imperial power. Sergeant Painted Crow articulates 
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a resonance of Indian Country not as an invocation of empire, but as a critique. In her telling, 
Indian Country is the place where the United States military should not be, the site of invasion, 



















Conclusion: Counterinsurgency at Standing Rock 
2016 was a year of visceral and violent political moments, but few matched the historical 
intensity of the Dakota Access Pipeline protests carried out by the Standing Rock Sioux and their 
allies. Videos and images, many disseminated on social media, showed groups of water-
protectors repeatedly targeted by police and paramilitary security forces with “less than lethal 
weapons.” The images evoked the so-called “Indian Wars” of the nineteenth century and they 
were a reminder of the ongoing violence of US settler-colonialism. Resistance to the pipeline 
forged networks of transnational indigenous solidarity even as the treaty claims of the Standing 
Rock Sioux were at times flattened by an environmentalism discourse that obfuscated Native 
sovereignty. The camps housing water-protectors attracted people from all over the world, 
including hundreds of US military veterans. In a public ceremony on December 5th, 2016, 
following a temporary break in the protests, a group of veterans issued a public apology to 
Native elders: “We came. We fought you. We took your land. We signed treaties that we 
broke.”589 Acutely aware of the role that the US military played in the conquest of Native people, 
these veterans sought to acknowledge that history and received a message of forgiveness from 
Lakota spiritual leader Leonard Crow Dog. After this brief reprieve in December 2016, the 
resistance continued into early 2017, when the protest camps were finally closed down following 
an executive order from newly elected President Donald Trump. In June of 2017 the pipeline 
began transporting oil. 
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Colonialism in the United States defies temporal boundaries, requiring analysis that can 
move fluidly between the past and the present. This project has done that, uncovering a web of 
cultural ideas and material practices that bind together the histories of US colonialism and 
militarism, a history that allows us to conclude that the “Indian Wars” are indeed everywhere, 
geographically and chronologically. The first two chapters of this dissertation showed how US 
settler-colonialism developed and practiced a form of warfare that blended civil governance with 
extreme violence, a “euthanasia politics” that sought to manage what was believed to be the 
inevitable extinction of Native peoples. In contrast to most histories of the “Indian Wars,” I have 
demonstrated that the violence of US continental expansion resulted in a codified doctrine of 
Indian fighting, a sort of proto-counterinsurgency that positioned Native peoples as insurgents in 
their own homelands. These military policies resulted in a series of extremely violent episodes, 
including the massacres at the Washita River in 1868 and the Marias River in 1870.  
At the end of the nineteenth century the “Indian Wars” went global as the US acquired 
overseas territories following the Spanish-American War. Charting these transnational 
connections, in chapters three and four I explored how American soldiers in the Philippines 
imagined themselves as “Indian fighters” and instituted tactics that had been honed on the plains 
and deserts of the western United States. The “Indian wars” emerged as a crucial element of US 
imperial culture, a framework for imagining the violence of an ever-expanding US global power, 
even as the strategic lessons of the nineteenth century were submerged. However, these lessons 
would ultimately reemerge as counterinsurgency moved to the forefront of US military policy in 
the twenty-first century. Chapter five investigated the contemporary military discourse around 
counterinsurgency warfare and the lingering traces of colonialism embedded in it. 
Counterinsurgency theory, particularly during the twenty-first century, has drawn on the history 
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of the “Indian Wars” to better wage the War on Terror. These counterinsurgency policies, which 
refracted outwards from the colonization of North America, have rebounded back into Indian 
Country, as Native people in the United States continue to be viewed as insurgents at places like 
Standing Rock.   
The #NODAPL protests offer a window into the contemporary manifestation of the 
militarized biopolitics I have traced out of these ongoing Indian Wars. The veterans who 
apologized at Standing Rock were likely focused on the military’s role in nineteenth century 
conflicts. But there were contemporary resonances as well. One Native veteran who attended the 
forgiveness ceremony noted that most veterans had received training in the sort of crowd 
suppression techniques used by law enforcement on the protesters at Standing Rock, linking 
domestic repression to the counterinsurgency tactics of the War on Terror: “We know that 
everyone on the other side of that has that training, so they know exactly the damage or the pain 
that they are inflicting.”590 Active-duty members of the military also took note of the historical 
continuities at Standing Rock. As one Army officer at the Command and General Staff College 
put it: 
The United States government still manages the consequences of it [the Indian Wars] today 
through the United States Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs. While 
Native American tribes may no longer have the capacity to fight a protracted insurgency 
against the United States government, significant issues still occur, even as late as 2016, 
demonstrated by the large-scale protests of the Dakota Access pipeline by the Standing Rock 
Sioux.591 
This officer frames ongoing-colonialism as a perpetual counterinsurgency, and the extreme, 
militarized response at Standing Rock is evidence that indigenous sovereignty claims will 
continue to be met with violence. And while this writer mentions Standing Rock, the focus is US 
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counterinsurgency strategy on a global scale. The main thrust of his argument is that the Indian 
Wars offer valuable strategic insight into the War on Terror: “The lessons the Indian Wars 
provide are still salient and must not be lost to posterity, especially for professional military 
study.”592  
It is not coincidental that a Marine Corps officer would be connecting Native people, 
Standing Rock, and counterinsurgency in the year 2017. As I have shown, the US military has 
spent much of the twenty-first century preoccupied with counterinsurgency in response to the 
wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. As officers scrambled to relearn and update the 
counterinsurgency tactics long relegated to the fringes of US military theory, the Indian Wars 
emerged as a historical “success,” an example on which to draw. These conflicts have always 
exercised a powerful cultural hold, particularly in the military. Enemy territory has often been 
“Indian Country,” from the Philippines, to Vietnam, to Iraq.593 US soldiers have imagined their 
enemies as “Indians” and imagined themselves as “Indian fighters,” with the history of 
continental expansion occupying a central place in America’s counterinsurgency-culture. But in 
the last 15+ years, at places like the Combat Studies Institute and the US Army War College, 
“Indian Country” went beyond a series of discursive resonances as officers offered 
recommendations for the War on Terror that attempted to draw strategic lessons from wars with 
Native people. The contemporary military discourse on counterinsurgency warfare now situates 
continental expansion as the earliest, and one of the most effective, examples of this form of 
warfare. 
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Critiques of US imperialism can follow similar tracks through time, tracing historical 
continuities and resonances. It is fair to question the utility of engaging uncritical definitions of 
“counterinsurgency” and “insurgents,” which risk normalizing histories of conquest. However, to 
simply dismiss “counterinsurgency” as a form of semantic colonialism is to miss an opportunity 
to explore the role the colonization of Native peoples has played in shaping patterns of military 
violence. The last thirty years of scholarship in Native American history has convincingly shown 
that Native people were often anything but “insurgents” or “guerillas,” in fact exercising a great 
deal of economic, political, and military power throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.594 Nonetheless, politicians and soldiers defined them as such, and that discursive 
colonialism had violent consequences. In October of 1868 General Philip Sheridan ordered his 
now-infamous subordinate George Custer into the field in pursuit of “the small parties of Indians 
now operating as guerillas” on the southern plains. In fact, these were Cheyenne warriors 
defending their traditional territories, but by referring to them as “guerillas,” a critique of not 
only their tactics but also their political status, Sheridan positioned the Cheyenne as insurgent to 
an already-existing US authority. A month later Custer would massacre a Cheyenne village along 
the Washita River in present-day Oklahoma, part of a broader effort to subordinate the Cheyenne 
to the biopolitical transformations of the reservation system.595 This is just one example of many, 
and we can critique the repression at Standing Rock as part of an ongoing counterinsurgency, 
both domestic and global, that emerged from the period of US continental expansion and has 
continually reemerged at home and overseas.596  
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This complex web of colonial histories played out at Standing Rock: veterans of the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq apologizing on treaty lands as paramilitary forces deployed 
counterterrorism measures against indigenous water-protectors, many of which were themselves 
veterans. Temporal boundaries seemed to blur as if America’s long counterinsurgency had come 
full circle. Private security firm TigerSwan, hired by pipeline builder Energy Transfer Partners to 
disrupt the protests in coordination with law enforcement, utilized a range of counterinsurgency 
tactics against what internal memos described as “an ideologically driven insurgency with a 
strong religious component,” elsewhere noting that the resistance to the pipeline “generally 
followed the jihadist insurgency model while active,” and that “we can expect the individuals 
who fought for and supported it to follow a post-insurgency model after its collapse.” Indeed, 
internal TigerSwan communications referred to future anti-pipeline protests as budding 
insurgencies that had to be met with counterinsurgency efforts: “While we can expect to see the 
continued spread of the anti-DAPL diaspora … aggressive intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield and active coordination between intelligence and security elements are now a proven 
method of defeating pipeline insurgencies.” Pipeline insurgencies. It would be easy to dismiss 
TigerSwan’s rhetoric as alarmist hyperbole, but these are categorizations made by a company 
full of War on Terror veterans, soldiers serving the interests of both state and capital. In a 
disturbing blending of public and private interests, TigerSwan intelligence memos were regularly 
shared with State and Federal law enforcement, and contractors met with investigators from the 
North Dakota Attorney General’s office, and collected evidence that would aid in the prosecution 
of water protectors. 597   
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As the water protectors left the protest camp in February, 2017, TigerSwan continued to 
exaggerate the threat of violence. A memo from TigerSwan to the pipeline company, Energy 
Transfer Partners, warned that “The threat level has dropped significantly. This however does 
not rule out the chance of future attack… As with any dispersion of any insurgency, expect 
bifurcation into splinter groups, looking for new causes.”598 Warning of an “anti-DAPL 
diaspora,” one TigerSwan report predicted a flowering of insurgent cells similar to the aftermath 
of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan:  
The archetype of a jihadist post-insurgency is the aftermath of the anti-Soviet 
Afghanistan jihad. While many insurgents went back to their pre-war lives, many, 
especially the external supporters (foreign fighters), went back out into the world looking 
to start or join new jihadist insurgencies. Most famously this “bleedout” resulted in 
Osama bin Laden and the rise of Al Qaeda, but the jihadist veterans of Afghanistan also 
ended up fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, North Africa, and Indonesia, among other 
places.599 
Portraying pipeline protesters as terrorists was not a stretch, at least for US law enforcement, 
despite TigerSwan’s seemingly exaggerated comparisons to Al Qaeda. The repression and 
surveillance of so-called “eco-terrorists” in the years after 9/11 was widespread, and included the 
Animal Liberation Front, the Earth Liberation Front, Greenpeace, the Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society, PETA, and others. TigerSwan easily grouped the #NODAPL movement 
within the “eco-terrorist” umbrella, and company leaders continued to compare anti-pipeline 
protesters all over the United States to Islamic terrorists.600 If the conduct of TigerSwan, other 
private security firms, and both local and federal law enforcement during anti-pipeline protests is 
any indication, “counterinsurgency” is becoming one of the dominant paradigms through which 
law enforcement views domestic protest and civil disobedience, particularly in Indian Country. 
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More than a year after the end of the #NODAPL protests, in September of 2018, the Department 
of Justice held an anti-terrorism training in Montana, likely in preparation for possible Native-led 
protest of the Keystone XL oil pipeline. Montana law enforcement agencies and state officials 
also worked with their counterparts in North Dakota to learn how to combat indigenous water-
protractors and their allies.601 Perhaps we have entered the era of pipeline-insurgencies. 
TigerSwan’s counterinsurgency against Native water protectors and their allies returns us 
once more to the paradox at the center of this project, namely the consistent way in which Native 
people in the United States have been positioned as “insurgents” in their own homelands for 
hundreds of years. As one Army officer argued in 2003: 
Both the Apaches and the Islamists possess a charismatic group of leaders. The Apaches 
were led by Cochise, Natchez, Victorio, Geronimo and others, names that still echo 
throughout the world. Today the leaders include Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar… all 
these historical and current leaders preach a fantasy ideology that seek to have the US 
depart from “their” territories and for “the people” to return to an imagined life that is 
forever gone.”602 
Comparisons like these point to the enduring hold that Native people have on US culture as the 
always-enemies haunting the edges of the American imaginary. But they also call attention to the 
role settler-colonialism played in the development of proto-counterinsurgent ideologies that 
disavow indigenous sovereignty in favor of a biopolitical claim of ownership over Native lives. 
This is the intertwined history of cultural attitudes and political processes I have detailed in this 
project: “their” territory is only an illusion; their “way of life” has disappeared, and they have 
been reduced to a simulation, stereotype, or representation. The existence of Native nations is 
branded a fantasy ideology, and Native life, divested of its indigeneity, is claimed by the state. It 
is the persistence of such attitudes towards Native people that this project has tried to push back 
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against, flipping “counterinsurgency” from a definition to a mode of critique that can account for 
the material and discursive effects of US colonialism. Counterinsurgency as a form of critique 
works to show how the US government and capital have a vested interest in continuing the 
centuries-long process of eroding and eliminating Native sovereignty.   
In contrast to such blatant disavowals of Native sovereignty, the water-protectors at 
Standing Rock attempted to mobilize their own biopolitical discourse through the slogan “water 
is life,” but ran headlong into a far more entrenched biopower embedded in the colonial 
mechanisms by which the US continues to regulate the lives of Native peoples. A similar 
relationship exists between the assertion that “Black Lives Matter,” and the response from police 
and politicians that “security matters more” (to say nothing of the slogan “Blue Lives 
Matter”).603 In this project biopower has been a menacing and often violent theoretical 
framework, one that helps illuminate the ways in which individual Native lives and entire Native 
populations have been rendered, at different times, as killable, changeable, disposable, invisible, 
and hyper-visible, subjected to particular forms of state violence.  
In contrast, #NODAPL and Black Lives Matter seem to both invoke what Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri call a “power of life by which we defend and seek our freedom,” a biopolitics 
not of control, but of emancipatory potential, of the production of alternative subjectivities 
unbound by regimes of discipline, security, and repression. For Hardt and Negri biopolitics is a 
site of struggle, and not a totalizing force.604 What is at stake in these competing discourses is the 
political meanings and values attached to “life.” Water-protectors defend the increasingly 
precarious role that natural resources play in sustaining human beings. Black Lives Matter 
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challenges the disposability of black bodies in the face generations of anti-black racism. In 
contrast, the normalization of counterinsurgency, at home and abroad, has further embedded 
biopolitics into the mechanisms of war, policing, and social control.605 “Life” under 
counterinsurgency is both under-threat and under-control; counterinsurgency mobilizes threats to 
life as a justification for the violence of security, and targets life as the object of military 
intervention. Under counterinsurgency, war not only makes the world safe, it makes the world, 
attempting to shape individual subjectivities, populations, and environments.606 In this world, 
water matters less than capital, and Black lives remain disposable under the United States’ 
racialized systems of security and control. As the archetypal “savages” of the Western colonial 
imaginary, Native people have been integral to the counterinsurgency discourses that define the 
world as dangerous, in need of intervention. “Indian Country” continues to be a threat, and its 
inhabitants continue to be targeted with the violent reforms of counterinsurgency. 
It is appropriate that I would conclude this project with a discussion of #NODAPL and 
the repression at Standing Rock. The population-centric warfare that dominated US 
counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan was reduced under the Obama 
administration, which saw the expansion of special operations under the Joint Special Operations 
Command and an increase in drone warfare, a further mechanization of warfare that stood in 
stark contrast to the intimate, community-based counterinsurgency championed by Petraeus and 
other COINdinistas during the Bush administration and the early part of the Obama 
administration. Instead of committing to large-scale developmental warfare and long-term 
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deployment of troops, President Obama’s counterterrorism strategy combined drones and Special 
Forces with an emphasis on foreign partnerships. This meant working “by, with, and through” 
the governments in the countries the United States sought to intervene, a practice Laleh Khalili 
calls indirect rule, a common feature of imperial counterinsurgencies during the twentieth 
century. 607 And, for all his rhetoric about travel bans and border walls, the Trump presidency has 
largely continued this commitment to indirect rule while expanding the military’s ability to 
conduct air strikes and drone attacks.608 If these trends continue then US global power may 
become increasingly diffuse, if no less decisive. What remains consistent is the invisibility of 
ongoing settler-colonialism. In a recent speech regarding Middle East policy in Cairo, Trump’s 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that “For those who fret about the use of American 
power, remember this: America has always been, and always will be, a liberating force, not an 
occupying power… when the mission is over, when the job is complete, America leaves.”609 The 
United States remains committed in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the war in Afghanistan recently 
entering its seventeenth year, but the true hypocrisy of Pompeo’s claim is located in Indian 
Country, an occupation that numbers in the hundreds of years.  
 It remains unclear where American warfare, and counterinsurgency in particular, is 
headed. It is possible the strategies championed by the Counterinsurgency Field Manual a 
decade ago will fade away in the face of technological advances, as drones and yet-undreamed 
innovations continue to change the shape of warfare. However, similar arguments were made in 
the 1990’s, and that did not prevent the US military from deploying large numbers of troops to 
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sustained (and in the case of Afghanistan, still ongoing) wars and occupations. As has been the 
case throughout US history, the current “America first” nationalist rhetoric will likely prove 
compatible with a robust global imperialism. Which brings us back to Standing Rock. Perhaps 
we know exactly where counterinsurgency is headed: once more into Indian Country, into the 
police departments of American cities, and into the ranks of private security firms promoting the 
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